Memoirs of General William T. Sherman — Complete
to the right, and found part of the Sixth Missouri pushing over the
sand-bar covered by the Thirteenth Regulars with a heavy fire. We
supposed, if once across, they could get up the bank and turn the
levee against the enemy, and left with that impression. Being in
heavy timber, I was not quite sure of my way back to the general,
his location being new, and therefore pushed full gallop for
Morgan's front, catching a good many stray shots from the
sharpshooters behind the levee, as I was compelled to keep in sight
of the bayou to hold direction. Something over half-way along
Morgan's division front, the commander of a Kentucky regiment
hailed me and said he must have support, as he was threatened by a
masked battery, and the enemy was in force in his front, and might
cross any moment. I answered, rather shortly, 'How the devil do
you know there is a masked battery? If you can't get over, how can
the rebels get at you?' He insisted on the battery, and danger. I
finally told him the bayou was utterly impassable there, but, if he
insisted the enemy could cross, I would insist on an advance on our
side at that point. Hurrying on to make up lost time, I soon
reached Morgan. He was making encouraging speeches in a general
way, but stopped to ask me questions as to Steele's rank, date of
commission, etc. I was very much disturbed at this, fearing want
of harmony, and rode on to Steele, whom I found cursing Morgan so
fiercely that I could not exactly make out the source of the
trouble, or reason why; but saw want of concert clearly enough. I
hastened back to General Sherman, and endeavored to impress my
ideas on him and my fears; but, while he admitted the facts, he
could not be made to believe that any jealousy or personal quarrel
could lead to a failure to support each other, and a neglect of
duty. The signal for attack had already been given, and the
artillery had opened, when I left him again for Morgan's front. I
found Morgan where I left him, and the troops advancing. I had
understood that he was to lead his division, and asked about it,
but, getting no satisfaction, pushed for the front, crossing the
slough at the little bridge at the head of the bayou. I found the
willows cut off eighteen inches or two feet long, with sharp points
above the mud, making it slow and difficult to pass, save at the
bridge. I overtook the rear of the advance about two or three
hundred feet up the gentle slope, and was astonished to find how
small a force was making the attack. I was also surprised to find
that they were Steele's men instead of Morgan's. I also saw
several regiments across the bayou, but not advancing; they were
near the levee. A heavy artillery and infantry fire was going on
all this time. While making my way along the column, from which
there were very few falling back, a shell burst near me, and the
concussion confused me at the time and left me with a headache for
several months. When I got my wits about me again I found a good
many coming back, but the main part of the force was compact and
keeping up the fight. I did not get closer to the woods than about
five hundred feet, and found that a large number had penetrated
into the enemy's works. When our men fell back, very few ran, but
came slowly and sullenly, far more angry than frightened. I found
General Frank Blair on foot, and with him Colonel Sea, of Southwest
Missouri, and learned that Colonel Thomas Fletcher, afterward
Governor of Missouri, was captured with many of his men. They both
insisted there on the spot, with those around us, that if all the
men ordered up had gone up, or even all that crossed the bayou had
moved forward, we could have readily established ourselves in the
enemy's works. I was firmly of the same opinion at the time on the
ground; and, an entrance effected, we could have brought the whole
force on dry ground, and had a base of operations against
Vicksburg--though probably, in view of later events, we would have
had to stand a siege from Pemberton's army. After explanations
with Blair, I rode to where the men were, who had crossed the
bayou, but had not advanced with the others. I found them to be De
Courcey's brigade; of Morgan's division, which General Sherman
supposed to be in advance. In fact, it was the intended support
that made the attack. A correspondence and controversy followed
between General Blair and Colonel De Courcey, most of which I have,
but nothing came of it. On reaching the bayou, I found that
Thayer's brigade, of Steele's division, had in some way lost its
direction and filed off to the right. Remembering the masked
battery, I suspected that had something to do with the matter, and,
on following it up, I learned that the Kentucky colonel before
mentioned had appealed for aid against the masked battery and
invisible force of rebels, and that a regiment had been ordered to
him. This regiment, filing off into the timber, had been followed
by Thayer's brigade, supposing it to be advancing to the front, and
thus left a single brigade to attack a superior force of the enemy
in an intrenched and naturally strong position. By the time the
mistake could be rectified, it was too late. Our loss was from one
hundred and fifty to two hundred killed, and about eleven hundred
prisoners and wounded. During the afternoon I went with a flag of
truce, with reference to burying the dead. I saw between eighty
and one hundred of our men dead, all stripped. There were others
closer into the enemy's works than I was allowed to go. On going
later to where the Sixth Missouri crossed, I found that they were
under the bank, and had dug in with their hands and bayonets, or
anything in reach, to protect themselves from a vertical fire from
the enemy overhead, who had a heavy force there. With great
difficulty they were withdrawn at night. Next day arrangements
were made to attempt a lodgment below Haines's Bluff: This was to
be done by Steele's command, while the rest of the force attacked
again where we had already tried. During the day locomotives
whistled, and a great noise and fuss went on in our front, and we
supposed that Grant was driving in Pemberton, and expected firing
any moment up the Yazoo or in the rear of Vicksburg. Not hearing
this, we concluded that Pemberton was throwing his forces into
Vicksburg. A heavy fog prevented Steele from making his movement.
Rain began to fall, and our location was not good to be in after a
heavy rain, or with the river rising. During the night (I think)
of January, 1, 1863, our troops were embarked, material and
provisions having been loaded during the day. A short time before
daylight of the 2d, I went by order of the general commanding, to
our picket lines and carefully examined the enemy's lines, wherever
a camp-fire indicated their presence. They were not very vigilant,
and I once got close enough to hear them talk, but could understand
nothing. Early in the morning I came in with the rear-guard, the
enemy advancing his pickets and main guards only, and making no
effort at all to press us. Once I couldn't resist the temptation
to fire into a squad that came bolder than the rest, and the two
shots were good ones. We received a volley in return that did come
very close among us, but hurt none of my party. Very soon after
our rear-guard was aboard, General Sherman learned from Admiral
Porter that McClernand had arrived at the mouth of the Yazoo. He
went, taking me and one other staff-officer, to see McClernand, and
found that, under an order from the President, he had taken command
of the Army of the Mississippi. He and his staff, of whom I only
remember two-Colonels Scates and Braham, assistant adjutant-general
and aide-de-camp--seemed to think they had a big thing, and, so far
as I could judge, they had just that. All hands thought the
country expected them to cut their way to the Gulf; and to us, who
had just come out of the swamp, the cutting didn't seem such an
easy job as to the new-comers. Making due allowance for the
elevation they seemed to feel in view of their job, everything
passed off pleasantly, and we learned that General Grant's
communications had been cut at Holly Springs by the capture of
Murphy and his force (at Holly Springs), and that he was either in
Memphis by that time or would soon be. So that, everything
considered, it was about as well that we did not get our forces on
the bluff's of Walnut Hill."
The above statement was sent to General Sherman in a letter dated
"Chicago, February 5,1876," and signed "John H. Hammond." Hammond
was General Sherman's assistant adjutant-general at the Chickasaw
Bayou.
J. E. TOURTELOTTE, Colonel and Aide-de-Camp.
On 29th December, 1862, at Chickasaw Bayou, I was in command of the
Thirty-first Missouri Volunteer Infantry, First Brigade, First
Division, Fifteenth Army Corps (Blair's brigade). Colonel Wyman,
of the Thirteenth Illinois Volunteer Infantry, having been killed,
I was the senior colonel of the brigade. General Blair rode up to
where my regiment lay, and said to me:
"We are to make a charge here; we will charge in two lines; your
regiment will be in the first line, and the Twenty-ninth
(Cavender's) will support you. Form here in the timber, and move
out across the bayou on a double-quick, and go right on to the top
of the heights in your front." He then told me to await a signal.
I then attempted to make a reconnaissance of the ground over which
we would have to charge, and rode out to the open ground in my
front, and saw that there was water and soft mud in the bayou, and
was fired upon by the sharp-shooters of the enemy, and turned and
went back into the woods where my command lay. Soon after that
General Blair came near me, and I told him there was water and mud
in the bayou, and I doubted if we could get across. He answered me
that General Morgan told him there was no water nor mud to hinder
us. I remarked that I had seen it myself, and General Morgan, or
any one else, could see it if he would risk being shot at pretty
lively. I then told General Blair that it was certain destruction
to us if we passed over the abatis upon the open ground where there
had once been a corn-field; that we could never reach the base of
the hill. He turned to me and said, "Can't you take your regiment
up there?" I told him, "Yes, I can take my regiment anywhere,
because the men do not know any better than to go," but remarked
that old soldiers could not be got to go up there. General Blair
then said, "Tom, if we succeed, this will be a grand thing; you
will have the glory of leading the assault." He then went on to
say that General Morgan's division would support us, and they were
heroes of many battles, and pointed to the Fifty-eighth Ohio, then
forming in the rear of the Thirteenth Illinois on my right, and
said: "See these men? They are a part of Morgan's division, and are
heroes of many battles." I laughingly said that they might be
heroes, but the regiment did not number as many as one of my
companies. He again assured me we would be supported by Morgan's
division, and all I had to do was to keep right on and "keep going
till you get into Vicksburg." I took my position in advance of my
regiment and awaited the signal. When we heard it, we raised a
shout, and started at a double-quick, the Thirteenth Illinois on my
right. I saw no troops on my left. When we emerged from the
woods, the enemy opened upon us; crossing the bayou under fire, and
many of the men sinking in the mud and water, our line was very
much disordered, but we pretty well restored it before reaching the
abatis. Here we were greatly disordered, but somewhat restored the
line on reaching the plateau or corn-field. The Twenty-ninth