"De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries
LXXX.--Whilst skirmishes were fought in this manner, they advanced but
slowly and gradually, and frequently halted to help their rear, as then
happened. For having advanced four miles, and being very much harassed
by our horse, they took post on a high mountain, and there entrenched
themselves on the front only, facing the enemy; and did not take their
baggage off their cattle. When they perceived that Caesar's camp was
pitched, and the tents fixed up, and his horse sent out to forage, they
suddenly rushed out about twelve o'clock the same day, and, having hopes
that we should be delayed by the absence of our horse, they began to
march, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with the legions that
remained. He left a few cohorts to guard his baggage, and ordered the
foragers to be called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to follow
him. The horse shortly returned to their daily duty on march, and
charged the rear so vigorously, that they almost forced them to fly; and
several privates and some centurions were killed. The main body of
Caesar's army was at hand, and universal ruin threatened them.
LXXXI.--Then indeed, not having opportunity either to choose a
convenient position for their camp, or to march forward, they were
obliged to halt, and to encamp at a distance from water, and on ground
naturally unfavourable. But for the reasons already given, Caesar did
not attack them, nor suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his men
might be the readier to pursue them whether they attempted to run off by
night or by day. Observing the defect in their position, they spent the
whole night in extending their works, and turn their camp to ours. The
next day, at dawn, they do the same, and spend the whole day in that
manner, but in proportion as they advanced their works, and extended
their camp, they were farther distant from the water; and one evil was
remedied by another. The first night, no one went out for water. The
next day, they left a guard in the camp, and led out all their forces to
water: but not a person was sent to look for forage. Caesar was more
desirous that they should be humbled by these means, and forced to come
to terms, than decide the contest by battle. Yet he endeavoured to
surround them with a wall and trench, that he might be able to check
their most sudden sally, to which he imagined that they must have
recourse. Hereupon, urged by want of fodder, that they might be the
readier for a march, they killed all their baggage cattle.
LXXXII.--In this work, and the deliberations on it, two days were spent.
By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's works was finished. To
interrupt his progress, they drew out their legions about the eighth
hour, by a certain signal, and placed them in order of battle before
their camp. Caesar calling his legions off from their work, and ordering
the horse to hold themselves in readiness, marshalled his army: for to
appear to decline an engagement contrary to the opinion of the soldiers
and the general voice, would have been attended with great disadvantage.
But for the reasons already known, he was dissuaded from wishing to
engage, and the more especially, because the short space between the
camps, even if the enemy were put to flight, would not contribute much
to a decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant from each
other above two thousand feet. Two parts of this were occupied by the
armies, and one third left for the soldiers to charge and make their
attack. If a battle should be begun, the nearness of the camps would
afford a ready retreat to the conquered party in the flight. For this
reason Caesar had resolved to make resistance, if they attacked him, but
not to be the first to provoke the battle.
LXXXIII.--Afranius's five legions were drawn up in two lines, the
auxiliary cohorts formed the third line, and acted as reserves. Caesar
had three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the
first line. Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: and
three others were behind these. The slingers and archers were stationed
in the centre of the line; the cavalry closed the flanks. The hostile
armies being arranged in this manner, each seemed determined to adhere
to his first intention: Caesar not to hazard a battle, unless forced to
it; Afranius to interrupt Caesar's works. However, the matter was
deferred, and both armies kept under arms till sunset; when they both
returned to their camp. The next day Caesar prepared to finish the works
which he had begun. The enemy attempted to pass the river Segre by a
ford. Caesar, having perceived this, sent some light-armed Germans and a
party of horse across the river, and disposed several parties along the
banks to guard them.
LXXXIV.--At length, beset on all sides, their cattle having been four
days without fodder, and having no water, wood, or corn, they beg a
conference; and that, if possible, in a place remote from the soldiers.
When this was refused by Caesar, but a public interview offered if they
chose it, Afranius's son was given as a hostage to Caesar. They met in
the place appointed by Caesar. In the hearing of both armies, Afranius
spoke thus: "That Caesar ought not to be displeased either with him or
his soldiers, for wishing to preserve their attachment to their general,
Cneius Pompey. That they had now sufficiently discharged their duty to
him, and had suffered punishment enough, in having endured the want of
every necessary: but now, pent up almost like wild beasts, they were
prevented from procuring water, and prevented from walking abroad; and
were not able to bear the bodily pain or the mental disgrace: but
confessed themselves vanquished: and begged and entreated, if there was
any room left for mercy, that they should not be necessitated to suffer
the most severe penalties." These sentiments were delivered in the most
submissive and humble language.
LXXXV.--Caesar replied, "That either to complain or sue for mercy became
no man less than him: for that every other person had done their duty:
himself, in having declined to engage on favourable terms, in an
advantageous situation and time, that all things tending to a peace
might be totally unembarrassed: his army, in having preserved and
protected the men whom they had in their power, notwithstanding the
injuries which they had received, and the murder of their comrades; and
even Afranius's soldiers, who of themselves treated about concluding a
peace, by which they thought that they would secure the lives of all.
Thus, that the parties on both sides inclined to mercy: that the
generals only were averse to peace: that they paid no regard to the laws
either of conference or truce; and had most inhumanly put to death
ignorant persons, who were deceived by a conference: that therefore,
they had met that fate which usually befalls men from excessive
obstinacy and arrogance; and were obliged to have recourse, and most
earnestly desire that which they had shortly before disdained. That for
his part, he would not avail himself of their present humiliation, or
his present advantage, to require terms by which his power might be
increased, but only that those armies, which they had maintained for so
many years to oppose him, should be disbanded: for six legions had been
sent into Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many and powerful
fleets provided, and generals of great military experience sent to
command them, for no other purpose than to oppose him; that none of
these measures were adopted to keep the Spains in peace, or for the use
of the province, which, from the length of the peace, stood in need of
no such aid; that all these things were long since designed against him:
that against him a new sort of government was established, that the same
person should be at the gates of Rome, to direct the affairs of the
city; and though absent, have the government of two most warlike
provinces for so many years: that against him the laws of the
magistrates had been altered; that the late praetors and consuls should
not be sent to govern the provinces as had been the constant custom, but
persons approved of and chosen by a faction. That against him the excuse
of age was not admitted: but persons of tried experience in former wars
were called up to take the command of the armies, that with respect to
him only, the routine was not observed which had been allowed to all
generals, that, after a successful war, they should return home and
disband their armies, if not with some mark of honour, at least without
disgrace: that he had submitted to all these things patiently, and would
still submit to them: nor did he now desire to take their army from them
and keep it to himself (which, however, would not be a difficult
matter), but only that they should not have it to employ against him:
and therefore, as he said before, let them quit the provinces, and
disband their army. If this was complied with, he would injure no
person; that these were the last and only conditions of peace."
LXXXVI.--It was very acceptable and agreeable to Afranius's soldiers, as
might be easily known from their signs of joy, that they who expected
some injury after this defeat, should obtain without solicitation the
reward of a dismissal. For when a debate was introduced about the place
and time of their dismissal, they all began to express, both by words
and signs, from the rampart where they stood, that they should be
discharged immediately: for although every security might be given that
they would be disbanded, still the matter would be uncertain, if it was
deferred to a future day. After a short debate on either side, it was
brought to this issue: that those who had any settlement or possession
in Spain, should be immediately discharged: the rest at the river Var.
Caesar gave security that they should receive no damage, and that no
person should be obliged against his inclination to take the military
oath under him.
LXXXVII.--Caesar promised to supply them with corn from the present
time, till they arrived at the river Var. He further adds, that whatever
any of them lost in the war, which was in the possession of his
soldiers, should be restored to those that lost them. To his soldiers he
made a recompense in money for those things, a just valuation being
made. Whatever disputes Afranius's soldiers had afterwards amongst
themselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar's decision. Afranius
and Petreius, when pay was demanded by the legions, a sedition almost
breaking out, asserted that the time had not yet come, and required that
Caesar should take cognizance of it: and both parties were content with
his decision. About a third part of their army being dismissed in two
days, Caesar ordered two of his legions to go before, the rest to follow
the vanquished enemy: that they should encamp at a small distance from
each other. The execution of this business he gave in charge to Quintus
Fufius Kalenus, one of his lieutenants. According to his directions,
they marched from Spain to the river Var, and there the rest of the army
was disbanded.
BOOK II
I.--Whilst these things were going forward in Spain, Caius Trebonius,
Caesar's lieutenant, who had been left to conduct the assault of
Massilia, began to raise a mound, vineae, and turrets against the town,
on two sides: one of which was next the harbour and docks, the other on
that part where there is a passage from Gaul and Spain to that sea which
forces itself up the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed almost
on three sides by the sea, the remaining fourth part is the only side
which has access by land. A part even of this space, which reaches to
the fortress, being fortified by the nature of the country, and a very