Bacon's Essays, and Wisdom of the Ancients
a hill with four hundred thousand men, discovered the army of the
Romans, being not above fourteen thousand, marching towards him, he
made himself merry with it, and said, “Yonder men are too many for an
ambassage, and too few for a fight;” but before the sun set, he found
them enow to give him the chase with infinite slaughter. Many are the
examples of the great odds between number and courage; so that a man
may truly make a judgment, that the principal point of greatness in any
state is to have a race of military men. Neither is money the sinews
of war (as it is trivially said), where the sinews of men’s arms,
in base and effeminate people, are failing: for Solon said well to
Crœsus (when in ostentation he showed him his gold), “Sir, if any
other come that hath better iron than you, he will be master of all
this gold.” Therefore, let any prince or state, think soberly of his
forces, except his militia of natives be of good and valiant soldiers;
and let princes, on the other side, that have subjects of martial
disposition, know their own strength, unless they be otherwise wanting
unto themselves. As for mercenary forces (which is the help in this
case), all examples show that, whatsoever estate or prince doth rest
upon them, he may spread his feathers for a time, but he will mew them
soon after.
The blessing of Judah and Issachar[331] will never meet; that the
same people, or nation, should be both the lion’s whelp and the ass
between burdens; neither will it be, that a people overlaid with taxes
should ever become valiant and martial. It is true that taxes, levied
by consent of the estate, do abate men’s courage less; as it hath been
seen notably in the excises of the Low Countries, and, in some degree,
in the subsidies[332] of England; for, you must note, that we speak now
of the heart, and not of the purse; so that, although the same tribute
and tax, laid by consent or by imposing, be all one to the purse, yet
it works diversely upon the courage. So that you may conclude, that no
people overcharged with tribute is fit for empire.
Let states that aim at greatness take heed how their nobility and
gentlemen do multiply too fast; for that maketh the common subject grow
to be a peasant and base swain, driven out of heart, and, in effect,
but the gentleman’s laborer. Even as you may see in coppice woods; if
you leave your staddles[333] too thick, you shall never have clean
underwood, but shrubs and bushes. So in countries, if the gentlemen
be too many, the commons will be base; and you will bring it to that,
that not the hundred poll will be fit for a helmet, especially as
to the infantry, which is the nerve of an army; and so there will be
great population and little strength. This which I speak of, hath been
nowhere better seen than by comparing of England and France; whereof
England, though far less in territory and population, hath been,
nevertheless, an overmatch; in regard, the middle people of England
make good soldiers, which the peasants of France do not. And herein
the device of King Henry the Seventh (whereof I have spoken largely
in the history of his life) was profound and admirable; in making
farms and houses of husbandry of a standard, that is, maintained with
such a proportion of land unto them as may breed a subject to live in
convenient plenty, and no servile condition, and to keep the plough in
the hands of the owners, and not mere hirelings; and thus, indeed, you
shall attain to Virgil’s character, which he gives to ancient Italy:—
“Terra potens armis atque ubere glebæ.”[334]
Neither is that state (which, for anything I know, is almost peculiar
to England, and hardly to be found anywhere else, except it be,
perhaps, in Poland), to be passed over; I mean the state of free
servants and attendants upon noblemen and gentlemen, which are noways
inferior unto the yeomanry for arms; and, therefore, out of all
question, the splendor and magnificence, and great retinues, and
hospitality of noblemen and gentlemen received into custom, do much
conduce unto martial greatness; whereas, contrariwise, the close and
reserved living of noblemen and gentlemen causeth a penury of military
forces.
By all means, it is to be procured that the trunk of Nebuchadnezzar’s
tree of monarchy[335] be great enough to bear the branches and the
boughs; that is, that the natural subjects of the crown, or state, bear
a sufficient proportion to the stranger subjects that they govern.
Therefore, all states that are liberal of naturalization towards
strangers are fit for empire; for to think that a handful of people
can, with the greatest courage and policy in the world, embrace too
large extent of dominion, it may hold for a time, but it will fail
suddenly. The Spartans were a nice people in point of naturalization;
whereby, while they kept their compass, they stood firm; but when
they did spread, and their boughs were becoming too great for their
stem, they became a windfall upon the sudden. Never any state was, in
this point, so open to receive strangers into their body as were the
Romans; therefore, it sorted with them accordingly, for they grew to
the greatest monarchy. Their manner was to grant naturalization (which
they called “jus civitatis”),[336] and to grant it in the highest
degree, that is, not only “jus commercii,”[337] “jus connubii,”[338]
“jus hæreditatis;”[339] but, also, “jus suffragii,”[340] and “jus
honorum;”[341] and this not to singular persons alone, but likewise to
whole families; yea, to cities and sometimes to nations. Add to this
their custom of plantation of colonies, whereby the Roman plant was
removed into the soil of other nations, and, putting both constitutions
together, you will say, that it was not the Romans that spread upon
the world, but it was the world that spread upon the Romans; and
that was the sure way of greatness. I have marvelled sometimes at
Spain, how they clasp and contain so large dominions with so few
natural Spaniards;[342] but sure the whole compass of Spain is a very
great body of a tree, far above Rome and Sparta at the first; and,
besides, though they have not had that usage to naturalize liberally,
yet they have that which is next to it; that is, to employ, almost
indifferently, all nations in their militia of ordinary soldiers;
yea, and sometimes in their highest commands; nay, it seemeth at
this instant they are sensible of this want of natives, as by the
pragmatical sanction,[343] now published, appeareth.
It is certain that sedentary and within-door arts, and delicate
manufactures (that require rather the finger than the arm), have in
their nature a contrariety to a military disposition; and, generally,
all warlike people are a little idle, and love danger better than
travail; neither must they be too much broken of it, if they shall be
preserved in vigor. Therefore, it was great advantage in the ancient
states of Sparta, Athens, Rome, and others, that they had the use
of slaves, which commonly did rid those manufactures; but that is
abolished, in greatest part, by the Christian law. That which cometh
nearest to it is, to leave those arts chiefly to strangers (which, for
that purpose, are the more easily to be received), and to contain the
principal bulk of the vulgar natives within those three kinds, tillers
of the ground, free servants, and handicraftsmen of strong and manly
arts; as smiths, masons, carpenters, &c., not reckoning professed
soldiers.
But, above all, for empire and greatness, it importeth most, that
a nation do profess arms as their principal honor, study, and
occupation; for the things which we formerly have spoken of are but
habilitations[344] towards arms; and what is habilitation without
intention and act? Romulus, after his death (as they report or feign),
sent a present to the Romans, that, above all, they should intend[345]
arms, and then they should prove the greatest empire of the world. The
fabric of the state of Sparta was wholly (though not wisely) framed
and composed to that scope and end; the Persians and Macedonians had
it for a flash;[346] the Gauls, Germans, Goths, Saxons, Normans, and
others, had it for a time; the Turks have it at this day, though in
great declination. Of Christian Europe, they that have it are in effect
only the Spaniards; but it is so plain, that every man profiteth in
that he most intendeth, that it needeth not to be stood upon. It is
enough to point at it, that no nation which doth not directly profess
arms, may look to have greatness fall into their mouths; and, on the
other side, it is a most certain oracle of time, that those states that
continue long in that profession (as the Romans and Turks principally
have done), do wonders; and those that have professed arms but for an
age have, notwithstanding, commonly attained that greatness in that age
which maintained them long after, when their profession and exercise of
arms had grown to decay.
Incident to this point is, for a state to have those laws or customs
which may reach forth unto them just occasions (as may be pretended)
of war; for there is that justice imprinted in the nature of men,
that they enter not upon wars (whereof so many calamities do ensue),
but upon some, at the least specious grounds and quarrels. The Turk
hath at hand, for cause of war, the propagation of his law or sect, a
quarrel that he may always command. The Romans, though they esteemed
the extending the limits of their empire to be great honor to their
generals when it was done, yet they never rested upon that alone to
begin a war. First, therefore, let nations that pretend to greatness
have this, that they be sensible of wrongs, either upon borderers,
merchants, or politic ministers; and that they sit not too long upon
a provocation: secondly, let them be pressed,[347] and ready to give
aids and succors to their confederates, as it ever was with the Romans;
insomuch, as if the confederate had leagues defensive with divers other
states, and, upon invasion offered, did implore their aids severally,
yet the Romans would ever be the foremost, and leave it to none other
to have the honor. As for the wars, which were anciently made on the
behalf of a kind of party, or tacit conformity of estate, I do not see
how they may be well justified: as when the Romans made a war for the
liberty of Græcia; or, when the Lacedæmonians and Athenians made wars
to set up or pull down democracies and oligarchies; or when wars were
made by foreigners, under the pretence of justice or protection, to
deliver the subjects of others from tyranny and oppression, and the
like. Let it suffice, that no estate expect to be great, that is not
awake upon any just occasion of arming.
Nobody can be healthful without exercise, neither natural body nor
politic; and, certainly, to a kingdom, or estate, a just and honorable
war is the true exercise. A civil war, indeed, is like the heat of a
fever; but a foreign war is like the heat of exercise, and serveth to
keep the body in health; for, in a slothful peace, both courages will
effeminate and manners corrupt. But, howsoever it be for happiness,
without all question for greatness, it maketh to be still, for the
most part, in arms; and the strength of a veteran army (though it be a
chargeable business) always on foot, is that which commonly giveth the
law, or, at least, the reputation amongst all neighbor states, as may
well be seen in Spain,[348] which hath had, in one part or other, a
veteran army, almost continually, now by the space of sixscore years.
To be master of the sea is an abridgment of a monarchy. Cicero, writing
to Atticus, of Pompey’s preparation against Cæsar, saith, “Consilium
Pompeii plane Themistocleum est; putat enim, qui mari potitur, eum
rerum potiri;[349] and, without doubt, Pompey had tired out Cæsar, if