Aristotle
in which the thesis set up declares the predicate as Proprium of the
subject.
A Proprium may belong to its subject either _per se_ and _semper_, or
relatively to something else and occasionally or sometimes. It is a
proprium _per se_ of man to be an animal by nature tractable. It is a
relative proprium of the soul in regard to the body, to exercise
command; of the body in regard to the soul, to obey command. It is a
proprium _semper_ of a god, to be immortal; it is an occasional
_proprium_ (_i.e._, sometimes) of this or that man, to be walking in
the market-place.[202] When the proprium is set out relatively to
something else, the debate must involve two questions, and may
involve four. Thus, if the thesis affirms that it is a proprium of
man relatively to horse (discriminating man from horse) to be by
nature two-footed, you may (as opponent) either deny that man is
two-footed, or affirm that horse is two-footed; or you may go farther
and affirm that man is by nature four-footed, or deny that horse is
by nature four-footed. If you can succeed in showing any one of these
four, you will have refuted the thesis.[203]
[Footnote 202: Ibid. V. i. p. 128, b. 14-21. That which Aristotle
calls Proprium _per se_ is a proprium of the subject as much
_relative_ as what he calls specially the _relative_ Proprium. The
Proprium _per se_ discriminates the subject from everything else; the
_relative_ Proprium discriminates it from some given correlate.]
[Footnote 203: Topic. V. i. p. 128, b. 22-33.]
The Proprium _per se_ discriminates its subject from everything else,
and is universally true thereof; the _relative_ Proprium
discriminates its subject only from some other assignable subject.
The relative Proprium may be either constant and universally true, or
true with exceptions--true and applicable in the ordinary course of
things: it may be tested through those _Loci_ which have been
enumerated as applicable to the Accident. The Proprium _per se_, and
the _constant_ Proprium, have certain _Loci_ of their own, which we
shall now indicate. These are the most logical (_sensu Aristotelico_)
or suitable for Dialectic; furnishing the most ample matter for
debates.[204]
[Footnote 204: Ibid. b. 34-p. 129, a. 35. [Greek: tô=n d' i)di/ôn
e)sti\ _lo/gika\_ ma/lista;] &c. He explains presently what he means
by [Greek: logika/--logiko\n de\ tou=t' e)sti\ pro/blêma, pro\s o(\
lo/goi ge/noit' a)\n kai\ suchnoi\ kai\ kaloi/]. The distinctions in
this paragraph are not very sharply drawn.]
Aristotle distinguishes (1) those cases in which the alleged proprium
is a true proprium, but is incorrectly or informally set out in the
thesis, from those (2) in which it is untruly predicated, or is no
proprium at all.
To set out a proprium well, that which is predicated ought to be
clearer and better known than the subject of which it is predicated,
since the purpose of predicating the proprium is to communicate
knowledge.[205] If it be more obscure or less known, you may impugn
the thesis as bad in form, or badly set out. Thus, if the thesis
declare, as a proprium of fire, that fire is of all things the most
like to the soul, this is not well set out, because the essence of
the soul is not so well known as the essence of fire. Moreover, the
fact that the predicate belongs to the subject, ought to be better
known even than the subject itself; for whoever is ignorant that A
belongs to B at all, cannot possibly know that A is the proprium of
B.[206] Thus, if the thesis declare, as proprium of fire, that it is
the first or most universal subject in which it is the nature of soul
to be found, the predicate is here doubly unknowable: first, the
hearer does not know that the soul is found in fire at all; next, he
does not know that fire is the _first_ subject in which soul is
found. On the other hand, the respondent will repel your attack if he
can show that his proprium is more knowable in both the two
above-mentioned ways. If, for example, he declares as thesis, To have
sensible perception is the proprium of an animal, here the proprium
is both well known in itself, and well known as belonging to the
given subject. Accordingly, it is well set out, as far as this
condition is concerned.[207]
[Footnote 205: Ibid. p. 129, b. 7: [Greek: gnô/seôs ga\r e(/neka to\
i)/dion poiou/metha; dia\ gnôrimôte/ron ou)=n a)podote/on; ou(/tô
ga\r e)/stai katanoei=n i(kanô=s ma=llon.]
He repeats the same dictum, substantially, in the next page, p. 130,
a. 4: [Greek: to\ ga\r i)/dion tou= mathei=n cha/rin a)podi/dotai];
and, again, p. 131, a. 1.]
[Footnote 206: Ibid. b. 15: [Greek: o( mê\ ga\r ei)dô\s ei) tô=|d'
u(pa/rchei, ou)d' ei) tô=|d' u(pa/rchei mo/nô| gnôriei=.]]
[Footnote 207: Topic. V. ii. p. 129, b. 21-29.]
A second condition of its being well set out is, that it shall
contain neither equivocal term nor equivocal or amphibolical
proposition. Thus, if the thesis declares, To perceive is the
proprium of an animal, it is equivocal; for it may mean either to
have sensible perception, or to exercise sensible perception
actually. You may apply the test to such a thesis, by syllogizing
from one or both of these equivocal meanings. The respondent will
make good his defence, if he shows that there is no such
equivocation: as, for example, if the thesis be, It is a proprium of
fire to be the body most easily moved into the upper region; where
there is no equivocation, either of term or proposition.[208]
Sometimes the equivocation may be, not in the name of the proprium
itself, but in the name of the subject to which it is applied. Where
this last is not _unum et simplex_ but equivocal, the thesis must
specify which among the several senses is intended; and, if that be
neglected, the manner of setting out is incorrect.[209]
[Footnote 208: Ibid. b. 30-p. 130, a. 13.]
[Footnote 209: Ibid. p. 130, a. 15-28.]
Another form of the like mistake is, where the same term is repeated
both in the predicate and in the subject; which is often done, both
as to Proprium and as to Definition, though it is a cause of
obscurity, as well as a tiresome repetition.[210] The repetition may
be made in two ways: either directly, by the same term occurring
twice; or indirectly, when the second term given is such that it
cannot be defined without repeating the first. An example of direct
repetition is, Fire is a _body_ the rarest among _bodies_ (for
proprium of fire). An example of indirect repetition is, Earth is a
_substance_ which tends most of all _bodies_ downwards to the lowest
region (as proprium of earth); for, when the respondent is required
to define _bodies_, he must define them--such and such
_substances_.[211] An example free from objection on this ground is,
Man is an animal capable of receiving cognition (as proprium of man).
[Footnote 210: Ibid. a. 30-34. [Greek: tara/ttei ga\r to\n a)kou/onta
pleona/kis lechthe/n--kai\ pro\s tou/tois a)doleschei=n dokou=sin.]]
[Footnote 211: Ibid. a. 34-b. 5. [Greek: e(/n ga\r kai\ tau)to/n
e)sti sô=ma kai\ ou)si/a toiadi/; e)/stai **ga\r ou(=tos to\
_ou)si/a_ pleona/kis ei)rêkô/s.]]
Another mode of bad or incorrect setting out is, when the term
predicated as proprium belongs not only to the subject, but also to
all other subjects. Such a proposition is useless; for it furnishes
no means of discriminating the subject from anything; whereas
discrimination is one express purpose of the Proprium as well as of
the Definition.[212] Again, another mode is, when the thesis declares
several propria belonging to the same subject, without announcing
that they are several. As the definer ought not to introduce into his
definition any words beyond what are required for declaring the
essence of the subject, so neither should the person who sets out a
proprium add any words beyond those requisite for constituting the
proprium. Thus, if the thesis enunciates, as proprium of fire, that
it is the thinnest and lightest body, here are two propria instead of
one. Contrast with this another proprium, free from the objection
just pointed out--Moist is that which may assume every variety of
figure.[213]
[Footnote 212: Topic. V. ii. p. 130, b. 12: [Greek: a)chrei=on
**ga\r e)/stai to\ mê\ chôri/zon a)po/ tinôn, **to\ d' e)n
toi=s i)di/ois lego/menon chôri/zein dei=, katha/per kai\ ta\ e)n
toi=s o(/rois.]]
[Footnote 213: Ibid. b. 23-37.]
A farther mistake is, when the predicate declaring the proprium
includes either the subject itself or some species comprehended under
the subject; for example, when we are told, as a proprium of animal,
that animal is a substance of which man is a species. We have already
seen that the proprium ought to be better known than its subject; but
man is even less known (posterior in respect to cognition) than
animal, because it is a species under the genus animal.[214]
[Footnote 214: Ibid. iii. p. 130, b. 38.]
Again, our canon--That the Proprium should be better known than its
subject, or should make the subject better known--will be violated in
another way, if the proprium enunciated be something opposite to the
subject, or in any other way _simul naturâ_ as compared with the
subject; and still more, if it be _posterius naturâ_ as compared with
the subject. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of good, that
good is that which is most opposite to evil, his proprium will not be
well or correctly set out.[215]
[Footnote 215: Ibid. p. 131, a. 12-26. This _locus_ is not clear or
satisfactory, as Alexander remarks in Scholia (p. 284, b. 12-23,
Br.). He says that it may pass as an [Greek: e)/ndoxon]--something
sufficiently plausible to be employed in Dialectic. In fact,
Alexander virtually controverts this _locus_ in what he says a little
farther down (Schol. p. 285, a. 31), that the Proprium is always
_simul naturâ_ with its subject.]
Perhaps, again, the thesis may enunciate as proprium what is not
constantly appurtenant to the subject, but is sometimes absent
therefrom; or, intending to enunciate an occasional proprium, it may
omit to specify the qualifying epithet _occasional_. In either case
the proprium is not well set out, and a ground is furnished for
censure, which ought always to be avoided.[216]
[Footnote 216: Topic. V. iii. p. 131, a. 27-b. 18. [Greek: ou)k
e)/stai kalô=s kei/menon to\ i)/dion--ou)/koun dote/on e)sti\n
e)pitimê/seôs skê=psin.]]
Moreover, the proprium will not be well set out, if it be such as
does not necessarily belong to the subject, but is only shown by the
evidence of sense to belong thereunto. In this case, when the subject
is out of the reach of sensible perception, no one knows whether the
supposed proprium still continues as its attribute. Thus, suppose the
thesis to enunciate as a proprium of the sun, that it is the
brightest star borne in movement above the earth: the fact that it is
so borne in movement above the earth is one that we know by sensible
perception only; accordingly, after the sun sets and we cease to see
it, we cannot be sure that it continues to be borne in movement. If a
proprium knowable as such by sense be chosen, it ought to be one
which is also knowable independently, as belonging to the subject by
necessity. Thus, if a man enunciates, as proprium of superficies,
that superficies is what first becomes coloured or first receives
colour, this is a proprium well set out. For we know clearly that it
must always belong to a superficies; though we may also obtain the
additional evidence of sense, by looking at some perceivable
body.[217]
[Footnote 217: Ibid. b. 19-36. [Greek: oi(=on e)pei\ o( the/menos
e)piphanei/as i)/dion o(\ prô=ton ke/chrôstai, ai)sthêtô=| me/n tini
_proske/chrêtai_ tô=| kechrô=sthai, _toiou/tô| d' o(\ phanero/n
e)stin u(pa/rchon a)ei/_, ei)/ê a)\n kata\ tou=to kalô=s