Memoirs of General William T. Sherman — Complete
salt-water....
Alexander Stephens, R. M. T. Hunter, and Judge Campbell, are now at
my headquarters, very desirous of going to Washington to see Mr.
Lincoln, informally, on the subject of peace. The peace feeling
within the rebel lines is gaining ground rapidly. This, however,
should not relax our energies in the least, but should stimulate us
to greater activity.
I have received your very kind letters, in which you say you would
decline, or are opposed to, promotion. No one world be more
pleased at your advancement than I, and if you should be placed in
my position, and I put subordinate, it would not change our
personal relations in the least. I would make the same exertions to
support you that you have ever done to support me, and would do all
in my power to make our cause win.
Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865.
Major-General G. H. THOMAS, commanding Army of the Cumberland.
GENERAL: With this I send you a letter from General Sherman. At
the time of writing it, General Sherman was not informed of the
depletion of your command by my orders. It will, be impossible at
present for you to move south as he contemplated, with the force of
infantry indicated. General Slocum is advised before this of the
changes made, and that for the winter you will be on the defensive.
I think, however, an expedition from East Tennessee, under General
Stoneman might penetrate South Carolina, well down toward Columbia,
destroying the railroad and military resources of the country, thus
visiting a portion of the State which will not be reached by
Sherman's forces. He might also be able to return to East
Tennessee by way of Salisbury, North Carolina, thus releasing home
our prisoners of war in rebel hands.
Of the practicability of doing this, General Stoneman will have to
be the judge, making up his mind from information obtained while
executing the first part of his instructions. Sherman's movements
will attract the attention of all the force the enemy can collect,
thus facilitating the execution of this.
Three thousand cavalry would be a sufficient force to take. This
probably can be raised in the old Department of the Ohio, without
taking any now under General Wilson. It would require, though, the
reorganization of the two regiments of Kentucky Cavalry, which
Stoneman had in his very successful raid into Southwestern
Virginia.
It will be necessary, probably, for you to send, in addition to the
force now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, to
enable General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley, and
the mountain-passes in rear of Stevenson.
You may order such an expedition. To save time, I will send a copy
of this to General Stoneman, so that he can begin his preparations
without loss of time, and can commence his correspondence with you
as to these preparations.
As this expedition goes to destroy and not to fight battles, but to
avoid them when practicable, particularly against any thing like
equal forces, or where a great object is to be gained, it should go
as light as possible. Stoneman's experience, in raiding will teach
him in this matter better than he can be directed.
Let there be no delay in the preparations for this expedition, and
keep me advised of its progress. Very respectfully, your obedient
servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, January 81, 1865.
Major-General J. M. SCHOFIELD, commanding army of the Ohio.
GENERAL: I have requested by telegraph that, for present purposes,
North Carolina be erected into a department, and that you be placed
in command of it, subject to Major-General Sherman's orders. Of
course, you will receive orders from me direct until such time as
General Sherman gets within communicating distance of you. This
obviates the necessity of my publishing the order which I informed
you would meet you at Fortress Monroe. If the order referred to
should not be published from the Adjutant-General's office, you
will read these instructions as your authority to assume command of
all the troops in North Carolina, dating all official
communications, "Headquarters Army of the Ohio." Your headquarters
will be in the field, and with the portion of the army where you
feel yourself most needed. In the first move you will go to Cape
Fear River.
Your movements are intended as cooperative with Sherman's movement
through the States of South and North Carolina. The first point to
be obtained is to secure Wilmington. Goldsboro' will then be your
objective point, moving either from Wilmington or Newbern, or both,
as you may deem best. Should you not be able to reach Goldsboro',
you will advance on the line or lines of railway connecting that
place with the sea-coast, as near to it as you can, building the
road behind you. The enterprise under you has two objects: the
first is, to give General Sherman material aid, if needed, in his
march north; the second, to open a base of supplies for him on the
line of his march. As soon, therefore, as you can determine which
of the two points, Wilmington or Newbern, you can best use for
throwing supplies from to the interior, you will commence the
accumulation of twenty days rations and forage for sixty thousand
men and twenty thousand animals. You will get of these as many as
you can house and protect, to such point in the interior as you may
be able to occupy.
I believe General Innis N. Palmer has received some instructions
directly from General Sherman, on the subject of securing supplies
for his army. You can learn what steps he has taken, and be
governed in your requisitions accordingly. A supply of
ordnance-stores will also be necessary.
Make all your requisitions upon the chiefs of their respective
departments, in the field, with me at City Point. Communicate with
me by every opportunity, and, should you deem it necessary at any
time, send a special boat to Fortress Monroe, from which point you
can communicate by telegraph.
The supplies referred to in these instructions are exclusive of
those required by your own command.
The movements of the enemy may justify you, or even make it your
imperative duty, to cut loose from your base and strike for the
interior, to aid Sherman. In such case you will act on your own
judgment, without waiting for instructions. You will report,
however, what you propose doing. The details for carrying out
these instructions are necessarily left to you. I would urge,
however, if I did not know that you are already fully alive to the
importance of it, prompt action. Sherman may be looked for in the
neighborhood of Goldsboro' any time from the 22d to the 28th of
February. This limits your time very materially.
If rolling-stock is not secured in the capture of Wilmington, it
can be supplied from Washington: A large force of railroad-men has
already been sent to Beaufort, and other mechanics will go to Fort
Fisher in a day or two. On this point I have informed you by
telegraph.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CITY POINT, VIRGINIA, March 16, 1865.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding military Division of the
Mississippi.
GENERAL: Your interesting letter of the 12th inst. is just
received. I have never felt any uneasiness for your safety, but I
have felt great anxiety to know just how you were progressing. I
knew, or thought I did, that, with the magnificent army with you,
you would come out safely somewhere.
To secure certain success, I deemed the capture of Wilmington of
the greatest importance. Butler came near losing that prize to us.
But Terry and Schofield have since retrieved his blunders, and I do
not know but the first failure has been as valuable a success for
the country as the capture of Fort Fisher. Butler may not see it
in that light.
Ever since you started on the last campaign, and before, I have
been attempting to get something done in the West, both to
cooperate with you and to take advantage of the enemy's weakness
there--to accomplish results favorable to us. Knowing Thomas to be
slow beyond excuse, I depleted his army to reinforce Canby, so that
he might act from Mobile Bay on the interior. With all I have
said, he has not moved at last advices. Canby was sending a
cavalry force, of about seven thousand, from Vicksburg toward
Selma. I ordered Thomas to send Wilson from Eastport toward the
same point, and to get him off as soon after the 20th of February
as possible. He telegraphed me that he would be off by that date.
He has not yet started, or had not at last advices. I ordered him
to send Stoneman from East Tennessee into Northwest South Carolina,
to be there about the time you would reach Columbia. He would
either have drawn off the enemy's cavalry from you, or would have
succeeded in destroying railroads, supplies, and other material,
which you could not reach. At that time the Richmond papers were
full of the accounts of your movements, and gave daily accounts of
movements in West North Carolina. I supposed all the time it was
Stoneman. You may judge my surprise when I afterward learned that
Stoneman was still in Louisville, Kentucky, and that the troops in
North Carolina were Kirk's forces! In order that Stoneman might
get off without delay, I told Thomas that three thousand men would
be sufficient for him to take. In the mean time I had directed
Sheridan to get his cavalry ready, and, as soon as the snow in the
mountains melted sufficiently, to start for Staunton, and go on and
destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and canal. Time advanced,
until he set the 28th of February for starting. I informed Thomas,
and directed him to change the course of Stoneman toward Lynchburg,
to destroy the road in Virginia up as near to that place as
possible. Not hearing from Thomas, I telegraphed to him about the
12th, to know if Stoneman was yet off. He replied not, but that he
(Thomas) would start that day for Knoxville, to get him off as soon
as possible.
Sheridan has made his raid, and with splendid success, so far as
heard. I am looking for him at "White House" to-day. Since about
the 20th of last month the Richmond papers have been prohibited
from publishing accounts of army movements. We are left to our own
resources, therefore, for information. You will see from the
papers what Sheridan has done; if you do not, the officer who bears
this will tell you all.
Lee has depleted his army but very little recently, and I learn of
none going south. Some regiments may have been detached, but I
think no division or brigade. The determination seems to be to
hold Richmond as long as possible. I have a force sufficient to
leave enough to hold our lines (all that is necessary of them), and
move out with plenty to whip his whole army. But the roads are
entirely impassable. Until they improve, I shall content myself
with watching Lee, and be prepared to pitch into him if he attempts
to evacuate the place. I may bring Sheridan over--think I will
--and break up the Danville and Southside Railroads. These are the
last avenues left to the enemy.
Recruits have come in so rapidly at the West that Thomas has now
about as much force as he had when he attacked Hood. I have
stopped all who, under previous orders, would go to him, except
those from Illinois.
Fearing the possibility of the enemy falling back to Lynchburg, and
afterward attempting to go into East Tennessee or Kentucky, I have
ordered Thomas to move the Fourth Corps to Bull's Gap, and to