Aristotle
29. If the definiend be a something really existent, the definition
given of it ought not to be a proposition declaring an incompatible
combination, such as neither does nor can exist. Some, for example,
define white--colour mingled with fire; which is incompatible, since
that which is incorporeal (colour) cannot be mingled with a body
(fire).[324]
[Footnote 324: Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, a. 38-b. 3.]
30. Again, suppose the definiend to be a _Relatum_: the correlate
thereof must of course be declared in the definition. Care, however,
must be taken that it shall be declared, not in vague generality but,
distinctly and with proper specialization; otherwise, the definition
will be incorrect either entirely or partially. Thus, if the
respondent defines medicine--the science of the really existent, he
is incorrect either wholly or partially. The _relatum_ ought to
reciprocate or to be co-extensive with its correlate.[325] When the
correlate, however, is properly specialized in the definition, it may
be declared under several different descriptions; for the same real
thing may be at once _ens_, _album_, _bonum_. None of these
descriptions will be incorrect. Yet, if the correlate is thus
described in the definition of a _relatum_, the definition cannot be
considered good or sufficient. For it applies to more things besides
the definiend; and a good definition ought to reciprocate or to be
co-extensive with its definiend.[326]
[Footnote 325: Ibid. b. 4, seq.: [Greek: e)/ti o(/soi mê\ diairou=sin
e)n toi=s pro/s ti pro\s o(\ le/getai, a)ll' e)n plei/osi
perilabo/ntes ei)=pan, ê)\ o(/lôs ê)\ e)pi/ ti pseu/dontai, oi(=on
ei)/ tis tê\n i)atrikê\n e)pistê/mên o)/ntos ei)=pen--o(moi/ôs de\
kai\ e)pi\ tô=n a)/llôn, e)peidê\ a)ntistre/phei pa/nta ta\ pro/s
ti.]]
[Footnote 326: Ibid. b. 12-23. [Greek: e)/ti d' a)du/naton to\n
toiou=ton lo/gon i)/dion tou= a)podothe/ntos ei)=nai;--dê=lon ou)=n
o(/ti o( toiou=tos ou)demia=s e)sti\n e)pistê/mês o(rismo/s; i)/dion
ga\r kai\ ou) koino\n dei= to\n o(rismo\n ei)=nai.]]
31. Another mistake in defining is committed, when a man defines, not
the subject purely and simply but, the subject in a high measure of
excellence. Sometimes the rhetor (_e.g._) is defined--one who can
perceive and produce without omission all that there is plausible in
any cause; the thief is defined--one who takes away secretly what
belongs to another. But these are the definitions, not of a rhetor
and a thief generally but, of a skilful rhetor and skilful thief. The
thief is one who is bent on taking away secretly, not one who _does_
take away secretly.[327]
[Footnote 327: Ibid. b. 24-30. [Greek: ou) ga\r o( la/thra|
lamba/nôn, a)ll' o( boulo/menos la/thra| lamba/nein, kle/ptês
e)sti/n.]]
32. Again, another error consists in defining what is desirable in
itself and on its own account, as if it were desirable as a means
towards some other end--as productive or preservative thereof. For
example, if a man defines justice--that which is preservative of the
laws; or wisdom--that which is productive of happiness, he presents
them as if they were desirable, not for themselves but, with
reference to something different from themselves. This is a mistake;
and it is not less a mistake, though very possibly the same subject
may be desirable both for itself and for the sake of something else.
For the definition ought to enunciate what is best in the definiend;
and the best of everything resides most in its essence, not in what
it is relatively to something else. It is better to be desirable _per
se_, than _alterius causâ_.[328]
[Footnote 328: Topic. VI. xii. p. 149, b. 31-39. [Greek: e(ka/stou
ga\r to\ be/ltiston e)n tê=| ou)si/a| ma/lista, be/ltion de\ to\ di'
au(to\ ai(reto\n ei)=nai tou= di' e(/teron, ô(/ste tou=to kai\ to\n
o(rismo\n e)/dei ma=llon sêmai/nein.]]
33. Perhaps the definition tendered may be a complex proposition,
enunciating two terms either jointly or severally, in one or other of
three combinations. Either the definiend is A and B; or it is that
which springs out of A and B; or it is A with B.[329] In each of
these three cases you may find arguments for impugning the
definition.
[Footnote 329: Ibid. xiii. p. 150, a. 1-4: [Greek: skopei=n de\ kai\
ei)/ tinos o(rismo\n a)podidou\s ta/de, ê)\ to\ e)k tou/tôn, ê)\
to/de meta\ tou=de ô(ri/sato.]]
_a._ Thus, take the first of the three. Suppose the respondent to
define justice by saying, It is temperance and courage. You may urge
against him, that two men, one of whom is temperate without being
courageous, while the other is courageous without being temperate,
will be just together, though neither of them separately is just;
nay, that each of them separately (the one being temperate and
cowardly, the other courageous and intemperate), will be both just
and unjust; since, if justice is temperance and courage, injustice
will be intemperance and cowardice.[330] The definer is open to the
farther objection that he treats enumeration of parts as identical
with the whole; as if he defined a house--bricks and mortar,
forgetting the peculiar mode of putting them together. Bricks and
mortar may exist, and yet there may be no house.[331]
[Footnote 330: Ibid. a. 4-14.]
[Footnote 331: Ibid. a. 15-21. [Greek: dê=lon ga\r o(/ti tô=n merô=n
o)/ntôn ou)de\n kôlu/ei to\ o(/lon mê\ ei)=nai; ô(/ste ou) tau)to\n
ta\ me/rê tô=| o(/lô|.]]
_b._ Next, suppose the definition to declare, that the definiend is
that which springs from A and B--is a result or compound of A and B.
You will then examine whether A and B are such as to yield any
result; for some couples (as a line and a number) yield no result.
Or, perhaps, the definiend may by its own nature inhere in some first
subject, while A and B do not inhere in any one first subject, but
one in the other; in which case the definition is assailable.[332]
Or, even granting that it is the nature of A and B to inhere in the
same first subject, you may find that that first subject is not the
same as the one in which the definiend inheres. Now the whole cannot
thus inhere in one, and the parts in another: you will here have a
good objection. Or, perhaps, it may appear that, if the whole be
destroyed, the parts will be destroyed also; which ought not to be,
but the reverse; for, when the parts are destroyed, the whole must
necessarily vanish. Or, perhaps, the definiend may be good or bad,
while the parts of the definition (A and B) are neither one nor the
other. (Yet this last is not a conclusive objection; for it will
sometimes happen in compound medicines that each of the ingredients
is good, while they are bad if given in conjunction.)[333] Or,
perhaps, the whole may bear the same name as one of its parts: this,
also, will render the definition impeachable. Still more will it be
impeachable, if it enunciates simply a result or compound of A and B,
without specifying the manner of composition; it ought to declare not
merely the parts of the compound, but also the way in which they are
put together to form the compound.[334]
[Footnote 332: Ibid. a. 22-30. [Greek: e)/ti ei) to\ me\n ô(risme/non
e)n e(ni/ tini pe/phuke tô=| prô/tô| gi/nesthai, e)x ô(=n d'
e)/phêsen au)to\ ei)=nai, mê\ e)n e(ni/ tini tô=| prô/tô|, all'
e(ka/teron e)n e(kate/rô|.]]
[Footnote 333: Topic. VI. xiii. p. 150, a. 30-b. 13.]
[Footnote 334: Ibid. b. 14-26. [Greek: e)/ti ei) mê\ ei)/rêke to\n
tro/pon tê=s sunthe/seôs;] &c.]
_c._ Lastly, suppose the definition to declare that the definiend is
A along with B. You will note, first, that this third head must be
identical either with the first or with the second (_e.g._, honey
_with_ water means either honey and water, or the compound of honey
with water); it will therefore be open to impeachment on one or other
of the above-named grounds of objection, according as the respondent
may admit.[335] You may also distinguish all the different senses in
which one thing may be said to be _with_ another (_e.g._, when the
two are in the same recipient, justice and courage together in the
soul; or in the same place; or in the same time), and you may be able
to show that in none of these senses can the two parts of the
definition be truly said to be one along with the other.[336] Or, if
it be true that these two parts are co-existent in time, you may
enquire whether they are not affirmed with relation to different
correlates. _E.g._, The definition of courage may be tendered thus:
Courage is daring along with right intelligence; upon which you may
remark that daring may have reference to an act of spoliation, and
that right intelligence may have reference to the preservation of
health. Now a man who has both daring and right intelligence in
_these_ senses, cannot be termed courageous, and thus you will have
an argument against the definition. And, even if they be affirmed
with reference to the same correlate (_e.g._, the duties of a
physician), a man who has both daring and right intelligence in
reference to these duties will hardly be styled courageous; the term
courage must be so defined as to have reference to its appropriate
end; _e.g._, the dangers of war, or any still more public-spirited
end.[337] Another mistake may, perhaps, be committed in this same
sort of definition--A along with B; as when, for example, the
definition tendered of anger is--pain along with the belief of being
treated with contempt. What the definer really intends here is, that
the pain arises from the belief of being treated with contempt. But
this is not expressed by the terms of his definition, in any one of
their admissible meanings.[338]
[Footnote 335: Ibid. b. 27-32. [Greek: ô(/st' e)a\n o(poterô|ou=n
tô=n ei)rême/nôn tau)to\n _o(mologê/sê|_ ei)=nai to\ to/de meta\
tou=de, tau)ta\ a(rmo/sei le/gein a(/per pro\s e(ka/teron tou/tôn
e)/mprosthen ei)/rêtai.]]
[Footnote 336: Ibid. b. 32-39. [Greek: ê)\ ô(s e)/n tini tau)tô=|
dektikô=|], &c.]
[Footnote 337: Topic. VI. xiii. p. 151, a. 1-13. [Greek: ou)/te ga\r
pro\s e(/teron au)tôn e(ka/teron dei= le/gesthai ou)/te pro\s
tau)to\n to\ tucho/n, a)lla\ pro\s to\ tê=s a)ndrei/as te/los, oi(=on
pro\s tou\s polemikou\s kindu/nous ê)\ ei)/ ti ma=llon tou/tou
te/los.]]
[Footnote 338: Ibid. a. 14-19.]
34. Perhaps the definition, while including two or more distinct
parts, may be tendered in this form: The definiend is the composition
of A and B; _e.g._, animal is the composition of soul and body. You
will first note that the definer has not declared what sort of
composition. There is a great difference between one mode of
composition and another; the mode must be specialized. Both flesh and
bone may be defined--a composition of fire, earth, and water; but one
mode of composition makes flesh, another makes bone, out of these
same elements. You may also take the farther objection that to define
a compound as composition is erroneous; the two are essentially
disparate, one of them being abstract, the other concrete.[339]
[Footnote 339: Ibid. a. 20-31.]
35. If the definiend be in its nature capable of receiving two
contrary attributes, and if the respondent define it by one or other
of them, you have an argument against him. If one of them is
admissible, the other must be equally so; and upon this supposition
there would be two distinct definitions of the same subject; which
has been already declared impossible. Thus, it is wrong to define the
soul as a substance which is recipient of knowledge; the soul is also
recipient of ignorance.[340]
[Footnote 340: Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.]
36. Perhaps the definiend is not sufficiently well known to enable
you to attack the definition as a whole, but you may find arguments
against one or other of its parts; this is sufficient to upset it. If
it be obscure and unintelligible, you should help to correct and