Fifty years in Wall Street
the South, and again entered into confidence with Slidell on the
possibility of joint mediation on the part of England, France and
Russia. “My own preference,” said the Emperor, “is for a proposition for
an armistice for six months, with the Southern ports open to the
commerce of the world. This would put a stop to the effusion of blood”
(How tender-hearted he was!) “and hostilities would probably never be
resumed. We can urge it,” he added, “on the high grounds of humanity,
and the interests of the whole civilized world. If it be refused by the
North, it will afford good reason for recognition, and perhaps for more
active intervention.”
Mr. Slidell then suggested that if the Emperor would give some kind of
assurance that the police would not interfere, ships and munitions of
war might be sent from France to the Confederacy.
“Why could you not have the ships built as if for the Italian
Government?” suggested the Emperor. “I do not think it would be
difficult, but I will consult my ministers about it.”
Napoleon then suggested the joint appeal for the six months’ armistice
to England and Russia, which was declined by both. He then made a direct
offer of mediation to the United States Government, in the most friendly
terms, and on the “high grounds of humanity.”
The United States Government did not see it in this light, and rejected
Napoleon’s humane offer.
The Confederate agents then obtained power to build ships of war in
French ports, and to arm and equip them, and proceed to sea without
molestation from the French authorities, the Treaty of Paris forbidding
such a hostile act against a friendly power like the North to the
contrary notwithstanding. The despot of France imagined himself above
all treaties at that time.
The English Alabama was then cruising in a most successful manner. The
Emperor had a conference with Mr. Arman, a large shipbuilder, and
assured him that there would be no difficulty about building the ships
for the Confederates under the disguise of their Italian destination.
Accordingly, a contract was made for building five ships of war at
Bordeaux and Nantes, and afterwards another contract for three iron-clad
rams.
In 1863 the Emperor had a great deal of business on hand, but was still
convinced, amid all his diplomatic duties that the South should be
recognized by the European powers. He was afraid, however, of putting
his Mexican expedition in jeopardy by risking a rupture with the North.
Finally, he said: “I will make a direct proposition to England for joint
recognition. This will effectually prevent Lord Palmerston from
misrepresenting my position and wishes on the American question.”
Accordingly, he had an interview with those two worthy members of
Parliament, Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay, at Fontainebleau, which was
said to be highly satisfactory. He authorized them to state in the House
of Commons that he was both willing and anxious to recognize the
Confederate States, with the co-operation of England.
There was a great debate in Parliament on the subject, in the midst of
which Earl Russell arose and said that Baron Gros, the French Minister,
had received no communication from his Government on American affairs.
Mr. Roebuck, who made the motion on the authority of the Emperor, was
astonished that he had been so badly fooled. It still remains a mystery,
however, why Baron Gros did not receive the advice in question from the
Emperor, because M. Mocquard, the Emperor’s Secretary, wrote to Slidell
as follows: “On the next day after the interview of Messrs. Roebuck and
Lindsay with the Emperor, the Minister of Foreign Affairs telegraphed
Baron Gros to ‘officiously’ inform Lord Palmerston that, should Great
Britain be willing to recognize the South, the Emperor would be willing
to follow her in that way.”
The only explanation that seems plausible under these circumstances is,
that the Palmerston-Russell Cabinet interrupted this telegram to Baron
Gros for diplomatic purposes, or that the Baron, seeing that the debate
in Parliament had taken an unfavorable turn, had prudently resolved to
suppress the advice from Napoleon, in order that his master might not
commit himself while England was not heart and soul with him in the
enterprise. In fact, England had begun to see that she had taken a false
position, and Mr. Gladstone’s eloquent spurt, to the effect that
“Jefferson Davis had created a nation,” was no longer the diplomatic
faith of England. She was more influenced by fear than love, as she
always is, and had begun to think, after the capture of New Orleans and
the destruction of the Confederate fleet, that the Federal Government
was capable of organizing a formidable navy. The London _Times_, which
voiced diplomatic sentiment then, said so. During this very debate on
Roebuck’s motion, Lee’s army had been beaten at Gettysburg, Vicksburg
had surrendered and victory was beginning to perch on the Northern
banners everywhere. Napoleon also drew in his horns, complaining
bitterly that “perfidious Albion” had gone back on him, and he was
afraid to permit the war ships, when finished, to leave the French ports
for any destination, and when he permitted the English privateer, the
Rappahannock, to depart, it was under the injunction that the American
minister should know nothing about it.
What Lord Palmerston called a “concatenation of circumstances”
contributed largely to force the Emperor to change his policy towards
the United States. Maximilian’s Mexican expedition was exceedingly
unpopular, trouble was brewing in several parts of the continent, and
Bismarck and Von Moltke were cunningly and deliberately weaving that net
in which the Man of Destiny, seven years later, was hopelessly entangled
at Sedan. His dream of a French American Empire beyond the Mississippi
had vanished long before his last abject act of humiliation in
surrendering the sword of France to Bismarck. And ere he died, a
miserable wreck of disappointed ambition, again a political exile, he
had the opportunity of seeing our own Republic, which he sought to
destroy, rehabilitated, and on its way to become the greatest nation in
history.
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CHAPTER IX.
SECRETARY CHASE AND THE TREASURY.
THE DEPLETED CONDITION OF THE TREASURY WHEN MR. CHASE TOOK
OFFICE.—PREPARATIONS FOR WAR AND GREAT EXCITEMENT IN
WASHINGTON.—CHIVALROUS SOUTHERNERS IN A FERMENT.—OFFICIALS UP IN
ARMS IN DEFENCE OF THEIR MENACED POSITIONS.—MISCALCULATION WITH
REGARD TO THE PROBABLE DURATION OF THE WAR.—A VISIT TO WASHINGTON
AND AN INTERVIEW WITH SECRETARY CHASE.—DISAPPOINTMENT ABOUT
THE SALE OF GOVERNMENT BONDS.—A PANIC PRECIPITATED IN
WALL STREET.—MILLIONAIRES REDUCED TO INDIGENCE IN A FEW
HOURS.—MIRACULOUSLY SAVED FROM THE WRECK.—HOW IT HAPPENED.
Soon after Mr. Chase came into the Treasury he found that money was
seriously needed. In fact the Treasury was empty. The expenditure for
the fiscal year ending June, 1861, was 62 millions, and there were only
41 millions of revenue to meet them, and even this amount was threatened
with a serious reduction on account of the traitorous and rebellious
attitude of the South.
After President Lincoln had called upon Congress to provide for the
enlistment of 400,000 men, the expenses of the Government were soon
advanced to the enormous amount of a million dollars a day. The
Secretary of the Treasury made a calculation, which he submitted to the
President, showing that the probable expenditures would amount to 318
millions for the ensuing year. He advised that 80 millions be provided
for by taxation, 240 millions by loan, and that 50 millions of Treasury
notes, redeemable in coin on demand, should be issued.
The Secretary was authorized by Congress to borrow a sum not exceeding
250 millions, on the credit of the United States, and as a part of this
loan he was, in the words of the Act, “to issue in exchange for coin, or
pay for salaries or other dues from the United States, not over 50
millions of Treasury notes, bearing no interest, but payable on demand
at New York, Philadelphia or Boston.”
When Mr. Chase advertised for bids on the bonds known as the 81 issue
all bids at 94 and above were accepted, and those under 94 were
rejected.
I got up a syndicate immediately to take the entire balance of the loan
at 94, and went on to Washington to see the Secretary. This syndicate
comprised a number of New York banks and many large capitalists. I
called upon Secretary Chase when I arrived, informed him of the object
of my visit and made him an offer of 94 for the entire balance of the
loan.
He was in favor of the proposition, but requested me to leave the matter
open until the following morning for him to consider. It was a question
with him whether he ought not to give those whose bids had been rejected
an equal opportunity with the parties I represented.
I never can forget the impression I received on my approach to
Washington that morning. As I looked through the window of the
sleeping-car my eye was met by an entire train load of brass cannon.
There were at least a dozen platform cars, each having one of those huge
guns, all apparently in order to wheel at once against the enemy. I
shall always remember the feelings that came over me at that moment. The
question of war or no war was vividly presented to my mind, and this was
the uppermost thought during my visit at Washington.
I descended from my traveling quarters as soon as the train was
announced as having arrived at the capital, and repaired to Willard’s,
then the principal, if not, in fact, the only hotel for a traveler to go
to, and it was an old-fashioned, historic hostelry. I hastened to my
room, rapidly performed my ablutions, and then found my way into the
dingy breakfast room. On inquiry, I found that ten o’clock was the usual
hour for heads of departments, including Mr. Chase, to be at the
Treasury. At that hour I went to see him. I sent in my card and was
ushered into his presence without delay. He was a man of portly frame
and distinguished bearing, and impressed me with the feeling of being in
the presence of an individual far above the average standard of humanity
in every respect.
I informed the Secretary of my mission, with the result above stated.
About seven-eighths of the people of Washington, at that time, were
Southerners. The office-holders were largely composed of the latter, and
they were expecting to be suddenly turned out of office. This rendered
the place a boiling caldron of conspiracy and treason.
As I went around collecting information, the sight of those cannon that
at first had made such an indescribable impression upon me, continued to
haunt my vision wherever I went. The air was filled with rumors of war,
and everybody was wound up to the highest pitch of hostile excitement.
As I mingled among the people, the impression was forced upon me that
war was inevitable, and that up to the very hilt of the sword. I felt
that the contest would be long and bloody.
I sent a dispatch to my firm in New York, conveying my impressions to
that effect, and advised them to clear the decks in preparation
therefor. I urged them to lose no time in selling off all the mercantile