Letters of Pliny
knowledge, so particularly of what relates to the customs of the senate;
for who is there so tamely industrious as to desire to learn what he can
never have an opportunity of putting in practice? Besides, it is not
very easy to retain even the knowledge one has acquired where no
opportunity of employing it occurs. Hence it was that Liberty, on her
return[129] found us totally ignorant and inexperienced; and thus in the
warmth of our eagerness to taste her sweets, we are sometimes hurried
off to action, ere we are well instructed how we ought to act. But by
the institution of our ancestors, it was wisely provided that the young
should learn from the old, not only by precept, but by their own
observation, how to behave in that sphere in which they were one day
themselves to move; while these, again, in their turn, transmitted the
same mode of instruction to their children. Upon this principle it was
that the youth were sent early into the army, that by being taught to
obey they might learn to command, and, whilst they followed others,
might be trained by degrees to become leaders themselves. On the same
principle, when they were candidates for any office, they were obliged
to stand at the door of the senate-house, and were spectators of the
public council before they became members of it. The father of each
youth was his instructor upon these occasions, or if he had none, some
person of years and dignity supplied the place of a father. Thus they
were taught by that surest method of discipline, Example; how far the
right of proposing any law to the senate extended; what privileges a
senator had in delivering his opinion in the house; the power of the
magistrates in that assembly, and the rights of the rest of the members;
where it is proper to yield, and where to insist; when and how long to
speak, and when to be silent; how to make necessary distinctions between
contrary opinions, and how to improve upon a former motion: in a word,
they learnt by this means every senatorial usage. As for myself, it is
true indeed, I served in the army when I was a youth; but it was at a
time when courage was suspected, and want of spirit rewarded; when
generals were without authority, and soldiers without modesty; when
there was neither discipline nor obedience, but all was riot, disorder,
and confusion; in short, when it was happier to forget than to remember
what one learnt. I attended likewise in my youth the senate, but a
senate shrinking and speechless; where it was dangerous to utter one's
opinion, and mean and pitiable to be silent. What pleasure was there in
learning, or indeed what could be learnt, when the senate was convened
either to do nothing whatever or to give their sanction to some
consummate infamy! when they were assembled either for cruel or
ridiculous purposes, and when their deliberations were never serious,
though often sad! But I was not only a witness to this scene of
wretchedness, as a spectator; I bore my share of it too as a senator,
and both saw and suffered under it for many years; which so broke and
damped my spirits that they have not even yet been able fully to recover
themselves. It is within quite recently (for all time seems short in
proportion to its happiness) that we could take any pleasure in knowing
what relates to or in setting about the duties of our station. Upon
these considerations, therefore, I may the more reasonably entreat you,
in the first place, to pardon my error (if I have been guilty of one),
and, in the next, to lead me out of it by your superior knowledge: for
you have always been diligent to examine into the constitution of your
country, both with respect to its public and private, its ancient and
modern, its general and special laws. I am persuaded indeed the point
upon which I am going to consult you is such an unusual one that even
those whose great experience in public business must have made them, one
would have naturally supposed, acquainted with everything were either
doubtful or absolutely ignorant upon it. I shall be more excusable,
therefore, if I happen to have been mistaken; as you will earn the
higher praise if you can set me right in an affair which it is not clear
has ever yet fallen within your observation. The enquiry then before the
house was concerning the freedmen of Afranius Dexter, who being found
murdered, it was uncertain whether he fell by his own hands, or by those
of his household; and if the latter, whether they committed the fact in
obedience to the commands of Afranius, or were prompted to it by their
own villainy. After they had been put to the question, a certain senator
(it is of no importance to mention his name, but if you are desirous to
know, it was myself) was for acquitting them; another proposed that they
should be banished for a limited time; and a third that they should
suffer death.
These several opinions were so extremely different that it was
impossible either of them could stand with the other. For what have
death and banishment in common with one another? Why, no more than
banishment and acquittal have together. Though an acquittal approaches
rather nearer a sentence of exile than a sentence of death does: for
both the former agree at least in this that they spare life, whereas the
latter takes it away. In the meanwhile, those senators who were for
punishing with death, and those who proposed banishment, sat together on
the same side of the house: and thus by a present appearance of
unanimity suspended their real disagreement. I moved, therefore, that
the votes for each of the three opinions should be separately taken, and
that two of them should not, under favour of a short truce between
themselves, join against the third. I insisted that such of the members
who were for capital punishment should divide from the others who voted
for banishment; and that these two distinct parties should not be
permitted to form themselves into a body, in opposition to those who
declared for acquittal, when they would immediately after disunite
again: for it was not material that they agreed in disliking one
proposal, since they differed with respect to the other two. It seemed
very extraordinary that he who moved the freedmen should be banished,
and the slaves suffer death, should not be allowed to join these two in
one motion, but that each question should be ordered to be put to the
house separately; and yet that the votes of one who was for inflicting
capital punishment upon the freedmen should be taken together with that
of one who was for banishing them. For if, in the former instance, it
was reasonable that the motion should be divided, because it
comprehended two distinct propositions, I could not see why, in the
latter case, suffrages so extremely different should be thrown into the
same scale. Permit me, then, notwithstanding the point is already
settled, to go over it again as if it were still undecided, and to lay
before you those reasons at my ease, which I offered to the house in the
midst of much interruption and clamour. Let us suppose there had been
only three judges appointed to hear this cause, one of whom was of
opinion that the parties in question deserved death; the other that they
should only be banished; and the third that they ought to be acquitted:
should the two former unite their weight to overpower the latter, or
should each be separately balanced? For the first and second are no more
compatible than the second and third. They ought therefore in the same
manner to be counted in the senate as contrary opinions, since they were
delivered as different ones. Suppose the same person had moved that they
should both have been banished and put to death, could they possibly, in
pursuance of this opinion, have suffered both punishments? Or could it
have been looked upon as one consistent motion when it united two such
different decisions? Why then should the same opinion, when delivered by
distinct persons, be considered as one and entire, which would not be
deemed so if it were proposed by a single man? Does not the law
manifestly imply that a distinction is to be made between those who are
for a capital conviction, and those who are for banishment, in the very
form of words made use of when the house is ordered to divide? You who
are of such an opinion, come to this side; you who are of any other, go
over to the side of him whose opinion you follow. Let us examine this
form, and weigh every sentence: You who are of this opinion: that is,
for instance, you who are for banishment, come on this side; namely, on
the side of him who moved for banishment. From whence it is clear he
cannot remain on this side of those who are for death. You who are for
any other: observe, the law is not content with barely saying another,
but it adds any. Now can there be a doubt as to whether they who declare
for a capital conviction are of any other opinion than those who propose
exile! Go over to the side of him whose opinion you follow: does not the
law seem, as it were, to call, compel, drive over, those who are of
different opinions, to contrary sides? Does not the consul himself point
out, not only by this solemn form of words, but by his hand and gesture,
the place in which every man is to remain, or to which he is to go over?
"But," it is objected, "if this separation is made between those who
vote for inflicting death, and those who are on the side of exile, the
opinion for acquitting the prisoners must necessarily prevail." But how
does that affect the parties who vote? Certainly it does not become them
to contend by every art, and urge every expedient, that the milder
sentence may not take place. "Still," say they, "those who are for
condemning the accused either capitally or to banishment should be first
set in opposition to those who are for acquitting them, and afterwards
weighed against each other." Thus, as, in certain public games, some
particular combatant is set apart by lot and kept to engage with the
conqueror; so, it seems, in the senate there is a first and second
combat, and of two different opinions, the prevailing one has still a
third to contend with. What? when any particular opinion is received, do
not all the rest fall of course? Is it reasonable, then, that one should
be thrown into the scale merely to weigh down another? To express my
meaning more plainly: unless the two parties who are respectively for
capital punishment and exile immediately separate upon the first
division of the house it would be to no purpose afterwards to dissent
from those with whom they joined before. But I am dictating instead of
receiving instruction. -- Tell me then whether you think these votes
should have been taken separately? My motion, it is true, prevailed;
nevertheless I am desirous to know whether you think I ought to have
insisted upon this point, or have yielded as that member did who
declared for capital punishment? For convinced, I will not say of the
legality, but at least of the equity of my proposal, he receded from his
opinion, and went over to the party for exile: fearing perhaps, if the
votes were taken separately (which he saw would be the case), the
freedmen would be acquitted: for the numbers were far greater on that
side than on either of the other two, separately counted. The
consequence was that those who had been influenced by his authority,
when they saw themselves forsaken by his going over to the other party,
gave up a motion which they found abandoned by the first proposer, and
deserted, as it were, with their leader. Thus the three opinions were
resolved at length into two; and of those two, one prevailed, and the
other was rejected; while the third, as it was not powerful enough to
conquer both the others, had only to choose to which of the two it would
yield. Farewell.
XC -- To PATERNUS