"De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries
thought the most likely method to remove and abate the apprehension of
an abolition of debt, the usual consequence of civil wars and
dissensions, and to support the credit of the debtors. He likewise
restored to their former condition (the praetors and tribunes first
submitting the question to the people) some persons condemned for
bribery at the elections, by virtue of Pompey's law, at the time when
Pompey kept his legions quartered in the city (these trials were
finished in a single day, one judge hearing the merits, and another
pronouncing the sentences), because they had offered their service to
him in the beginning of the civil war, if he chose to accept them;
setting the same value on them as if he had accepted them, because they
had put themselves in his power. For he had determined that they ought
to be restored, rather by the judgment of the people, than appear
admitted to it by his bounty: that he might neither appear ungrateful in
repaying an obligation, nor arrogant in depriving the people of their
prerogative of exercising this bounty.
II.--In accomplishing these things, and celebrating the Latin festival,
and holding all the elections, he spent eleven days; and having resigned
the dictatorship, set out from the city, and went to Brundisium, where
he had ordered twelve legions and all his cavalry to meet him. But he
scarcely found as many ships as would be sufficient to transport fifteen
thousand legionary soldiers and five hundred horse. This [the scarcity
of shipping] was the only thing that prevented Caesar from putting a
speedy conclusion to the war. And even these troops embarked very short
of their number, because several had fallen in so many wars in Gaul, and
the long march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and a
severe autumn in Apulia and the district about Brundisium, after the
very wholesome countries of Spain and Gaul, had impaired the health of
the whole army.
III.--Pompey having got a year's respite to provide forces, during which
he was not engaged in war, nor employed by an enemy, had collected a
numerous fleet from Asia, and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens,
Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, and had given
directions that a great number should be built in every other place. He
had exacted a large sum of money from Asia, Syria, and all the kings,
dynasts, tetrarchs, and free states of Achaia; and had obliged the
corporations of those provinces, of which he himself had the government,
to count down to him a large sum.
IV.--He had made up nine legions of Roman citizens; five from Italy,
which he had brought with him; one veteran legion from Sicily, which
being composed of two, he called the Gemella; one from Crete and
Macedonia, of veterans who had been discharged by their former generals,
and had settled in those provinces; two from Asia, which had been levied
by the activity of Lentulus. Besides he had distributed among his
legions a considerable number, by way of recruits, from Thessaly,
Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus: with his legions he also intermixed the
soldiers taken from Caius Antonius. Besides these, he expected two
legions from Syria, with Scipio; from Crete, Lacedaemon, Pontus, Syria,
and other states, he got about three thousand archers, six cohorts of
slingers, two thousand mercenary soldiers, and seven thousand horse; six
hundred of which, Deiotarus had brought from Gaul; Ariobarzanes, five
hundred from Cappadocia. Cotus had given him about the same number from
Thrace, and had sent his son Sadalis with them. From Macedonia there
were two hundred, of extraordinary valour, commanded by Rascipolis; five
hundred Gauls and Germans; Gabinius's troops from Alexandria, whom Aulus
Gabinius had left with king Ptolemy, to guard his person. Pompey, the
son, had brought in his fleet eight hundred, whom he had raised among
his own and his shepherds' slaves. Tarcundarius, Castor and Donilaus had
given three hundred from Gallograecia: one of these came himself, the
other sent his son. Two hundred were sent from Syria by Comagenus
Antiochus, whom Pompey rewarded amply. The most of them were archers. To
these were added Dardanians, and Bessians, some of them mercenaries;
others procured by power and influence: also, Macedonians, Thessalians,
and troops from other nations and states, which completed the number
which we mentioned before.
V.--He had laid in vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt,
Crete, Cyrene, and other countries. He had resolved to fix his winter
quarters at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other sea-ports, to hinder
Caesar from passing the sea: and for this purpose had stationed his
fleet along the sea-coast. The Egyptian fleet was commanded by Pompey,
the son: the Asiatic, by Decimus Laelius, and Caius Triarius: the
Syrian, by Caius Cassius: the Rhodian, by Caius Marcellus, in
conjunction with Caius Coponius; and the Liburnian, and Achaian, by
Scribonius Libo, and Marcus Octavius. But Marcus Bibulus was appointed
commander-in-chief of the whole maritime department, and regulated every
matter. The chief direction rested upon him.
VI.--When Caesar came to Brundisium, he made a speech to the soldiers:
"That since they were now almost arrived at the termination of their
toils and dangers, they should patiently submit to leave their slaves
and baggage in Italy, and to embark without luggage, that a greater
number of men might be put on board: that they might expect everything
from victory and his liberality." They cried out with one voice, "he
might give what orders he pleased, that they would cheerfully fulfil
them." He accordingly set sail the fourth day of January, with seven
legions on board, as already remarked. The next day he reached land,
between the Ceraunian rocks and other dangerous places; meeting with a
safe road for his shipping to ride in, and dreading all other ports
which he imagined were in possession of the enemy, he landed his men at
a place called Pharsalus, without the loss of a single vessel.
VII.--Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were at Oricum, with
eighteen Asiatic ships, which were given into their charge by the orders
of Decimus Laelius: Marcus Bibulus at Corcyra, with a hundred and ten
ships. But they had not the confidence to dare to move out of the
harbour; though Caesar had brought only twelve ships as a convoy, only
four of which had decks; nor did Bibulus, his fleet being disordered and
his seamen dispersed, come up in time: for Caesar was seen at the
continent before any account whatsoever of his approach had reached
those regions.
VIII.--Caesar, having landed his soldiers, sent back his ships the same
night to Brundisium, to transport the rest of his legions and cavalry.
The charge of this business was committed to lieutenant Fufius Kalenus,
with orders to be expeditious in transporting the legions. But the ships
having put to sea too late, and not having taken advantage of the night
breeze, fell a sacrifice on their return. For Bibulus, at Corcyra, being
informed of Caesar's approach, hoped to fall in with some part of our
ships, with their cargoes, but found them empty; and having taken about
thirty, vented on them his rage at his own remissness, and set them all
on fire: and, with the same flames, he destroyed the mariners and
masters of the vessels, hoping by the severity of the punishment to
deter the rest. Having accomplished this affair, he filled all the
harbours and shores from Salona to Oricum with his fleets. Having
disposed his guard with great care, he lay on board himself in the depth
of winter, declining no fatigue or duty, and not waiting for
reinforcements, in hopes that he might come within Caesar's reach.
IX.--But after the departure of the Liburnian fleet, Marcus Octavius
sailed from Illyricum with what ships he had to Salona; and having
spirited up the Dalmatians, and other barbarous nations, he drew Issa
off from its connection with Caesar; but not being able to prevail with
the council of Salona, either by promises or menaces, he resolved to
storm the town. But it was well fortified by its natural situation, and
a hill. The Roman citizens built wooden towers, the better to secure it;
but when they were unable to resist, on account of the smallness of
their numbers, being weakened by several wounds, they stooped to the
last resource, and set at liberty all the slaves old enough to bear
arms; and cutting the hair off the women's heads, made ropes for their
engines. Octavius, being informed of their determination, surrounded the
town with five encampments, and began to press them at once with a siege
and storm. They were determined to endure every hardship, and their
greatest distress was the want of corn. They, therefore, sent deputies
to Caesar, and begged a supply from him; all other inconveniences they
bore by their own resources, as well as they could: and after a long
interval, when the length of the siege had made Octavius's troops more
remiss than usual, having got an opportunity at noon, when the enemy
were dispersed, they disposed their wives and children on the walls, to
keep up the appearance of their usual attention; and forming themselves
into one body, with the slaves whom they had lately enfranchised, they
made an attack on Octavius's nearest camp, and having forced that,
attacked the second with the same fury; and then the third and the
fourth, and then the other, and beat them from them all: and having
killed a great number, obliged the rest and Octavius himself to fly for
refuge to their ships. This put an end to the blockade. Winter was now
approaching, and Octavius, despairing of capturing the town, after
sustaining such considerable losses, withdrew to Pompey, to Dyrrachium.
X.--We have mentioned that Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's, had
fallen twice into Caesar's power; first at Corfinium, and afterwards in
Spain. Caesar thought him a proper person, on account of his favours
conferred on him, to send with proposals to Pompey: and he knew that he
had an influence over Pompey. This was the substance of his proposals:
"That it was the duty of both, to put an end to their obstinacy, and
forbear hostilities, and not tempt fortune any further; that sufficient
loss had been suffered on both sides, to serve as a lesson and
instruction to them, to render them apprehensive of future calamities,
by Pompey, in having been driven out of Italy, and having lost Sicily,
Sardinia, and the two Spains, and one hundred and thirty cohorts of
Roman citizens, in Italy and Spain: by himself, in the death of Curio,
and the loss of so great an army in Africa, and the surrender of his
soldiers in Corcyra. Wherefore, they should have pity on themselves, and
the republic: for, from their own misfortunes, they had sufficient
experience of what fortune can effect in war. That this was the only
time to treat of peace; when each had confidence in his own strength,
and both seemed on an equal footing. Since, if fortune showed ever so
little favour to either, he who thought himself superior, would not
submit to terms of accommodation; nor would he be content with an equal
division, when he might expect to obtain the whole. That, as they could
not agree before, the terms of peace ought to be submitted to the senate
and people in Rome. That in the meantime, it ought to content the
republic and themselves, if they both immediately took oath in a public
assembly, that they would disband their forces within the three
following days. That having divested themselves of the arms and
auxiliaries, on which they placed their present confidence, they must
both of necessity acquiesce in the decision of the people and senate. To
give Pompey the fuller assurance of his intentions, he would dismiss all
his forces on land, even his garrisons.