Fifty years in Wall Street

regulate rates of interest, after the manner of the Bank of England, is deserving of no consideration whatever. It would merely excite and provoke the jealousy and opposition of other banking institutions, and create a sort of monopoly with special privileges, without securing the end in view. A Bank of Banks is not what we want, nor do we want a revival of the old United States Bank. Such a bank as the Bank of England, or the Bank of France, could not be created here, either in a day or a generation, for those time-honored institutions are the growth of ages. They are very much older than any of the other banks there; and, under the control of their respective governments, they have grown up with their countries and become practically, although not by ownership, government institutions. Hence their prestige and power, and the impossibility of other banks superseding them. It may, however, deserve consideration whether the New York Clearing House might not exert power in regulating rates of interest similar to that exercised by the Bank of England, providing the banks belonging to it would unite to give it that power; and is there any reason why they should not? Even without any formal or concentrated action in this direction, outside of the Clearing House Committee, it could appoint a committee to name every week, or oftener when necessary, as the Bank of England does, a minimum rate of interest on call loans and discounts. It could also fix a maximum rate for each. This need not be compulsory; but even only as a recommendation it would have a powerful moral effect, and the Wall Street banks, if they approved of the innovation, would conform to it. The Clearing House could, indeed, after the formal approval of this regulation by its members, enforce its observance under penalties, if deemed necessary. In this alone, in my opinion, a practical remedy would be found for the high rate evil on the Stock Exchange. But, at the same time, greater elasticity could be given to our national bank currency if Congress would amend the law so as to permit of currency being issued against specified bank assets, subject to the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency. This is a feature of the banking system of other countries, which has always worked very well and to the satisfaction of all interests; and what our currency urgently needs is greater elasticity. Strictly speaking, according to economic principles, we cannot expect a perfect currency, with all the resiliency and elasticity possible in a currency, so long as bonds instead of gold are used as the basis of our bank circulation. Yet for security the bonds are, under present conditions, just as good as gold; and there would be more elasticity in the bank circulation based upon them if the restrictions imposed upon their redemption by the Act of 1882, which are now unnecessary, were removed. Indeed, the inability to promptly retire bank notes is one of the worst faults of our system, and Congress should repeal the restrictions without delay. If this obstacle in the way of resiliency were removed, and the unlimited retirement of bank notes permitted, we may rest assured that free expansion, when demanded, would quickly follow curtailment, and this ebb and flow of the currency would obviously be an elastic movement. As it is, there is a great waste of banking power in our treatment of national bank notes and reserves. We have $544,765,959 of national bank notes, and only $337,130,321 of United States legal tender notes, and, setting gold aside, the redemption of the former in the latter is obviously absurd and inconsistent with sound finance and good banking. We see in the present system this $544,765,959 of banking capital absorbed and represented by non-reserve currency. The capital is perfectly safe, but it is locked out of any other use, and rendered inefficient for any other purpose. This calls for a remedy. The percentage of reserves to loans in national banks has decreased from more than 20 per cent in 1898 to less than 15 per cent. Hence the bank reserves require to be increased. The law relating to the redemption of national bank notes in United States notes, or greenbacks, was passed when the greenbacks very largely exceeded the bank notes in amount, but the reversal of these conditions reminds us that the tail is now wagging the dog. This alone makes it clear that the law should be amended. But beyond all this we should open our money market more to the rest of the world by establishing a new factor, which would always afford prompt relief in times of stringency, by giving us cable transfers of gold, instead of gold shipments, and of itself prevent abnormally high rates. Through this medium we could, instantly, practically draw gold from Europe whenever wanted, and Europe could do the same from us, when needed there. I refer to the establishment of an International Gold Transfer System, or Clearing House, to supersede and dispense with what I may call the old-fashioned gold see-saw. Gold in circulation is doing good work, but gold see-sawing across the ocean is going to waste. The custom of shipping gold from one country to another, in response to the ups and downs of the market rates for foreign exchange, not only reminds me of the forward-and-back movement in a quadrille, but suggests that, as the precious metal is rendered practically useless while in transit, it should not be used in a dance of that kind across the ocean. The subject may not seem to be very important, but it really is so, for “tall oaks from little acorns grow”; and it is surprising that in the march of modern improvement this method of settling international balances has not been superseded by a shorter, quicker, and cheaper cut to transatlantic adjustments. Bankers, in both hemispheres, are absurdly behind this progressive and electric age, in transporting gold from the New World to the Old, and vice versa, to adjust balances between them, whenever the rates of exchange show a profit in the transaction. That they could profitably dispense with it is obvious, as they could easily establish this transfer system, this international clearing house for gold, at very small expense. Thus the risk, and loss of time, involved in the old-fashioned method would be eliminated, while the new arrangement, being under their own control, would beyond peradventure serve every necessary purpose of the shippers, combined with perfect safety. The disadvantage of shipping boxes or kegs of gold to and fro between America and Europe is apparent when we consider that it is a time-wasting see-saw performance, which involves the expense of packing, cartage, freightage, insurance, and loss of interest while in transit, and still greater loss due to abrasion consequent on sea transportation, to say nothing of bankers’ commissions, and risk of partial or entire loss by robbery, accident, or marine disaster; ignoring, moreover, the restraints it imposes upon our foreign trade. All these disadvantages could be obviated and this handicap upon our commerce removed by a mutual-interest arrangement, between the leading banks in the United States and Europe, to deposit a sufficiently large amount of gold on each side of the Atlantic, and issue international clearing-house certificates and draw bills of exchange against the deposits. This gold could be counted as part of their reserve, if in their own vaults; or the Bank of England, in London, and the United States Sub-Treasury in Wall Street, could be used as the gold depositaries. We have a clearing house for bank checks in each of the large cities, and one also for the transactions of the New York Stock Exchange. London, too, has its bank clearing house. Why, then, should the clearing house system not be extended to international transfers of gold, so as to make them possible at any moment by cable-telegraph instead of the slow process of six-days transfers? In this way our international dealings would be quickened and extended and our financial and commercial relations become more intimate. There is no good reason why we should unnecessarily treat gold as we do, when we can save time, money, and risk by keeping the metal where it is, and issuing certificates of deposit against it, and the use and transfer of which would serve as well as gold shipments. The present custom becomes a ridiculous “chasse” across the Atlantic, when we see the same gold shipped to Europe, then shipped back to America within a few days after reaching its destination, without being unpacked, owing to sudden intervening changes in the rates of exchange, making it profitable for the former gold exporting country to import the metal. Such wasteful shilly-shally procedure would be likely to excite mirth in opera bouffe, but bankers who ship gold are very serious about it, and seem to be without enough perception of the ludicrous to see anything funny in its coming and going, although they feel the shoe pinch in its costliness in both time and money. As the world’s gold production increases the urgent need of this over-sea change will become more and more conspicuous, and its adoption will accord with the generally progressive spirit and methods of our telegraphic and telephonic age. Had such an international gold clearing house existed the sagacious but unprecedented action of the Secretary of the Treasury, to relieve the money market by making deposits, as secured loans, in certain banks, to encourage and cover their prospective gold importations from Europe, the same to be returned on the arrival of the gold, would have been unnecessary. While this expedient has well served a temporary purpose, it is not to be relied upon as a permanent source of relief during monetary stress, and it involves a stretch of authority under the law that is open to grave objection. But, as it happened, the Secretary’s action, which was taken just before the San Francisco disaster occurred, proved particularly fortunate, and probably prevented a very serious aggravation of the stringency in the money market, owing to the heavy remittances to California. It was a piece of good luck that seemed almost providential, and the end justified the means. But it should always be regarded as only a fortuitous circumstance and temporary expedient, not as a permanent source of relief; and it emphasizes our need of a new international gold transfer system. Moreover, the benefit Europe would derive from it would be equal to our own. The Secretary, under the circumstances, acted wisely in also increasing the Treasury deposits in the national banks, while the Government’s receipts were largely in excess of its disbursements, so as to offset, as far as possible, this preponderance of receipts, and lessen the drain of money into the Sub-Treasuries. But this method of relief is, too, only a temporary expedient, to remedy the evils of the Sub-Treasury system. While the Sub-Treasury system lasts Congress should authorize the Secretary to deposit customs, as well as internal revenue receipts, in the national bank depositaries, in time of stringency, when the Government’s receipts exceed its disbursements, and it has more than a sufficient working balance. The Government should, as a compensation to it, require the banks to pay interest at, say, two and one-half or three per cent per annum on such deposits, these not to exceed, in amount, 25 per cent of their paid-up and unimpaired capital, and to be returnable on demand, but without requiring these special deposits to be secured. They should, however, be made a first lien upon the assets of the banks. If the changes above suggested were made, I am sanguine that they would prove to be remedies for the evils and disadvantages under which we now