Memoirs of General William T. Sherman — Complete
have thorough and hearty cooperation. I will not let side issues
draw me off from your main plans in which I am to knock Jos.
Johnston, and to do as much damage to the resources of the enemy as
possible. I have heretofore written to General Rawlins and to
Colonel Comstock (of your staff) somewhat of the method in which I
propose to act. I have seen all my army, corps, and division
commanders, and have signified only to the former, viz., Schofield,
Thomas, and McPherson, our general plans, which I inferred from the
purport of our conversation here and at Cincinnati.
First, I am pushing stores to the front with all possible dispatch,
and am completing the army organization according to the orders
from Washington, which are ample and perfectly satisfactory.
It will take us all of April to get in our furloughed veterans, to
bring up A. J. Smith's command, and to collect provisions and
cattle on the line of the Tennessee. Each of the armies will
guard, by detachments of its own, its rear communications.
At the signal to be given by you, Schofield, leaving a select
garrison at Knoxville and London, with twelve thousand men will
drop down to the Hiawassee, and march against Johnston's right by
the old Federal road. Stoneman, now in Kentucky, organizing the
cavalry forces of the Army of the Ohio, will operate with Schofield
on his left front--it may be, pushing a select body of about two
thousand cavalry by Ducktown or Elijah toward Athens, Georgia.
Thomas will aim to have forty-five thousand men of all arms, and
move straight against Johnston, wherever he may be, fighting him
cautiously, persistently, and to the best advantage. He will have
two divisions of cavalry, to take advantage of any offering.
McPherson will have nine divisions of the Army of the Tennessee, if
A. J. Smith gets here, in which case he will have full thirty
thousand of the best men in America. He will cross the Tennessee
at Decatur and Whitesburg, march toward Rome, and feel for Thomas.
If Johnston falls behind the Coosa, then McPherson will push for
Rome; and if Johnston falls behind the Chattahoochee, as I believe
he will, then McPherson will cross over and join Thomas.
McPherson has no cavalry, but I have taken one of Thomas's
divisions, viz., Garrard's, six thousand strong, which is now at
Colombia, mounting, equipping, and preparing. I design this
division to operate on McPherson's right, rear, or front, according
as the enemy appears. But the moment I detect Johnston falling
behind the Chattahoochee, I propose to cast off the effective part
of this cavalry division, after crossing the Coosa, straight for
Opelika, West Point, Columbus, or Wetumpka, to break up the road
between Montgomery and Georgia. If Garrard can do this work well,
he can return to the Union army; but should a superior force
interpose, then he will seek safety at Pensacola and join Banks,
or, after rest, will act against any force that he can find east of
Mobile, till such time as he can reach me.
Should Johnston fall behind the Chattahoochee, I will feign to the
right, but pass to the left and act against Atlanta or its eastern
communications, according to developed facts.
This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed, to look, but I will
ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy
that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against
you or Banks.
If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama
River, he will in a measure solve the most difficult part of my
problem, viz., "provisions." But in that I must venture. Georgia
has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not
starve. If the enemy interrupt our communications, I will be
absolved from all obligations to subsist on our own resources, and
will feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever we
can find. I will inspire my command, if successful, with the
feeling that beef and salt are all that is absolutely necessary to
life, and that parched corn once fed General Jackson's army on that
very ground.
As ever, your friend and servant,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
CULPEPPER COURT HOUSE, VIRGINIA, April 19, 1864.
Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding Military Division of the
Mississippi.
GENERAL: Since my letter to you of April 4th I have seen no reason
to change any portion of the general plan of campaign, if the enemy
remain still and allow us to take the initiative. Rain has
continued so uninterruptedly until the last day or two that it will
be impossible to move, however, before the 27th, even if no more
should fall in the meantime. I think Saturday, the 30th, will
probably be the day for our general move.
Colonel Comstock, who will take this, can spend a day with you, and
fill up many little gaps of information not given in any of my
letters.
What I now want more particularly to say is, that if the two main
attacks, yours and the one from here, should promise great success,
the enemy may, in a fit of desperation, abandon one part of their
line of defense, and throw their whole strength upon the other,
believing a single defeat without any victory to sustain them
better than a defeat all along their line, and hoping too, at the
same time, that the army, meeting with no resistance, will rest
perfectly satisfied with their laurels, having penetrated to a
given point south, thereby enabling them to throw their force first
upon one and then on the other.
With the majority of military commanders they might do this.
But you have had too much experience in traveling light, and
subsisting upon the country, to be caught by any such ruse. I hope
my experience has not been thrown away. My directions, then, would
be, if the enemy in your front show signs of joining Lee, follow
him up to the full extent of your ability. I will prevent the
concentration of Lee upon your front, if it is in the power of this
army to do it.
The Army of the Potomac looks well, and, so far as I can judge,
officers and men feel well. Yours truly,
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI
NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE, April 24, 1864
Lieutenant-General U. S. GRANT, Commander-in-Chief,
Culpepper, Virginia
GENERAL: I now have, at the hands of Colonel Comstock, of your
staff, the letter of April 19th, and am as far prepared to assume
the offensive as possible. I only ask as much time as you think
proper, to enable me to get up McPherson's two divisions from
Cairo. Their furloughs will expire about this time, and some of
them should now be in motion for Clifton, whence they will march to
Decatur, to join General Dodge.
McPherson is ordered to assemble the Fifteenth Corps near Larkin's,
and to get the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps (Dodge and Blair) at
Decatur at the earliest possible moment. From these two points he
will direct his forces on Lebanon, Summerville, and Lafayette,
where he will act against Johnston, if he accept battle at Dalton;
or move in the direction of Rome, if the enemy give up Dalton, and
fall behind the Oostenaula or Etowah. I see that there is some
risk in dividing our forces, but Thomas and Schofield will have
strength enough to cover all the valleys as far as Dalton; and,
should Johnston turn his whole force against McPherson, the latter
will have his bridge at Larkin's, and the route to Chattanooga via
Willa's Valley and the Chattanooga Creek, open for retreat; and if
Johnston attempt to leave Dalton, Thomas will have force enough to
push on through Dalton to Kingston, which will checkmate him. My
own opinion is that Johnston will be compelled to hang to his
railroad, the only possible avenue of supply to his army, estimated
at from forty-five to sixty thousand men.
At Lafayette all our armies will be together, and if Johnston
stands at Dalton we must attack him in position. Thomas feels
certain that he has no material increase of force, and that he has
not sent away Hardee, or any part of his army. Supplies are the
great question. I have materially increased the number of cars
daily. When I got here, the average was from sixty-five to eighty
per day. Yesterday the report was one hundred and ninety-three;
to-day, one hundred and thirty-four; and my estimate is that one
hundred and forty-five cars per day will give us a day's supply and
a day's accumulation.
McPherson is ordered to carry in wagons twenty day's rations, and
to rely on the depot at Ringgold for the renewal of his bread.
Beeves are now being driven on the hoof to the front; and the
commissary, Colonel Beckwith, seems fully alive to the importance
of the whole matter.
Our weakest point will be from the direction of Decatur, and I will
be forced to risk something from that quarter, depending on the
fact that the enemy has no force available with which to threaten
our communications from that direction.
Colonel Comstock will explain to you personally much that I cannot
commit to paper. I am, with great respect,
W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General.
On the 28th of April I removed my headquarters to Chattanooga, and
prepared for taking the field in person. General Grant had first
indicated the 30th of April as the day for the simultaneous
advance, but subsequently changed the day to May 5th. McPhersons
troops were brought forward rapidly to Chattanooga, partly by rail
and partly by marching. Thomas's troops were already in position
(his advance being out as far as Ringgold-eighteen miles), and
Schofield was marching down by Cleveland to Red Clay and Catoosa
Springs. On the 4th of May, Thomas was in person at Ringgold, his
left at Catoosa, and his right at Leet's Tan-yard. Schofield was
at Red Clay, closing upon Thomas's left; and McPherson was moving
rapidly into Chattanooga, and out toward Gordon's Mill.
On the 5th I rode out to Ringgold, and on the very day appointed by
General Grant from his headquarters in Virginia the great campaign
was begun. To give all the minute details will involve more than
is contemplated, and I will endeavor only to trace the principal
events, or rather to record such as weighed heaviest on my own mind
at the time, and which now remain best fixed in my memory.
My general headquarters and official records remained back at
Nashville, and I had near me only my personal staff and
inspectors-general, with about half a dozen wagons, and a single
company of Ohio sharp-shooters (commanded by Lieutenant McCrory) as
headquarters or camp guard. I also had a small company of
irregular Alabama cavalry (commanded by Lieutenant Snelling), used
mostly as orderlies and couriers. No wall-tents were allowed, only
the flies. Our mess establishment was less in bulk than that of
any of the brigade commanders; nor was this from an indifference to
the ordinary comforts of life, but because I wanted to set the
example, and gradually to convert all parts of that army into a
mobile machine, willing and able to start at a minute's notice, and
to subsist on the scantiest food. To reap absolute success might
involve the necessity even of dropping all wagons, and to subsist
on the chance food which the country was known to contain. I had
obtained not only the United States census-tables of 1860, but a
compilation made by the Controller of the State of Georgia for the
purpose of taxation, containing in considerable detail the
"population and statistics" of every county in Georgia. One of my
aides (Captain Dayton) acted as assistant adjutant general, with an
order-book, letter-book, and writing-paper, that filled a small
chest not much larger than an ordinary candle-boa. The only
reports and returns called for were the ordinary tri-monthly