Memoirs of General William T. Sherman — Complete
events did not keep pace with my desires." General Schofield had
reported to me that night:
I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to make
any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps. I have ordered
General Johnson's division to replace General Hascall's this
evening, and I propose to-morrow to take my own troops
(Twenty-third Corps) to the right, and try to recover what has been
lost by two days' delay. The force may likely be too small.
I sanctioned the movement, and ordered two of Palmers divisions
--Davis's and Baird's--to follow en echelon in support of Schofield,
and summoned General Palmer to meet me in person: He came on the
6th to my headquarters, and insisted on his resignation being
accepted, for which formal act I referred him to General Thomas.
He then rode to General Thomas's camp, where he made a written
resignation of his office as commander of the Fourteenth Corps, and
was granted the usual leave of absence to go to his home in
Illinois, there to await further orders. General Thomas
recommended that the resignation be accepted; that Johnson, the
senior division commander of the corps, should be ordered back to
Nashville as chief of cavalry, and that Brigadier-General Jefferson
C. Davis, the next in order, should be promoted major general, and
assigned to command the corps. These changes had to be referred to
the President, in Washington, and were, in due time, approved and
executed; and thenceforward I had no reason to complain of the
slowness or inactivity of that splendid corps. It had been
originally formed by General George H. Thomas, had been commanded
by him in person, and had imbibed some what his personal character,
viz., steadiness, good order, and deliberation nothing hasty or
rash, but always safe, "slow, and sure." On August 7th I
telegraphed to General Halleck:
Have received to-day the dispatches of the Secretary of War and of
General Grant, which are very satisfactory. We keep hammering away
all the time, and there is no peace, inside or outside of Atlanta.
To-day General Schofield got round the line which was assaulted
yesterday by General Reilly's brigade, turned it and gained the
ground where the assault had been made, and got possession of all
our dead and wounded. He continued to press on that flank, and
brought on a noisy but not a bloody battle. He drove the enemy
behind his main breastworks, which cover the railroad from Atlanta
to East Point, and captured a good many of the skirmishers, who are
of his best troops--for the militia hug the breastworks close. I
do not deem it prudent to extend any more to the right, but will
push forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too
hot to be endured. I have sent back to Chattanooga for two
thirty-pound Parrotts, with which we can pick out almost any house in
town. I am too impatient for a siege, and don't know but this is as
good a place to fight it out on, as farther inland. One thing is
certain, whether we get inside of Atlanta or not, it will be a
used-up community when we are done with it.
In Schofield's extension on the 5th, General Reilly's brigade had
struck an outwork, which he promptly attacked, but, as usual, got
entangled in the trees and bushes which had been felled, and lost
about five hundred men, in killed and wounded; but, as above
reported, this outwork was found abandoned the next day, and we
could see from it that the rebels were extending their lines,
parallel with the railroad, about as fast as we could add to our
line of investment. On the 10th of August the Parrott
thirty-pounders were received and placed in Position; for a couple
of days we kept up a sharp fire from all our batteries converging
on Atlanta, and at every available point we advanced our
infantry-lines, thereby shortening and strengthening the
investment; but I was not willing to order a direct assault, unless
some accident or positive neglect on the part of our antagonist
should reveal an opening. However, it was manifest that no such
opening was intended by Hood, who felt secure behind his strong
defenses. He had repelled our cavalry attacks on his railroad, and
had damaged us seriously thereby, so I expected that he would
attempt the same game against our rear. Therefore I made
extraordinary exertions to recompose our cavalry divisions, which
were so essential, both for defense and offense. Kilpatrick was
given that on our right rear, in support of Schofield's exposed
flank; Garrard retained that on our general left; and McCook's
division was held somewhat in reserve, about Marietta and the
railroad. On the 10th, having occasion to telegraph to General
Grant, then in Washington, I used this language:
Since July 28th Hood has not attempted to meet us outside his
parapets. In order to possess and destroy effectually his
communications, I may have to leave a corps at the railroad-bridge,
well intrenched, and cut loose with the balance to make a circle of
desolation around Atlanta. I do not propose to assault the works,
which are too strong, nor to proceed by regular approaches. I have
lost a good many regiments, and will lose more, by the expiration
of service; and this is the only reason why I want reenforcements.
We have killed, crippled, and captured more of the enemy than we
have lost by his acts.
On the 12th of August I heard of the success of Admiral Farragut in
entering Mobile Bay, which was regarded as a most valuable
auxiliary to our operations at Atlanta; and learned that I had been
commissioned a major-general in the regular army, which was
unexpected, and not desired until successful in the capture of
Atlanta. These did not change the fact that we were held in check
by the stubborn defense of the place, and a conviction was forced
on my mind that our enemy would hold fast, even though every house
in the town should be battered down by our artillery. It was
evident that we most decoy him out to fight us on something like
equal terms, or else, with the whole army, raise the siege and
attack his communications. Accordingly, on the 13th of August, I
gave general orders for the Twentieth Corps to draw back to the
railroad-bridge at the Chattahoochee, to protect our trains,
hospitals, spare artillery, and the railroad-depot, while the rest
of the army should move bodily to some point on the Macon Railroad
below East Point.
Luckily, I learned just then that the enemy's cavalry, under
General Wheeler, had made a wide circuit around our left flank, and
had actually reached our railroad at Tilton Station, above Resaca,
captured a drove of one thousand of our beef-cattle, and was strong
enough to appear before Dalton, and demand of its commander,
Colonel Raum, the surrender of the place. General John E. Smith,
who was at Kingston, collected together a couple of thousand men,
and proceeded in cars to the relief of Dalton when Wheeler
retreated northward toward Cleveland. On the 16th another
detachment of the enemy's cavalry appeared in force about Allatoona
and the Etowah bridge, when I became fully convinced that Hood had
sent all of his cavalry to raid upon our railroads. For some days
our communication with Nashville was interrupted by the destruction
of the telegraph-lines, as well as railroad. I at once ordered
strong reconnoissances forward from our flanks on the left by
Garrard, and on the right by Kilpatrick. The former moved with so
much caution that I was displeased; but Kilpatrick, on the
contrary, displayed so much zeal and activity that I was attracted
to him at once. He reached Fairburn Station, on the West Point
road, and tore it up, returning safely to his position on our right
flank. I summoned him to me, and was so pleased with his spirit
and confidence, that I concluded to suspend the general movement of
the main army, and to send him with his small division of cavalry
to break up the Macon road about Jonesboro, in the hopes that it
would force Hood to evacuate Atlanta, and that I should thereby not
only secure possession of the city itself, but probably could catch
Hood in the confusion of retreat; and, further to increase the
chances of success.
I ordered General Thomas to detach two brigades of Garrard's
division of cavalry from the left to the right rear, to act as a
reserve in support of General Kilpatrick. Meantime, also, the
utmost activity was ordered along our whole front by the infantry
and artillery. Kilpatrick got off during the night of the 18th,
and returned to us on the 22d, having made the complete circuit of
Atlanta. He reported that he had destroyed three miles of the
railroad about Jonesboro, which he reckoned would take ten days to
repair; that he had encountered a division of infantry and a
brigade of cavalry (Ross's); that he had captured a battery and
destroyed three of its guns, bringing one in as a trophy, and he
also brought in three battle-flags and seventy prisoners. On the
23d, however, we saw trains coming into Atlanta from the south,
when I became more than ever convinced that cavalry could not or
would not work hard enough to disable a railroad properly, and
therefore resolved at once to proceed to the execution of my
original plan. Meantime, the damage done to our own railroad and
telegraph by Wheeler, about Resaca and Dalton, had been repaired,
and Wheeler himself was too far away to be of any service to his
own army, and where he could not do us much harm, viz., up about
the Hiawassee. On the 24th I rode down to the Chattahoochee
bridge, to see in person that it could be properly defended by the
single corps proposed to be left there for that purpose, and found
that the rebel works, which had been built by Johnston to resist
us, could be easily utilized against themselves; and on returning
to my camp, at that same evening, I telegraphed to General
Halleck as follows:
Heavy fires in Atlanta all day, caused by our artillery. I will be
all ready, and will commence the movement around Atlanta by the
south, tomorrow night, and for some time you will hear little of
us. I will keep open a courier line back to the Chattahoochee
bridge, by way of Sandtown. The Twentieth Corps will hold the
railroad-bridge, and I will move with the balance of the army,
provisioned for twenty days.
Meantime General Dodge (commanding the Sixteenth Corps) had been
wounded in the forehead, had gone to the rear, and his two
divisions were distributed to the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps.
The real movement commenced on the 25th, at night. The Twentieth
Corps drew back and took post at the railroad-bridge, and the
Fourth Corps (Stanley) moved to his right rear, closing up with the
Fourteenth Corps (Jeff. C. Davis) near Utoy Creek; at the same time
Garrard's cavalry, leaving their horses out of sight, occupied the
vacant trenches, so that the enemy did not detect the change at
all. The next night (26th) the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps,
composing the Army of the Tennessee (Howard), drew out of their
trenches, made a wide circuit, and came up on the extreme right of
the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland
(Thomas) along Utoy Creek, facing south. The enemy seemed to
suspect something that night, using his artillery pretty freely;
but I think he supposed we were going to retreat altogether. An
artillery-shot, fired at random, killed one man and wounded
another, and the next morning some of his infantry came out of
Atlanta and found our camps abandoned. It was afterward related
that there was great rejoicing in Atlanta "that the Yankees were
gone;" the fact was telegraphed all over the South, and several
trains of cars (with ladies) came up from Macon to assist in the
celebration of their grand victory.