Aristotle
xix.: the older editions placed the words preceding [Greek: peri\
de\] in ch. xviii. Zabarella observes the transition to a new subject
(Comm. ad Analyt. Post. II. ch. xv. p. 640):--"Postremum hoc caput
(beginning at [Greek: peri\ de\]) extra primariam tractationem
positum esse manifestum est: quum præcesserit epilogus respondens
prooemio quod legitur in initio primi libri Priorum Analyticorum."]
Aristotle has already laid down that there can be no Demonstration
without certain _præcognita_ to start from; and that these
_præcognita_ must, in the last resort, be _principia_ undemonstrable,
immediately known, and known even more accurately than the
conclusions deduced from them. Are they then cognitions, or cognizant
habits and possessions, born along with us, and complete from the
first? This is impossible (Aristotle declares); we cannot have such
valuable and accurate cognitions from the first moments of childhood,
and yet not be at all aware of them. They must therefore be acquired;
yet how is it possible for us to acquire them?[63] The fact is, that,
though we do not from the first possess any such complete and
accurate cognitions as these, we have from the first an inborn
capacity or potentiality of arriving at them. And something of the
same kind belongs to all animals.[64] All of them possess an
apprehending and discriminating power born with them, called Sensible
Perception; but, though all possess such power, there is this
difference, that with some the act of perception dwells for a longer
or shorter time in the mind; with others it does not. In animals with
whom it does not dwell, there can be no knowledge beyond perception,
at least as to all those matters wherein perception is evanescent;
but with those that both perceive and retain perceptions in their
minds, ulterior knowledge grows up.[65] There are many such retentive
animals, and they differ among themselves: with some of them reason
or rational notions arise out of the perceptions retained; with
others, it is not so. First, out of perception arises memory; next,
out of memory of the same often repeated, arises experience, since
many remembrances numerically distinct are summed up into one
experience. Lastly, out of experience, or out of the universal
notion, the _unum et idem_ which pervades and characterizes a
multitude of particulars, when it has taken rest and root in the
mind, there arises the _principium_ of art and science: of science,
in respect to objects existent; of art, in respect to things
generable.[66] And thus these mental habits or acquirements neither
exist in our minds determined from the beginning, nor do they spring
from other acquirements of greater cognitive efficacy. They spring
from sensible perception; and we may illustrate their growth by what
happens in the panic of a terrified host, where first one runaway
stops in his flight, then a second, then a third, until at last a
number docile to command is collected. One characteristic feature of
the mind is to be capable of this process.[67]
[Footnote 63: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 25-30: [Greek:
po/teron ou)k e)nou=sai ai( e(/xeis e)ggi/nontai, ê)\ e)nou=sai
lelê/thasin. ei) me\n dê\ e)/chomen au)ta/s, a)/topon; sumbai/nei
ga\r a)kribeste/ras e)/chontas gnô/seis a)podei/xeôs lantha/nein; ei)
de\ lamba/nomen mê\ e)/chontes pro/teron, pô=s a)\n gnôri/zoimen kai\
mantha/noimen e)k mê\ prou+parchou/sês gnô/seôs?] Compare, supra,
Analyt. Post. I. iii. p. 72, b. 20-30; Metaphys. A. ix. p. 993, a. 1,
with the Comment. of Alexander, p. 96, Bonitz.]
[Footnote 64: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 99, b. 30: [Greek: phanero\n
toi/nun ou)/t' e)/chein oi(=o/n te, ou)/t' a)gnoou=si kai\ mêdemi/an
e)/chousin e(/xin e)ggi/nesthai; a)na/gkê a)/ra e)/chein me/n tina
du/namin, mê\ toiau/tên d' e)/chein ê)\ e)/stai tou/tôn timiôte/ra
kat' a)kri/beian. phai/netai de\ tou=to/ ge pa=sin u(pa/rchon toi=s
zô/|ois.]]
[Footnote 65: Analyt. Post II. xix. p. 99, b. 37: [Greek: o(/sois
me\n ou)=n mê\ e)ggi/netai, ê)\ o(/lôs ê)\ peri\ a(\ mê\ e)ggi/netai,
ou)k e)/sti tou/tois gnô=sis e)/xô tou= ai)stha/nesthai; e)n oi(=s d'
e)/nestin ai)sthanome/nois e)/chein e)/ti e)n tê=| psuchê=|. pollô=n
de\ toiou/tôn ginome/nôn ê)/dê diaphora/ tis gi/netai, ô(/ste toi=s
me\n gi/nesthai lo/gon e)k tê=s tô=n toiou/tôn monê=s, toi=s de\
mê/.] Compare Analyt. Poster. I. p. 81, a. 38, seq., where the
dependence of Induction on the perceptions of sense is also affirmed.
See Themistius, pp. 50-51, ed. Spengel. The first chapter of the
Metaphysica (p. 981), contains a striking account of this generation
of universal notions from memory and comparison of sensible
particulars: [Greek: gi/netai de\ te/chnê, o(/tan e)k pollô=n tê=s
e)mpeiri/as e)nnoêma/tôn mi/a katho/lou ge/nêtai peri\ tô=n o(moi/ôn
u(po/lêpsis] ("_intellecta similitudo"_). Also in the Physica VII. p.
247, b. 20 (in the Paraphrase of Themistius, as printed in the Berlin
edition, at bottom of page): [Greek: e)k ga\r tê=s kata\ me/ros
e)mpeiri/as tê\n katho/lou lamba/nomen e)pistê/mên.]]
[Footnote 66: Analyt Post II. xix. p. 100, a. 3-10: [Greek: e)k me\n
ou)=n ai)sthê/seôs gi/netai mnê/mê, ô(/sper le/gomen, e)k de\ mnê/mês
polla/kis tou= au)tou= ginome/nês e)mpeiri/a; ai( ga\r pollai\
mnê=mai tô=| a)rithmô=| e)mpeiri/a mi/a e)sti/n. e)k d' e)mpeiri/as,
ê)\ e)k panto\s ê)remê/santos tou= katho/lou e)n tê=| psuchê=|, tou=
e(no\s para\ ta\ polla/, o(\ a)\n e)n a(/pasin e(\n e)nê=| e)kei/nois
to\ au)to/, te/chnês a)rchê\ kai\ e)pistê/mês; e)a\n me\n peri\
ge/nesin, te/chnês, e)a\n de\ peri\ to\ o)/n, e)pistê/mês.]
A theory very analogous to this (respecting the gradual generation of
scientific universal notions in the mind out of the particulars of
sense) is stated in the Phædon of Plato, ch. xlv. p. 96, B., where
Sokrates reckons up the unsuccessful tentatives which he had made in
philosophy: [Greek: kai\ po/teron to\ ai(=ma/ e)stin ô(=|
phronou=men, ê)\ o( a)ê\r, ê)\ to\ pu=r, ê)\ tou/tôn me\n ou)de/n, o(
de\ e)gke/phalo/s e)stin o( ta\s ai)sthê/seis pare/chôn tou=
a)kou/ein kai\ o(pa=n kai\ o)sphrai/nesthai, e)k _tou/tôn de\
gi/gnoito mnê/mê kai\ do/xa_, e)k _de\ mnê/mês kai\ do/xês, labou/sês
to\ ê)remei=n, kata\ tau=ta gi/gnesthai e)pistê/mên_.]
Boethius says, Comm. in Ciceronis Topica, p. 805:--"Plato ideas
quasdam esse ponebat, id est, species incorporeas, substantiasque
constantes et per se ab aliis naturæ ratione separatas, ut hoc ipsum
_homo_, quibus participantes cæteræ res homines vel animalia fierent.
At vero Aristoteles nullas putat extra esse substantias; sed
_intellectam similitudinem plurimorum inter se differentium
substantialem_, genus putat esse vel speciem. Nam cum homo et equus
differunt rationabilitate et irrationabilitate, horum _intellecta
similitudo_ efficit genus. Ergo communitas quædam et plurimorum inter
se differentium similitudo _notio_ est; cujus notionis aliud _genus_
est, aliud _forma_. Sed quoniam _similium intelligentia_ est omnis
notio, in rebus vero similibus necessaria est differentiarum
discretio, idcirco indiget notio quadam enodatione ac divisione;
velut ipse intellectus animalis sibi ipsi non sufficit," &c.
The phrase _intellecta similitudo plurimorum_ embodies both Induction
and Intellection in one. A like doctrine appears in the obscure
passages of Aristotle, De Animâ, III. viii. p. 429, b. 10; also p.
432, a. 3: [Greek: o( nou=s, ei)=dos ei)dô=n, kai\ ê( ai)/sthêsis,
ei)=dos ai)sthêtô=n. e)pei\ de\ ou)de\ pra=gma ou)the/n e)sti para\
ta\ mege/thê, ô(s dokei=, ta\ ai)sthêta\ kechôrisme/non, e)n toi=s
ei)/desi toi=s ai)sthêtoi=s ta\ noêta/ e)stin.]]
[Footnote 67: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 10-14: [Greek: ou)/te
dê\ e)nupa/rchousin a)phôrisme/nai ai( e(/xeis, ou)/t' a)p' a)/llôn
e(/xeôn gi/nontai gnôrimôte/rôn, a)ll' a)po\ ai)sthê/seôs,--ê( de\
psuchê\ u(pa/rchei toiau/tê ou)=sa oi(/a du/nasthai pa/schein
tou=to.]
The varieties of intellectual [Greek: e(/xeis] enumerated by
Aristotle in the sixth book of the Nikomachean Ethica, are elucidated
by Alexander in his Comment. on the Metaphysica. (A. p. 981) pp. 7,
8, Bonitz. The difference of [Greek: e(/xis] and [Greek: dia/thesis],
the durable condition as contrasted with the transient, is noted in
Categoriæ, pp. 8, 9. See also Eth. Nikom. II. i. ii. pp 1103, 4.]
Aristotle proceeds to repeat the illustration in clearer terms--at
least in terms which he thinks clearer.[68] We perceive the
particular individual; yet sensible perception is of the universal in
the particular (as, for example, when Kallias is before us, we
perceive man, not the man Kallias). Now, when one of a set of
particulars dwells some time in the mind, first an universal notion
arises; next, more particulars are perceived and detained, and
universal notions arise upon them more and more comprehensive, until
at last we reach the highest stage--the most universal and simple.
From Kallias we rise to man; from such and such an animal, to animal
_in genere_; from animal _in genere_, still higher, until we reach
the highest or indivisible genus.[69] Hence it is plain that the
first and highest _principia_ can become known to us only by
Induction; for it is by this process that sensible perception builds
up in us the Universal.[70] Now among )those intellective habits or
acquirements, whereby we come to apprehend truth, there are some
(Science and Noûs) that are uniformly and unerringly true, while
others (Opinion and Ratiocination) admit an alternative of
falsehood.[71] Comparing Science with Noûs, the latter, and the
latter only, is more accurate and unerring than Science. But all
Science implies demonstration, and all that we know by Science is
conclusions deduced by demonstration. We have already said that the
_principia_ of these demonstrations cannot be themselves
demonstrated, and therefore cannot be known by Science; we have also
said that they must be known more accurately than the conclusions.
How then can these _principia_ themselves be known? They can be known
only by Noûs, and from particulars. It is from the _principia_ known
by Noûs, with the maximum of accuracy, that Science demonstrates her
conclusions. Noûs is the great _principium_ of Science.[72]
[Footnote 68: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 14: [Greek: o(\ d'
_e)le/chthê me\n pa/lai_, ou) saphô=s de\ e)le/chthê, pa/lin
ei)/pômen.]
Waitz supposes that Aristotle here refers to a passage in the first
book of the Analytica Posteriora, c. xxxi. p. 87, b. 30. M.
Barthélemy St. Hilaire thinks (p. 290) that reference is intended to
an earlier sentence of this same chapter. Neither of these
suppositions seems to suit (least of all the last) with the meaning
of [Greek: pa/lai]. But whichever he meant, Aristotle has not done
much _to clear up_ what was obscure in the antecedent statements.]
[Footnote 69: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, a. 15: [Greek: sta/ntos
ga\r tô=n a)diapho/rôn e(no/s, prô=ton me\n e)n tê=| psuchê=|
katho/lou (kai\ ga\r ai)sthêsis tou= katho/lou e)sti/n, oi(=on
a)nthrô/pou, a)ll' ou) Kalli/ou a)nthrô/pou) pa/lin d' e)n tou/tois
i(/statai, _e(/ôs a)\n ta\ a)merê= stê=| kai\ ta\ katho/lou_, oi(=on
toiondi\ zô=|on, e(/ôs zô=|on; kai\ e)n tou/tô| ô(sau/tôs.]
These words are obscure: [Greek: ta\ a)merê=] must mean the highest
genera; indivisible, _i.e._ being a _minimum_ in respect of
_comprehension_. Instead of [Greek: ta\ katho/lou], we might have
expected [Greek: ta\ ma/lista katho/lou], or, perhaps, that [Greek:
kai\] should be omitted. Trendelenburg comments at length on this
passage, Arist. De Animâ Comment. pp. 170-174.]
[Footnote 70: Analyt. Post. II. xix. p. 100, b. 3: [Greek: dê=lon dê\
o(/ti ê(mi=n ta\ prô=ta e)pagôgê=| gnôri/zein a)nagkai=on; kai\ ga\r
kai\ ai)/sthêsis ou(/tô to\ katho/lou e)mpoiei=.] Compare, supra,