Memoirs of General William T. Sherman — Complete
adoption of any course by you that may force me to deviate from
them in future. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your
obedient servant,
W. J. HARDEE, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
IN THE FIELD, NEAR SAVANNAH, December 18, 1864 8 p.m.
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, City Point, Virginia.
GENERAL: I wrote you at length (by Colonel Babcock) on the 16th
instant. As I therein explained my purpose, yesterday I made a
demand on General Hardee for the surrender of the city of Savannah,
and to-day received his answer--refusing; copies of both letters
are herewith inclosed. You will notice that I claim that my lines
are within easy cannon-range of the heart of Savannah; but General
Hardee asserts that we are four and a half miles distant. But I
myself have been to the intersection of the Charleston and Georgia
Central Railroads, and the three-mile post is but a few yards
beyond, within the line of our pickets. The enemy has no pickets
outside of his fortified line (which is a full quarter of a mile
within the three-mile post), and I have the evidence of Mr. R. R.
Cuyler, President of the Georgia Central Railroad (who was a
prisoner in our hands), that the mile-posts are measured from the
Exchange, which is but two squares back from the river. By
to-morrow morning I will have six thirty-pound Parrotts in
position, and General Hardee will learn whether I am right or not.
From the left of our line, which is on the Savannah River, the
spires can be plainly seen; but the country is so densely wooded
with pine and live-oak, and lies so flat, that we can see nothing
from any other portion of our lines. General Slocum feels
confident that he can make a successful assault at one or two
points in front of General Davis's (Fourteenth) corps. All of
General Howard's troops (the right wing) lie behind the Little
Ogeechee, and I doubt if it can be passed by troops in the face of
an enemy. Still, we can make strong feints, and if I can get a
sufficient number of boats, I shall make a cooperative
demonstration up Vernon River or Wassaw Sound. I should like very
much indeed to take Savannah before coming to you; but, as I wrote
to you before, I will do nothing rash or hasty, and will embark for
the James River as soon as General Easton (who is gone to Port
Royal for that purpose) reports to me that he has an approximate
number of vessels for the transportation of the contemplated force.
I fear even this will cost more delay than you anticipate, for
already the movement of our transports and the gunboats has
required more time than I had expected. We have had dense fogs;
there are more mud-banks in the Ogeechee than were reported, and
there are no pilots whatever. Admiral Dahlgren promised to have
the channel buoyed and staked, but it is not done yet. We find
only six feet of water up to King's Bridge at low tide, about ten
feet up to the rice-mill, and sixteen to Fort McAllister. All
these points may be used by us, and we have a good, strong bridge
across Ogeechee at King's, by which our wagons can go to Fort
McAllister, to which point I am sending all wagons not absolutely
necessary for daily use, the negroes, prisoners of war, sick, etc.,
en route for Port Royal. In relation to Savannah, you will remark
that General Hardee refers to his still being in communication with
his department. This language he thought would deceive me; but I
am confirmed in the belief that the route to which he refers (the
Union Plank-road on the South Carolina shore) is inadequate to feed
his army and the people of Savannah, and General Foster assures me
that he has his force on that very road, near the head of Broad
River, so that cars no longer run between Charleston and Savannah.
We hold this end of the Charleston Railroad, and have destroyed it
from the three-mile post back to the bridge (about twelve miles).
In anticipation of leaving this country, I am continuing the
destruction of their railroads, and at this moment have two
divisions and the cavalry at work breaking up the Gulf Railroad
from the Ogeechee to the Altamaha; so that, even if I do not take
Savannah, I will leave it in a bad way. But I still hope that
events will give me time to take Savannah, even if I have to
assault with some loss. I am satisfied that, unless we take it,
the gunboats never will, for they can make no impression upon the
batteries which guard every approach from the sea. I have a faint
belief that, when Colonel Babcock reaches you, you will delay
operations long enough to enable me to succeed here. With Savannah
in our possession, at some future time if not now, we can punish
South Carolina as she deserves, and as thousands of the people in
Georgia hoped we would do. I do sincerely believe that the whole
United States, North and South, would rejoice to have this army
turned loose on South Carolina, to devastate that State in the
manner we have done in Georgia, and it would have a direst and
immediate bearing on your campaign in Virginia.
I have the honor to be your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General United States Army.
As soon as the army had reached Savannah, and had opened
communication with the fleet, I endeavored to ascertain what had
transpired in Tennessee since our departure. We received our
letters and files of newspapers, which contained full accounts of
all the events there up to about the 1st of December. As before
described, General Hood had three full corps of infantry--S. D.
Lee's, A. P. Stewart's, and Cheatham's, at Florence, Alabama--with
Forrest's corps of cavalry, numbering in the aggregate about
forty-five thousand men. General Thomas was in Nashville, Tennessee,
quietly engaged in reorganizing his army out of the somewhat broken
forces at his disposal. He had posted his only two regular corps,
the Fourth and Twenty-third, under the general command of
Major-General J. M. Schofield, at Pulaski, directly in front of
Florence, with the three brigades of cavalry (Hatch, Croxton, and
Capron), commanded by Major-General Wilson, watching closely for
Hood's initiative.
This force aggregated about thirty thousand men, was therefore
inferior to the enemy; and General Schofield was instructed, in
case the enemy made a general advance, to fall back slowly toward
Nashville, fighting, till he should be reenforced by General Thomas
in person. Hood's movement was probably hurried by reason of my
advance into Georgia; for on the 17th his infantry columns marched
from Florence in the direction of Waynesboro', turning, Schofield's
position at Pulaski. The latter at once sent his trains to the
rear, and on the 21st fell back to Columbia, Tennessee. General
Hood followed up this movement, skirmished lightly with Schofield
at Columbia, began the passage of Duck River, below the town, and
Cheatham's corps reached the vicinity of Spring Hill, whither
General Schofield had sent General Stanley, with two of his
divisions, to cover the movement of his trains. During the night
of November 29th General Schofield passed Spring Hill with his
trains and army, and took post at Franklin, on the south aide of
Harpeth River. General Hood now attaches serious blame to General
Cheatham for not attacking General Schofield in flank while in
motion at Spring Hill, for he was bivouacked within eight hundred
yards of the road at the time of the passage of our army. General
Schofield reached Franklin on the morning of November 30th, and
posted his army in front of the town, where some
rifle-intrenchments had been constructed in advance. He had the
two corps of Stanley and Cox (Fourth and Twenty-third), with
Wilson's cavalry on his flanks, and sent his trains behind the
Harpeth.
General Hood closed upon him the same day, and assaulted his
position with vehemence, at one time breaking the line and wounding
General Stanley seriously; but our men were veterans, cool and
determined, and fought magnificently. The rebel officers led their
men in person to the several persistent assaults, continuing the
battle far into the night, when they drew off, beaten and
discomfited.
Their loss was very severe, especially in general officers; among
them Generals Cleburn and Adams, division commanders. Hood's loss
on that day was afterward ascertained to be (Thomas's report):
Buried on the field, seventeen hundred and fifty; left in hospital
at Franklin, thirty-eight hundred; and seven hundred and two
prisoners captured and held: aggregate, six thousand two hundred
and fifty-two. General Schofields lose, reported officially, was
one hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-three
wounded, and eleven hundred and four prisoners or missing:
aggregate, twenty-three hundred and twenty-six. The next day
General Schofield crossed the Harpeth without trouble, and fell
back to the defenses of Nashville.
Meantime General Thomas had organized the employees of the
Quartermaster's Department into a corps, commanded by the
chief-quartermaster, General J. Z. Donaldson, and placed them in the
fortifications of Nashville, under the general direction of
Major-General Z. B. Tower, now of the United States Engineers. He
had also received the two veteran divisions of the Sixteenth Corps,
under General A. J. Smith, long absent and long expected; and he
had drawn from Chattanooga and Decatur (Alabama) the divisions of
Steedman and of R. S. Granger. These, with General Schofields army
and about ten thousand good cavalry, under General J. H. Wilson,
constituted a strong army, capable not only of defending Nashville,
but of beating Hood in the open field. Yet Thomas remained inside
of Nashville, seemingly passive, until General Hood had closed upon
him and had entrenched his position.
General Thomas had furthermore held fast to the railroad leading
from Nashville to Chattanooga, leaving strong guards at its
principal points, as at Murfreesboro', Deckerd, Stevenson,
Bridgeport, Whitesides, and Chattanooga. At Murfreesboro' the
division of Rousseau was reenforced and strengthened up to about
eight thousand men.
At that time the weather was cold and sleety, the ground was
covered with ice and snow, and both parties for a time rested on
the defensive. Those matters stood at Nashville, while we were
closing down on Savannah, in the early part of December, 1864; and
the country, as well as General Grant, was alarmed at the seeming
passive conduct of General Thomas; and General Grant at one time
considered the situation so dangerous that he thought of going to
Nashville in person, but General John A. Logan, happening to be at
City Point, was sent out to supersede General Thomas; luckily for
the latter, he acted in time, gained a magnificent victory, and
thus escaped so terrible a fate.
On the 18th of December, at my camp by the side of the plank-road,
eight miles back of Savannah, I received General Hardee's letter
declining to surrender, when nothing remained but to assault. The
ground was difficult, and, as all former assaults had proved so
bloody, I concluded to make one more effort to completely surround
Savannah on all aides, so as further to excite Hardee's fears, and,
in case of success, to capture the whole of his army. We had
already completely invested the place on the north, west, and
south, but there remained to the enemy, on the east, the use of the
old dike or plank-road leading into South Carolina, and I knew that
Hardee would have a pontoon-bridge across the river. On examining
my maps, I thought that the division of John P. Hatch, belonging to
General Fosters command, might be moved from its then position at
Broad River, by water, down to Bluffton, from which it could reach
this plank-road, fortify and hold it--at some risk, of course,