Fifty years in Wall Street
throne of France, he made the best use of his time, and he had studied
the history and geography of the United States and Canada with great
care and accuracy.
In justice to his character for gratitude, however, it must be said, in
passing, that, like young “Corneel” Vanderbilt, he paid all the money he
borrowed, and placed some of his New York and Hoboken creditors in good
positions at the Tuileries, under the Second Empire. He never forgot a
favor nor forgave an injury.
The Emperor’s knowledge of American affairs, as well as his ambitious
designs, were briefly, but at the same time very fully disclosed, in
conversation with Mr. Benjamin, at the Villa Eugenie, at Biarritz. “He
turned with peculiar and undisguised eagerness,” said Mr. Benjamin, “to
the Mexican question. He knew the very number of guns on the Morro, the
sums the United States had spent on the fortifications in Florida, the
exports and imports of Galveston and Matamoras, in fact everything which
well informed local agents could have reported to an experienced
statesman eager for information. He examined me again on Texas and its
population, the disposition of the French residents, the tendencies of
the German colonists, the feeling on the Mexican frontier. He observed
that Louisiana was nothing but French at the bottom. I was fully
persuaded that he proposed to seek in Mexico a compensation for the lost
colonies in the West Indies, which, he said, could not be recovered,
‘_sans nous brouiller avec nòs allies_,’ (without embroiling us with our
allies). He insisted upon it that France must, sooner or later, have a
foothold (_pied à terre_) on the Florida coast, for the purpose of
protecting her commerce in the Gulf, for, he added, ‘_Nous ne voulons
pas d’un autre_ _Gibraltar de ce côté là_,’ (we don’t want another
Gibraltar on that side.”)
Mr. Slidell’s predecessor at Paris, Mr. Rost, had received assurance
from the Duc de Morny, who was then next to the Emperor in his knowledge
of State affairs, that the South would be recognized. It was only a
question of time. After consulting with M. Thouvenel, Minister of
Foreign Affairs; Persigny, Minister of the Interior; Fould, Minister of
Finance; Rouher, Minister of Commerce; Baroche, President of the Council
of State; Mocquard, Private Secretary of the Emperor; Count Walewski, De
Morny and others, Slidell was satisfied that the Emperor was all right,
and he wrote to Jeff. Davis & Co. as follows:
“The Emperor has invited the English Government to join with him
in recognizing the South, but the English Government, owing to
Earl Russell, has refused to act simultaneously with him.”
This statement of Slidell was true in one sense, but it was not strictly
and diplomatically correct. There is no doubt that the English
Government would have been anxious enough to join the Emperor in any
scheme of conquest and spoliation that had a fair promise of success,
and an average chance of avenging the Boston Tea Party and the Battle of
Bunker Hill, but both powers were playing at the game of diplomacy, each
for the purpose of making the other responsible for taking the
initiative in the recognition of the South. They were both very
circumspect about committing themselves, and the Palmerston-Russell
Cabinet, with that caution which always characterized old “Pam” in
foreign affairs, would not recognize any suggestion from the Emperor
that did not bear his signature. The Emperor thought to make use of a
Mr. Lindsay, a wealthy shipowner and member of Parliament, to draw out
the English Government, but the latter was not to be committed to any
course of policy that might involve important responsibilities in the
future through any second-hand authority.
The Emperor seemed to have opened his mind very freely to Mr. Lindsay.
He told him that he would have taken steps to put an end to the blockade
of the Southern ports if the English Ministry had intimated a
willingness to act with him. He said he had forwarded intimation to this
effect through Mr. Thouvenel, but had not received a satisfactory
answer. He intimated that if England was ready, he was, and was prepared
at once to despatch a formidable fleet to the Mississippi, on condition
that England should send an equal force to demand free ingress and
egress for their merchantmen, and for the cargoes of goods and supplies
of cotton which were necessary to carry on the commerce of the world.
Napoleon was resolved to act, as he had always done, on the high ground
of conferring universal favors on humanity.
This was an old trick in his family, but it did not work effectually
this time. He said he had regarded the restoration of the Union
impossible from the first, and for that reason had deprecated the
continuance of the bloody contest, which could not lead to any other
result than separation. He authorized Mr. Lindsay to make this statement
to Lord Cowley, and to ascertain whether he would recommend the course
indicated to his Government.
It is very refreshing to reflect on the sensitive exhibition of feeling
displayed, in his ostensible attempt to stop the carnage and fratricidal
strife, by the man who planned and directed the wholesale assassinations
in connection with the sanguinary _Coup d’Etat_.
Mr. Lindsay reported back to the Emperor the substance of his interview
with Lord Cowley, who said that the English Government was not prepared
to act until further developments. It was about this time that Mr.
Seward was getting _in_ his fine diplomatic work with Earl Russell and
Palmerston, which helped materially to upset the calculations of the
Emperor.
Napoleon then requested Mr. Lindsay to see Palmerston, Russell, Derby
and Mr. Disraeli, and to gather their intentions. He desired Mr. Lindsay
to do all this of his own motion, and not as coming from him, and said
he did not wish to be embarrassed by the forms and delays of ordinary
diplomacy, because he felt the necessity of immediate action.
Lindsay again saw Earl Russell, as the accredited and special ambassador
of the Emperor, _viva voce_. The Earl informed him that he could not
receive any communications from a foreign power, except through the
regular diplomatic channel. He then sought an interview with Mr.
Disraeli, who was much more affable and communicative than the little
Lord who stood so punctiliously on ministerial ceremony.
Disraeli threw considerable light on the subject. After expressing a
deep interest in the affairs of the Confederacy, and saying that he
fully concurred in the views of the Emperor, he told Mr. Lindsay that he
had good reasons for believing that a secret understanding existed
between Earl Russell and Mr. Seward; that England, in the meantime,
would respect the Federal blockade and withhold recognition of the
South. “But if France should take the initiative,” said Mr. Disraeli in
conclusion, “any course she may adopt to put an end to the present state
of affairs will undoubtedly be supported by a large majority in
Parliament, and knowing this, Lord Russell will give a reluctant assent
to this, to avoid a change of ministry, which would otherwise certainly
follow.”
This shows that Disraeli saw very clearly through the duplicity of
English diplomacy, and that while England was profuse in her promises to
Mr. Seward, she was only waiting for the Emperor to act as pioneer in
order that she might have a safe opportunity as well as a plausible
pretext for armed intervention.
The Emperor complained that Earl Russell had divulged his views on
American affairs, as expressed through his ambassador, to Mr. Seward.
Lord Russell placed himself squarely on the “fence,” to be prepared for
any emergency. Finally, about the middle of April, the Emperor thought
it would be best that he himself should make a friendly appeal to the
Federal Government alone to open the ports, if England did not join him,
without further hesitation. He thought it would be necessary, however,
to accompany the appeal with a demonstration of force on the Southern
coasts; and if the appeal should be effective, to back it up by a
declaration of his purpose not to respect the blockade. He determined,
however, to wait a few days longer to see how England would act.
This resolution of the Emperor to make a friendly appeal to raise the
blockade was only a thin excuse to find a cause for quarrel with the
North, and it is very probable he would have acted on this determination
alone, but for an unexpected event which changed his projects, and the
apparent course of history.
About a week after this diplomatic conference, Commodores D. G.
Farragut, and D. D. Porter, with their able commanders Bailey and Bell,
had made the famous passage of forts Jackson and St. Philip, at the
mouth of the Mississippi, with the United States squadron, silenced the
Chalmette batteries and anchored in the harbor of New Orleans. After two
days’ parleying the city surrendered at discretion, or rather, the city
authorities passively and sullenly permitted Farragut, and afterwards
General Butler, to take possession of the city without shedding any
blood.
This great naval victory of Farragut’s squadron and its consequences
dampened the ardor of the Emperor. He saw the chances of backing up his
“friendly appeal” by a demonstration of force, were cut off, so far as
New Orleans and the forts of the Mississippi were concerned.
Yet, Napoleon did not totally relinquish the enterprise, on account of
this crushing defeat of the Confederacy. M. Billault, a prominent member
of Napoleon’s cabinet, after this event said to Slidell, “The cabinet,
with the probable exception of M. Thouvenel, are in favor of the South.
If New Orleans had not fallen, our recognition could not have been long
delayed, but if the Confederates should obtain successes in Virginia and
Tennessee, and hold the enemy at bay a month or two longer, we may see
an opportunity for intervention.”
The Emperor’s intentions, however, were fully revealed in an autograph
letter to General Forey, which was written in July and in which his
grasping ambition stood out in the boldest relief. He wrote: “In the
present state of civilization of the world, the prosperity of America is
not a subject of indifference to Europe, for she nourishes our
manufactures and gives life to our commerce. We are interested in having
the Republic of the United States a powerful and prosperous power, but
we are not willing to have that Republic take possession of the entire
Gulf of Mexico, command from there the Antilles as well as South
America, and monopolize the distribution of the products of the New
World. To prevent this, a stable Government must be established in
Mexico, and we will in that event have restored to the Latin race on the
other side of the Atlantic its power and prestige.”
Napoleon completely overdid the thing in this letter to General Forey.
The vaulting ambition which overleaps itself and falls on the other side
stuck out too plainly. He showed that he wanted the whole earth, and
this aroused the resentment of the South. In the following August, M.
Theron, a French consul in Texas, inspired by Napoleonic ideas of
annexation, coolly contemplated the transformation of Texas to a French
republic, and confided his project to Governor Lubbock of that State,
who apprised Jefferson Davis of the consul’s aspirations. This was too
much even for the Confederate Government, and M. Theron and the French
consul at Richmond were both politely requested to leave the Confederate
States.
Napoleon persisted in his intrigues for the purpose of getting a
foothold in this country, in spite of the rebuff which his officious
consuls had received from the Confederacy. He expressed himself desirous
of interesting some of the rest of the European powers in the cause of