Aristotle
So much greater are the difficulties belonging to the defence of a
Definition, as compared with the attack upon it; and the same may be
said about attack and defence of a Proprium, and of a Genus. In both
cases, the assailant will carry his point, if he can show that the
predicate in question is not predicable, in this relation, of all, or
that it is not predicable, in this relation, of any one. But the
defendant is required to make good the universal against every
separate objection advanced against any one of the particulars. It is
a general rule, that the work of destruction is easier than that of
construction; and the present cases come under that rule.[358] The
hardest of all theses to defend, and the easiest to overthrow, is
where Definition is affirmed; for the respondent in this case is
required to declare well the essence of his subject, and he stands in
need of the greatest number of auxiliary data; while all the _Loci_
for attack, even those properly belonging to the Proprium, the Genus,
and the Accident, are available against him.[359] Next in order, as
regards difficulty of defence, comes the theses affirming Proprium;
where the respondent has to make out, not merely that the predicate
belongs to the subject, but that it belongs thereunto exclusively and
reciprocally: here also all the _Loci_ for attack, even those
properly belonging to Accident, are available.[360] Easiest of all
theses to defend, while it is the hardest to impugn, is that in which
Accident alone is affirmed--the naked fact, that the predicate A
belongs to the Subject B, without investing it with the character
either of Genus or Proprium. Here what is affirmed is a minimum,
requiring the smallest array of data to be conceded; moreover, the
_Loci_ available for attack are the fewest, since many of those which
may be employed against Genus, Proprium, and Definition, have no
application against a thesis affirming merely Accident.[361] Indeed,
if the thesis affirmed be only a proposition particular (and not
universal), affirming Accident (and nothing more), the task of
refuting it will be more difficult than that of maintaining it.[362]
[Footnote 358: Ibid. b. 13-32. [Greek: e)/oike d', ô(/sper kai\ e)n
toi=s a)/llois to\ diaphthei=rai toi= poiê=sai r(a=|on, ou(/tô kai\
e)pi\ tou/tôn to\ a)naskeua/sai tou= kataskeua/sai.]]
[Footnote 359: Topic. VII. v. p. 155, a. 3-21: [Greek: phanero\n de\
kai\ dio/ti pa/ntôn r(a=|ston o(/ron a)naskeua/sai.]]
[Footnote 360: Ibid. a. 23-27. Aristotle has in view the most
complete Proprium: belonging _omni_, _soli_, _et semper_.]
[Footnote 361: Ibid. a. 28-36: [Greek: r(a=|ston de\ pa/ntôn
kataskeua/sai to\ sumbebêko/s;--a)naskeua/zein de\ chalepô/taton to\
sumbebêko/s, o(/ti e)la/chista e)n au)tô=| de/dotai], &c.]
[Footnote 362: Ibid. p. 154, b. 36-p. 155, a. 2: [Greek: to\ d' e)pi\
me/rous a)na/palin r(a=|on kataskeua/sai ê)\ a)naskeua/sai;
kataskeua/zonti me\n ga\r a)po/chrê dei=xai tini\ u(pa/rchon,
a)naskeua/zonti de\ deikte/on o(/ti ou)deni\ u(pa/rchei.]]
VIII.
The Eighth Book of the Topica brings our attention back to the
general considerations contained in the First. In the intervening
part of the treatise we have had the quadruple distribution of
dialectical problems, with the enumeration of those _Loci_ of
argument which bear upon each or all: we are now invited to study the
application of these distinctions in practice, and with this view to
look once more both at the persons and the purposes of dialectical
debate. What is the order of procedure most suitable, first, for the
questioner or assailant; next, for the respondent or defender?[363]
This order of procedure marks the distinctive line of separation
between the dialectician and the man of science or philosopher: to
both of them the _Loci_ of arguments are alike available, though each
of them deals with those arguments in his own way, and in an
arrangement suitable for his purpose.[364] The dialectician, being
engaged in debate, must shape his questions, and regulate his march
as questioner, according to the concessions obtained or likely to be
obtained from his respondent; who, if a question be asked having an
obvious refutative bearing on the thesis, will foresee the
consequences of answering in the affirmative, and will refuse to
grant what is asked. On the contrary, the philosopher, who pursues
investigation with a view to his own satisfaction alone, is under no
similar restriction. He looks out at once for such premisses as
conduct straight to a conclusion; and, the more obvious their bearing
on the conclusion is, the more scientific will the syllogism be, and
the better will he be pleased.[365]
[Footnote 363: Ibid. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 3: [Greek: meta\ de\ tau=ta
peri\ ta/xeôs, kai\ pô=s dei= e)rôta=n, lekte/on.]]
[Footnote 364: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 7: [Greek: me/chri me\n
ou)=n tou= eu(rei=n to\n to/pon, o(moi/ôs tou= philoso/phou kai\ tou=
dialektikou= ê( ske/psis, to\ d' ê)/dê tau=ta ta/ttein kai\
e)rôtêmati/zein i)/dion tou= dialektikou=.]]
[Footnote 365: Ibid. b. 10-16.]
In the _praxis dialectica_ (as has already been stated) two talkers
are assumed--the respondent who sets up a thesis which he undertakes
to defend, and a questioner who interrogates with a view to impugn
it; or at least with a view to compel the other to answer in an
inconsistent or contradictory manner. We are to assume, farther, a
circle of listeners, who serve to a certain extent as guarantees
against any breach of the rules of debate.[366] Three distinct
purposes may be supposed in the debate. 1. You as a questioner may be
a teacher, and the respondent a learner; your purpose is to teach
what you know, while he wishes to learn from you what he does not
know. 2. You engage in an intellectual contest or duel with the
respondent, each of you seeking only victory over the other, though
subject on both sides to observance of the rules of debate. 3. You
neither seek to teach, nor to conquer; you and the respondent have
both the same purpose--to test the argumentative consequences of
different admissions, and to acquire a larger command of the chains
of reasoning _pro_ and _con_, bearing on some given topic.[367]
[Footnote 366: Ibid. ii. p. 158, a. 10.]
[Footnote 367: Ibid. v. p. 159, a. 26: [Greek: ou) ga\r oi( au)toi\
skopoi\ toi=s dida/skousin ê)\ mantha/nousi kai\ toi=s
a)gnônizome/nois, ou)de\ tou/tois te kai\ toi=s diatri/bousi met'
a)llê/lôn ske/psis cha/rin.]]
According as the aim of the talkers is one or other of these three,
the good or bad conduct of the dialogue, on the part both of
questioner and of respondent, must be differently appreciated. Of
each of the three, specimens may be found in Plato, though not
carefully severed but running one into the other. Aristotle appears
to have been the first to formulate the distinction theoretically,
and to prescribe for the practice of each separately. He tells us
particularly that no one before him had clearly distinguished the
third head, and prescribed for it apart from the second. The merit of
having first done this he expressly claims for the Topica.[368]
[Footnote 368: Topic. VIII. v. p. 159, a. 25-37: [Greek: e)pei\ d'
e)sti\n a)dio/rista toi=s gumnasi/as kai\ pei/ras e(/neka tou\s
lo/gous poioume/nois--e)n de\ tai=s dialektikai=s suno/dois toi=s mê\
a)gô=nos cha/rin a)lla\ pei/ras kai\ ske/pseôs tou\s lo/gous
**poioume/nois, ou) **diê/rthrôtai/ pô ti/nos dei= stocha/zesthai
to\n a)pokrino/menon kai\ o(poi=a dido/nai kai\ poi=a mê/, pro\s to\
kalô=s ê)\ mê\ kalô=s phula/ttein tê\n the/sin. _e)pei\ ou)=n ou)de\n
e)/chomen paradedome/non u(p' a)/llôn, au)toi/ ti peirathô=men
ei)pei=n_.]]
Both the questioner and the respondent have a duty towards the
dialogue; their common purpose is to conduct it well, not only
obeying the peremptory rules, but displaying, over and above, skill
for the attainment of their separate ends. Under the first and third
heads, both may be alike successful. Under the second or contentious
head, indeed, one only of the two can gain the victory; yet, still,
even the defeated party may exhibit the maximum of skill which his
position admits. This is sufficient for his credit; so that the
common work will still be well performed.[369] But a partner who
performs his own part so as to obstruct instead of forwarding this
common work--who conducts the debate in a spirit of ill-tempered
contention rather than of regular Dialectic--deserves censure.[370]
[Footnote 369: Ibid. xi. p. 161, a. 19-b. 10: [Greek: ou) ga\r
e)/stin e)pi\ thate/rô| mo/non to\ lalô=s e)pitelesthê=nai to\
koino\n e)/rgon--e)pei\ de\ phau=los koinôno\s o( e)mpodi/zôn to\
koino\n e)/rgon, dê=lon o(/ti kai\ e)n lo/gô|.] Compare Topica, I.
iii. p. 101, b. 8.]
[Footnote 370: Ibid. a. 33: [Greek: dialektikô=s kai\ _mê\_
e)ristikô=s].--b. 2-18.]
Having thus in view the dialogue as a partnership for common profit,
Aristotle administers counsel to the questioning as well as to the
responding partner. You as questioner have to deal with a thesis set
up by the respondent. You see at once what the syllogism is that is
required to prove the contrary or contradictory of that thesis; and
your business is so to shape your questions as to induce the
respondent to concede the premisses necessary towards that syllogism.
If you ask him at once and directly to concede these premisses, he
sees your drift and answers in the negative. You must therefore begin
your approaches from a greater distance. You must ask questions
bearing only indirectly and remotely upon your ultimate
conclusion.[371] These outlying and preparatory questions will fall
under four principal heads. Either (1) they will be inductive
particulars, multiplied in order that you may obtain assent to an
universal comprising them all; or (2) they will be put for the
purpose of giving dignity to your discourse; or (3) they will be
shaped with a view to conceal or keep out of sight the ultimate
conclusion that you aim at; or (4), lastly, they will be introduced
to make your whole argument clearer.[372] The third of these four
general heads--the head of questions for the purpose of
concealment--comes out principally in dialectical contests for
victory. In those it is of supreme importance, and the result depends
much on the employment of it; but even in other dialectical debates
you must employ it to a certain extent.[373]
[Footnote 371: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 29: [Greek: ta\s me\n ou)=n
a)nagkai/as, di' ô(=n o( sullogismo/s, ou)k eu)thu\s au)ta\s
protate/on, a)ll' a)postate/on o(/ti a)nôta/tô], &c.]
[Footnote 372: Topic. VIII. i. p. 155, b. 20.]
[Footnote 373: Ibid. b. 26.]
Aristotle goes at great length into the means of Concealment. Suppose
the proposition which you desire to get conceded is, The science of
two contraries is the same. You will find it useful to commence by a
question more general: _e.g._, Is the science of two opposites the
same? If the respondent answers in the affirmative, you will deduce
from his concession, by syllogism, the conclusion which you desire.
If he answers in the negative, you must then try to arrive at your
end by a string of questions respecting particular contraries or
opposites; which if the respondent grants successively, you will
bring in your general question ultimately as the inductive result
from those concessions.[374] Your particulars must be selected from
obvious matters of sense and notoriety. You are likely to obtain in
this way admissions which will serve as premisses for several
different prosyllogisms, not indeed sufficient by themselves, yet
valuable as conditions and preliminaries to the final syllogism
whereby the thesis is refuted. For, when the questions are put in
this way, the respondent will not see your drift nor the consequences