"De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries
they took first to Domitius and to him their quaestor, nor bear arms
against those who had shared the same fortune, and endured the same
hardships in a siege, nor fight for those by whom they had been
opprobriously called deserters." To this he added a few words by way of
encouragement, what they might expect from his own liberality, if they
should follow him and Attius. On the delivery of this speech, no
intimation of their future conduct is given by Curio's army, and thus
both generals led back their troops to their camp.
XXIX.--However, a great and general fear spread through Curio's camp,
for it is soon increased by the various discourses of men. For every one
formed an opinion of his own; and to what he had heard from others,
added his own apprehensions. When this had spread from a single author
to several persons, and was handed from one another, there appeared to
be many authors for such sentiments as these: ["That it was a civil war;
that they were men; and therefore that it was lawful for them to act
freely, and follow which party they pleased." These were the legions
which a short time before had belonged to the enemy; for the custom of
offering free towns to those who joined the opposite party had changed
Caesar's kindness. For the harshest expressions of the soldiers in
general did not proceed from the Marsi and Peligni, as those which
passed in the tents the night before; and some of their fellow soldiers
heard them with displeasure. Some additions were also made to them by
those who wished to be thought more zealous in their duty.]
XXX.--For these reasons, having called a council, Curio began to
deliberate on the general welfare. There were some opinions, which
advised by all means an attempt to be made, and an attack on Varus's
camp; for when such sentiments prevailed among the soldiers, they
thought idleness was improper. In short, they said, "that it was better
bravely to try the hazard of war in a battle, than to be deserted and
surrounded by their own troops, and forced to submit to the greatest
cruelties." There were some who gave their opinion, that they ought to
withdraw at the third watch to the Cornelian camp; that by a longer
interval of time the soldiers might be brought to a proper way of
thinking; and also, that if any misfortune should befall them, they
might have a safer and readier retreat to Sicily, from the great number
of their ships.
XXXI.--Curio, censuring both measures, said, "that the one was as
deficient in spirit, as the other exceeded in it: that the latter
advised a shameful flight, and the former recommended us to engage at a
great disadvantage. For on what, says he, can we rely that we can storm
a camp, fortified both by nature and art? Or, indeed, what advantage do
we gain if we give over the assault, after having suffered considerable
loss; as if success did not acquire for a general the affection of his
army, and misfortune their hatred? But what does a change of camp imply
but a shameful flight, and universal despair, and the alienation of the
army? For neither ought the obedient to suspect that they are
distrusted, nor the insolent to know that we fear them; because our
fears augment the licentiousness of the latter, and diminish the zeal of
the former. But if, says he, we were convinced of the truth of the
reports of the disaffection of the army (which I indeed am confident are
either altogether groundless, or at least less than they are supposed to
be), how much better to conceal and hide our suspicions of it, than by
our conduct confirm it? Ought not the defects of an army to be as
carefully concealed as the wounds in our bodies, lest we should increase
the enemy's hopes? but they moreover advise us to set out at midnight,
in order, I suppose, that those who attempt to do wrong may have a
fairer opportunity; for conduct of this kind is restrained either by
shame or fear, to the display of which the night is most adverse.
Wherefore, I am neither so rash as to give my opinion that we ought to
attack their camp without hopes of succeeding; nor so influenced by fear
as to despond: and I imagine that every expedient ought first to be
tried; and I am in a great degree confident that I shall form the same
opinion as yourselves on this matter."
XXXII.--Having broken up the council he called the soldiers together,
and reminded them "what advantage Caesar had derived from their zeal at
Corfinium; how by their good offices and influence he had brought over a
great part of Italy to his interest. For, says he, all the municipal
towns afterwards imitated you and your conduct; nor was it without
reason that Caesar judged so favourably, and the enemy so harshly of
you. For Pompey, though beaten in no engagement, yet was obliged to
shift his ground, and leave Italy, from the precedent established by
your conduct. Caesar committed me, whom he considered his dearest
friend, and the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which he was not
able to protect Rome or Italy, to your protection. There are some here
present who encourage you to revolt from us; for what can they wish for
more, than at once to ruin us, and to involve you in a heinous crime? or
what baser opinions could they in their resentment entertain of you,
than that you would betray those who acknowledged themselves indebted to
you for everything, and put yourselves in the power of those who think
they have been ruined by you? Have you not heard of Caesar's exploits in
Spain? that he routed two armies, conquered two generals, recovered two
provinces, and effected all this within forty days after he came in
sight of the enemy? Can those who were not able to stand against him
whilst they were uninjured resist him when they are ruined? Will you,
who took part with Caesar whilst victory was uncertain, take part with
the conquered enemy when the fortune of the war is decided, and when you
ought to reap the reward of your services? For they say that they have
been deserted and betrayed by you, and remind you of a former oath. But
did you desert Lucius Domitius, or did Lucius Domitius desert you? Did
he not, when you were ready to submit to the greatest difficulties, cast
you off? Did he not, without your privacy, endeavour to effect his own
escape? When you were betrayed by him, were you not preserved by
Caesar's generosity? And how could he think you bound by your oath to
him, when, after having thrown up the ensigns of power, and abdicated
his government, he became a private person, and a captive in another's
power? A new obligation is left upon you, that you should disregard the
oath, by which you are at present bound; and have respect only to that
which was invalidated by the surrender of your general, and his
diminution of rank. But I suppose, although you are pleased with Caesar,
you are offended with me; however I shall not boast of my services to
you, which still are inferior to my own wishes or your expectations.
But, however, soldiers have ever looked for the rewards of labour at the
conclusion of a war; and what the issue of it is likely to be, not even
you can doubt. But why should I omit to mention my own diligence and
good fortune, and to what a happy crisis affairs are now arrived? Are
you sorry that I transported the army safe and entire, without the loss
of a single ship? That on my arrival, in the very first attack, I routed
the enemy's fleet? That twice in two days I defeated the enemy's horse?
That I carried out of the very harbour and bay, two hundred of the
enemy's victuallers, and reduced them to that situation that they can
receive no supplies either by land or sea? Will you divorce yourselves
from this fortune and these generals; and prefer the disgrace of
Corfinium, the defeat of Italy, the surrender of both Spains, and the
prestige of the African war? I, for my part, wished to be called a
soldier of Caesar's; you honoured me with the title of Imperator. If you
repent your bounty, I give it back to you; restore to me my former name
that you may not appear to have conferred the honour on me as a
reproach."
XXXIII.--The soldiers, being affected by this oration, frequently
attempted to interrupt him whilst he was speaking, so that they appeared
to bear with excessive anguish the suspicion of treachery, and when he
was leaving the assembly they unanimously besought him to be of good
spirits, and not hesitate to engage the enemy and put their fidelity and
courage to a trial. As the wishes and opinions of all were changed by
this act, Curio, with the general consent, determined, whenever
opportunity offered, to hazard a battle. The next day he led out his
forces and ranged them in order of battle on the same ground where they
had been posted the preceding day; nor did Attius Varus hesitate to draw
out his men, that, if any occasion should offer, either to tamper with
our men or to engage on equal terms, he might not miss the opportunity.
XXXIV.-There lay between the two armies a valley, as already mentioned,
not very deep, but of a difficult and steep ascent. Each was waiting
till the enemy's forces should attempt to pass it, that they might
engage with the advantage of the ground. At the same time, on the left
wing, the entire cavalry of Publius Attius, and several light-armed
infantry intermixed with them, were perceived descending into the
valley. Against them Curio detached his cavalry and two cohorts of the
Marrucini, whose first charge the enemy's horse were unable to stand,
but, setting spurs to their horses, fled back to their friends: the
light-infantry being deserted by those who had come out along with them,
were surrounded and cut to pieces by our men. Varus's whole army, facing
that way, saw their men flee and cut down. Upon which Rebilus, one of
Caesar's lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily
knowing that he had great experience in military matters, cried out,
"You see the enemy are daunted, Curio! why do you hesitate to take
advantage of the opportunity?" Curio, having merely "expressed this,
that the soldiers should keep in mind the professions which they had
made to him the day before," then ordered them to follow him, and ran
far before them all. The valley was so difficult of ascent that the
foremost men could not struggle up it unless assisted by those behind.
But the minds of Attius's soldiers being prepossessed with fear and the
flight and slaughter of their men, never thought of opposing us; and
they all imagined that they were already surrounded by our horse, and,
therefore, before a dart could be thrown or our men come near them,
Varus's whole army turned their backs and retreated to their camp.
XXXV.-In this flight one Fabius, a Pelignian and common soldier in
Curio's army, pursuing the enemy's rear, with a loud voice shouted to
Varus by his name, and often called him, so that he seemed to be one of
his soldiers, who wished to speak to him and give him advice. When
Varus, after being repeatedly called, stopped and looked at him, and
inquired who he was and what he wanted, he made a blow with his sword at
his naked shoulder and was very near killing Varus, but he escaped the
danger by raising his shield to ward off the blow. Fabius was surrounded
by the soldiers near him and cut to pieces; and by the multitude and
crowds of those that fled, the gates of the camps were thronged and the
passage stopped, and a greater number perished in that place without a
stroke than in the battle and flight. Nor were we far from driving them
from this camp; and some of them ran straightway to the town without
halting. But both the nature of the ground and the strength of the
fortifications prevented our access to the camp; for Curio's soldiers,
marching out to battle, were without those things which were requisite