Aristotle
to that class which Aristotle had discussed before, at the
commencement of Book V.]
[Footnote 255: Ibid. p. 139, a. 1-8.]
24. _Locus_ from the Superlative:--Suppose the affirmation to be, It
is a proprium of fire to be the lightest of all bodies: this you may
refute by showing that, if fire ceased to exist, there would still be
some other body the lightest of all bodies. Therefore the proprium
may still be predicated of something else, when its alleged subject
has ceased to exist. The proprium and its subject are not
reciprocating and co-extensive; therefore it is not a true
proprium.[256]
[Footnote 256: Ibid. a. 9-20.]
VI.
We now enter on the Sixth Book, containing the _Loci_ bearing on
Definition. In debates respecting Definition, there are five points
on any of which the attack and defence may turn:--[257]
1. That which the definer enunciates as a definition may not be true
at all, even as a predicate of the definiend or subject to be
defined; or at least not true of everything that bears the name of
the subject.
2. The definiend may have been included in a genus, but not in that
genus to which it rightly and specially belongs.
3. The definition given may not be specially appropriate to the
definiend (_i.e._, it may include, not only that but, other matters
besides).
4. The definition, though unobjectionable on any of the above three
grounds, may nevertheless not declare the Essence of the definiend.
5. Lastly, the definition may be good in substance, but badly
expressed or set out.
[Footnote 257: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 24-35: [Greek: tê=s de\ peri\
tou\s o(/rous pragmatei/as me/rê pe/nte e)sti/n.]]
As to the first of these five heads, the _Loci_ bearing thereupon
have already been enumerated in the Third Book, on Accident: in
accidental predications the question raised is always about the truth
or falsehood of the predication.[258] As to the second and third of
the five heads, these have been dealt with in the Fourth and Fifth
Books, enumerating the _Loci_ on Genus and Proprium.[259]
[Footnote 258: Topic. VI. i. p. 139, a. 36.]
[Footnote 259: Ibid. b. 3.]
There remain the fourth and fifth heads, on which we are about to
enter: (1) Whether the definition is well expressed or set out (the
fifth head); (2) Whether it has any right to be called a definition
at all, _i.e._, whether it declares the Essence of the subject (the
fourth).[260] The fifth is taken first, because to do a thing well is
always more difficult than to do it simply, and is therefore likely
to afford greater opening for argumentative attack.
[Footnote 260: Ibid. b. 6.]
The definition, while unobjectionable in substance, may be badly set
out in two ways. First, it may be indistinct in terms--not plain nor
clear. Next, it may be redundant: the terms may include more than is
required for the definition. Under each of these defects of
expression several _loci_ may be indicated.[261]
[Footnote 261: Ibid. b. 12-18.]
1. Indistinctness may arise from the employment of equivocal terms in
the definition. Or it may arise from the term to be defined being
itself equivocal; while the definer, taking no notice of such
equivocation, has tried to comprehend all its senses under one and
the same definition. You may attack him either by denying that the
definition as given covers all the different meanings of the
definiend; or you may yourself distinguish (which the definer has
omitted to do) these different meanings, and show that none of them
or few of them are covered by the definition.[262]
[Footnote 262: Topic. VI. ii. p. 139, b. 19. [Greek: o(moi/ôs de\
kai\ ei) tou= o(rizome/nou pleonachô=s legome/nou mê\ dielô\n
ei)=pen; a)/dêlon ga\r o(pote/rou to\n o(/ron a)pode/dôken,
e)nde/chetai/ te _sukophantei=n_ ô(s ou)k e)pharmo/ttontos tou=
lo/gou e)pi\ pa/nta ô(=n to\n o(rismo\n a)pode/dôken.]
The term [Greek: sukophantei=n] surprises us here, because the point
under consideration is indicated by Aristotle himself as a real
mistake; accordingly he ought not to characterize the procedure
whereby such mistake is exposed as _mere cavil_--[Greek:
sukophanti/a]. Alexander, in the Scholia (p. 287, b. 1, Br.), says
that Aristotle intends to apply the term [Greek: sukophantei=n] to
the respondent who advances this bad definition, not to the assailant
who impeaches it. But the text of Aristotle does not harmonize with
this interpretation.]
2. Indistinctness may arise from defining by means of a metaphor; but
Aristotle treats you as a caviller if you impugn this metaphor as
though it were _proprio sensu_.[263] He declares it to be wrong, but
he seems to think that you ought to object to it at once as a
metaphor, without troubling yourself to prove it inappropriate.
[Footnote 263: Ibid. b. 32: [Greek: e)nde/chetai de\ kai\ tê\n
metaphora\n ei)po/nta _sukophantei=n_ ô(s kuri/ôs ei)rêko/ta.] Here
again we have the word [Greek: sukophantei=n] to designate what seems
a legitimate mode of argumentative attack.]
3. Indistinctness will arise if the terms of the definition are rare
or far-fetched or founded upon some fact very little known.[264]
Definitions given by Plato are cited to illustrate this.
[Footnote 264: Ibid. p. 140, a. 3: [Greek: pa=n ga\r a)saphe\s to\
mê\ ei)ôtho/s].]
4. Indistinctness arises from the employment of a poetical image,
which is even worse than a professed metaphor: as where law is
defined to be--a measure or image of things by nature just.[265]
[Footnote 265: Ibid. a. 6-17. [Greek: chei=ron o(poiouou=s tô=n kata\
metaphora\n legome/nôn].]
5. The definition is indistinct, if it does not, while making known
the definiend, make clear at the same time its contrary.[266]
[Footnote 266: Ibid. a. 18.]
6. The definition is also indistinct if it does not, when enunciated,
make known what the definiend is, without requiring that the
definiend itself shall be expressly enunciated. The definition by
itself ought to suggest at once the name of the definiend. Otherwise,
the definer is no better than those archaic painters, who, when
painting a dog or a horse, were compelled to write the name alongside
in order that the animal might be recognized.[267]
[Footnote 267: Ibid. a. 20. This last condition is a high measure of
perfection to exact from a definition. Assuredly Aristotle's own
definitions often fall lamentably short of it.]
Such are the _Loci_ regarding Indistinctness in the setting out of
the definition. The second defect is Redundancy.
1. Redundancy will arise if the terms of the definition include
either all things absolutely, or all things contained in the same
genus as the definiend; since the definition ought to consist of a
generic term to discriminate the definiend from all extra-generic
things, and a differential term to discriminate it from other things
within the same genus. A definition of the kind mentioned will be
useless through redundancy.[268] It will also be open to the like
objection, if it includes what is merely a proprium of the definiend,
over and above the essential attributes; or, indeed, if it includes
any thing else except what is required for clearly bringing out the
definiend.[269] It will be still worse, if it comprises any attribute
not belonging to all individuals of the species; for then it will not
even be a proprium or a reciprocating predication.[270]
[Footnote 268: Topic. VI. iii. p. 140, a. 23-32. Alexander, however,
remarks very pertinently, that the defects of such a definition are
defects of substance rather than of expression. Aristotle has passed
unconsciously from the latter to the former: [Greek: e)n me\n tê=|
prô/tê| tô=n e)pho/dôn do/xeien a)\n o( A)ristote/lês meta/gein ei)s
ta\s pragmatika\s e)xeta/seis] (Schol. p. 287, b. 27, Br.).]
[Footnote 269: Ibid. a. 37: [Greek: a(plô=s d' ei)pei=n, a(/pan
peri/ergon ou(= a)phairethe/ntos to\ loipo\n dê=lon poiei= to\
o(rizo/menon.]]
[Footnote 270: Ibid. b. 16.]
2. Repetition is another fault sometimes committed. The same
attribute may be predicated twice over. Or a particular and narrow
attribute may be subjoined, in addition to a more general and
comprehensive attribute in which it has already been included.[271]
[Footnote 271: Ibid. b. 27-p. 141, a. 22.]
So much for the faults which belong to the manner of expressing the
definition tendered. Next, as bearing on the matter and substance of
the definition, the following _loci_ are distinguishable.
1. The first of these _loci_ is, if the matter of the definition is
not _prius_ and _notius_ as compared with the definiend. It is one of
the canons of Definition, the purpose of which is to impart knowledge
of the definiend, to introduce nothing except what is prior by nature
and better known than the latter. The essence of each definiend--the
being what it is--is one and only one. If a definition be given,
other than that by means of what is _prius_ and _notius_, it would
follow that the same definiend might have two distinct essences;
which is impossible. Accordingly, any proposition tendered as a
definition but enunciating what is not prior by nature and better
known than the definiend sins against this canon, and is to be held
as no true definition at all.[272]
[Footnote 272: Ibid. iv. p. 141, a. 24-b. 2.]
The _locus_ here indicated by this general feature is one, but it
includes a number of varieties.[273] More known, or less known, it
should first be observed, has two distinct meanings: either more or
less known _absolutely_ (_by nature_); or more or less known _to us_.
Absolutely, or by nature, the point is better known than the line;
the line, than the superficies; the superficies, than the solid; the
_prius_, than the _posterius_. But _to us_ the reverse is true. The
solid, as object of sensible perception, is earlier known and more
known than the superficies; the superficies, than the line; the line,
than the point; the _posterius_, than the _prius_. _To us_ means to
the bulk of mankind: _absolutely_ or _by nature_ refers to the
instructed, superior, teaching and expository, intellects.[274] There
may be some cases in which the _notius nobis_ coincides and is
identical with the _notius naturâ_;[275] but, as a rule, the two are
distinct, and the one is the inverse of the other. A genuine and
perfect definition is one which enunciates the essence of the Species
through Genus and Differentiæ, which are both of them absolutely
prior and more knowable than the Species, since, if they be supposed
non-existent, the Species is nowhere to be found. No man can know the
Species without knowing its Genus and Differentiæ; but you may know
the Genus and Differentiæ without knowing the Species; hence the
Species is more unknowable than they are.[276] This is the true
scientific definition; but there are persons incapable of acquiring
knowledge by means of it. To these persons, an imperfect explanation
or quasi-definition must be given, by means of matters knowable to
them.[277] Those, however, who regard such imperfect explanations as
true definitions, must be reminded that, upon that hypothesis, we
should be compelled to admit many distinct definitions of the same
definiend. For individuals differ from each other in respect to what
is more knowable: what is more so to one man is not more so to
another. Indeed the same man differs from himself on this point at
different periods: to the early and untrained mind objects of
sensible perception are the most knowable; but, when a man has been
improved by training and instruction, the case is reversed, and the
objects of intellect become the most familiar to his mind.[278] To
define properly, therefore, we must enunciate, not the _notiora
nobis_ but, the _notiora naturâ_ or _simpliciter_; understanding by