"De Bello Gallico" and Other Commentaries
inner part of the harbour, behind the town, and fastened them to the
shore, and sank a merchant-ship in the mouth of the harbour to block it
up; and near it he fixed another at anchor, on which he raised a turret,
and faced it to the entrance of the port, and filled it with soldiers,
and ordered them to keep guard against any sudden attack.
XL.--Cneius, Pompey's son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having got
intelligence of these things, came to Oricum, and weighed up the ship,
that had been sunk, with a windlass, and by straining at it with several
ropes, and attacked the other which had been placed by Acilius to watch
the port with several ships, on which he had raised very high turrets,
so that fighting as it were from an eminence, and sending fresh men
constantly to relieve the fatigued, and at the same time attempting the
town on all sides by land, with ladders and his fleet, in order to
divide the force of his enemies, he overpowered our men by fatigue, and
the immense number of darts, and took the ship, having beat off the men
who were put on board to defend it, who, however, made their escape in
small boats; and at the same time he seized a natural mole on the
opposite side, which almost formed an island over against the town. He
carried over land, into the inner part of the harbour, four galleys, by
putting rollers under them, and driving them on with levers. Then
attacking on both sides the ships of war which were moored to the shore,
and were not manned, he carried off four of them, and set the rest on
fire. After despatching this business, he left Decimus Laelius, whom he
had taken away from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to hinder
provisions from being brought into the town from Biblis and Amantia, and
went himself to Lissus, where he attacked thirty merchantmen, left
within the port by Antonius, and set them on fire. He attempted to storm
Lissus, but being delayed three days by the vigorous defence of the
Roman citizens who belonged to that district, and of the soldiers which
Caesar had sent to keep garrison there, and having lost a few men in the
assault, he returned without effecting his object.
XLI.--As soon as Caesar heard that Pompey was at Asparagium, he set out
for that place with his army, and having taken the capital of the
Parthinians on his march, where there was a garrison of Pompey's, he
reached Pompey in Macedonia, on the third day, and encamped beside him;
and the day following, having drawn out all his forces before his camp,
he offered Pompey battle. But perceiving that he kept within his
trenches, he led his army back to his camp, and thought of pursuing some
other plan. Accordingly, the day following, he set out with all his
forces by a long circuit, through a difficult and narrow road to
Dyrrachium; hoping, either that Pompey would be compelled to follow him
to Dyrrachium, or that his communication with it might be cut off,
because he had deposited there all his provisions and mat['e]riel of
war. And so it happened; for Pompey, at first not knowing his design,
because he imagined he had taken a route in a different direction from
that country, thought that the scarcity of provisions had obliged him to
shift his quarters; but having afterwards got true intelligence from his
scouts, he decamped the day following, hoping to prevent him by taking a
shorter road; which Caesar suspecting might happen, encouraged his
troops to submit cheerfully to the fatigue, and having halted a very
small part of the night, he arrived early in the morning at Dyrrachium,
when the van of Pompey's army was visible at a distance, and there he
encamped.
XLII.--Pompey, being cut off from Dyrrachium, as he was unable to effect
his purpose, took a new resolution, and entrenched himself strongly on a
rising ground, which is called Petra, where ships of a small size can
come in, and be sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered a part of his
men-of-war to attend him, and corn and provisions to be brought from
Asia, and from all the countries of which he kept possession. Caesar,
imagining that the war would be protracted to too great a length, and
despairing of his convoys from Italy, because all the coasts were
guarded with great diligence by Pompey's adherents; and because his own
fleets, which he had built during the winter, in Sicily, Gaul, and
Italy, were detained; sent Lucius Canuleius into Epirus to procure corn;
and because these countries were too remote, he fixed granaries in
certain places, and regulated the carriage of the corn for the
neighbouring states. He likewise gave directions that search should be
made for whatever corn was in Lissus, the country of the Parthini, and
all the places of strength. The quantity was very small, both from the
nature of the land (for the country is rough and mountainous, and the
people commonly import what grain they use); and because Pompey had
foreseen what would happen, and some days before had plundered the
Parthini, and having ravaged and dug up their houses, carried off all
the corn, which he collected by means of his horse.
XLIII.--Caesar, on being informed of these transactions, pursued
measures suggested by the nature of the country. For round Pompey's
camps there were several high and rough hills. These he first of all
occupied with guards, and raised strong forts on them. Then drawing a
fortification from one fort to another, as the nature of each position
allowed, he began to draw a line of circumvallation round Pompey; with
these views; as he had but a small quantity of corn, and Pompey was
strong in cavalry, that he might furnish his army with corn and other
necessaries from all sides with less danger: secondly, to prevent Pompey
from foraging, and thereby render his horse ineffectual in the
operations of the war; and thirdly, to lessen his reputation, on which
he saw he depended greatly, among foreign nations, when a report should
have spread throughout the world that he was blockaded by Caesar, and
dare not hazard a battle.
XLIV.--Neither was Pompey willing to leave the sea and Dyrrachium,
because he had lodged his mat['e]riel there, his weapons, arms, and
engines; and supplied his army with corn from it by his ships: nor was
he able to put a stop to Caesar's works without hazarding a battle,
which at that time he had determined not to do. Nothing was left but to
adopt the last resource, namely, to possess himself of as many hills as
he could, and cover as great an extent of country as possible with his
troops, and divide Caesar's forces as much as possible; and so it
happened: for having raised twenty-four forts, and taken in a compass of
fifteen miles, he got forage in this space, and within this circuit
there were several fields lately sown, in which the cattle might feed in
the meantime. And as our men, who had completed their works by drawing
lines of communication from one fort to another, were afraid that
Pompey's men would sally out from some part, and attack us in the rear;
so the enemy were making a continued fortification in a circuit within
ours to prevent us from breaking in on any side, or surrounding them on
the rear. But they completed their works first; both because they had a
greater number of men, and because they had a smaller compass to
enclose. When Caesar attempted to gain any place, though Pompey had
resolved not to oppose him with his whole force or to come to a general
engagement; yet he detached to particular places slingers and archers,
with which his army abounded, and several of our men were wounded, and
filled with great dread of the arrows; and almost all the soldiers made
coats or coverings for themselves of hair cloths, tarpaulins, or raw
hides to defend them against the weapons.
XLV.--In seizing the posts, each exerted his utmost power: Caesar, to
confine Pompey within as narrow a compass as possible; Pompey, to occupy
as many hills as he could in as large a circuit as possible, and several
skirmishes were fought in consequence of it. In one of these, when
Caesar's ninth legion had gained a certain post, and had begun to
fortify it; Pompey possessed himself of a hill near to and opposite the
same place, and endeavoured to annoy the men while at work; and as the
approach on one side was almost level, he first surrounded it with
archers and slingers, and afterwards by detaching a strong party of
light infantry, and using his engines, he stopped our works: and it was
no easy matter for our men at once to defend themselves, and to proceed
with their fortifications. When Caesar perceived that his troops were
wounded from all sides, he determined to retreat and give up the post;
his retreat was down a precipice, on which account they pushed on with
more spirit, and would not allow us to retire, because they imagined
that we resigned the place through fear. It is reported that Pompey said
that day in triumph to his friends about him, "That he would consent to
be accounted a general of no experience, if Caesar's legions effected a
retreat without considerable loss from that ground into which they had
rashly advanced."
XLVI.--Caesar, being uneasy about the retreat of his soldiers, ordered
hurdles to be carried to the further side of the hill, and to be placed
opposite to the enemy, and behind them a trench of a moderate breadth to
be sunk by his soldiers under shelter of the hurdles: and the ground to
be made as difficult as possible. He himself disposed slingers in
convenient places to cover our men in their retreat. These things being
completed, he ordered his legions to file off. Pompey's men insultingly
and boldly pursued and chased us, levelling the hurdles that were thrown
up in the front of our works, in order to pass over the trench. Which as
soon as Caesar perceived, being afraid that his men would appear not to
retreat, but to be repulsed, and that greater loss might be sustained,
when his men were almost half way down the hill, he encouraged them by
Antonius, who commanded that legion, ordered the signal of battle to be
sounded, and a charge to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninth
legion suddenly closing their files threw their javelins, and advancing
impetuously from the low ground up the steep, drove Pompey's men
precipitately before them, and obliged them to turn their backs; but
their retreat was greatly impeded by the hurdles that lay in a long line
before them, and the pallisadoes which were in their way, and the
trenches that were sunk. But our men being contented to retreat without
injury, having killed several of the enemy, and lost but five of their
own, very quietly retired, and having seized some other hills somewhat
on this side of that place, completed their fortifications.
XLVII.--This method of conducting a war was new and unusual, as well on
account of the number of forts, the extent and greatness of the works,
and the manner of attack and defence, as on account of other
circumstances. For all who have attempted to besiege any person, have
attacked the enemy when they were frightened or weak, or after a defeat;
or have been kept in fear of some attack, when they themselves have had
a superior force both of foot and horse. Besides, the usual design of a
siege is to cut off the enemy's supplies. On the contrary, Caesar, with
an inferior force, was enclosing troops sound and unhurt, and who had
abundance of all things. For there arrived every day a prodigious number
of ships, which brought them provisions: nor could the wind blow from
any point that would not be favourable to some of them. Whereas, Caesar,
having consumed all the corn far and near, was in very great distress,
but his soldiers bore all with uncommon patience. For they remembered
that they lay under the same difficulties last year in Spain, and yet by