Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
months after his solemn declaration to the Legislative Body, in which
he pledged himself in the face of France and Europe not to seek any
aggrandisement of territory. The pretext of a voluntary offer on the
part of Genoa was too absurd to deceive any one. The rapid progress of
Napoleon's ambition could not escape the observation of the Cabinet of
Vienna, which began to allow increased symptoms of hostility. The
change which was effected in the form of the Government of the Cisalpine
Republic was likewise an act calculated to excite remonstrance on the
part of all the powers who were not entirely subject to the yoke of
France. He disguised the taking of Genoa under the name of a gift,
and the possession of Italy under the appearance of a mere change of
denomination. Notwithstanding these flagrant outrages the exclusive
apologists of Napoleon have always asserted that he did not wish for
war, and he himself maintained that assertion at St. Helena. It is said
that he was always attacked, and hence a conclusion is drawn in favour
of his love of peace. I acknowledge Bonaparte would never have fired
a single musket-shot if all the powers of Europe had submitted to be
pillaged by him one after the other without opposition. It was in fact
declaring war against them to place them under the necessity of breaking
a peace, during the continuance of which he was augmenting his power,
and gratifying his ambition, as if in defiance of Europe. In this
way Napoleon commenced all the wars in which he was engaged, with
the exception of that which followed the peace of Marengo, and which
terminated in Moreau's triumph at Hohenlinden. As there was no liberty
of the press in France he found it easy to deceive the nation. He was in
fact attacked, and thus he enjoyed the pleasure of undertaking his great
military expeditions without being responsible in the event of failure.
During the Emperor's stay in the capital of the new kingdom of Italy he
received the first intelligence of the dissatisfaction of Austria and
Russia. That dissatisfaction was not of recent date. When I entered on
my functions at Hamburg I learned some curious details (which I will
relate in their proper place) respecting the secret negotiations
which had been carried on for a considerable time previously to the
commencement of hostilities. Even Prussia was no stranger to the
dissatisfaction of Austria and Russia; I do not mean the King, but
the Cabinet of Berlin, which was then under the control of Chancellor
Hardenberg; for the King of Prussia had always personally declared
himself in favour of the exact observance of treaties, even when their
conditions were not honourable. Be that as it may, the Cabinet of
Berlin, although dissatisfied in 1806 with the rapid progress of
Napoleon's ambition, was nevertheless constrained to conceal its
discontent, owing to the presence of the French troops in Hanover.
On returning from Milan the Emperor ordered the erection, of a monument
on the Great St. Bernard in commemoration of the victory of Marengo. M.
Denon who accompanied Napoleon, told me that he made a useless search to
discover the body of Desaix, which Bonaparte wished to be buried beneath
the monument and that it was at length found by General Savary. It
is therefore certain that the ashes of the brave Desaix repose on the
summit of the Alps.
The Emperor arrived in Paris about the end of June and instantly set off
for the camp at Boulogne. It was now once more believed that the project
of invading England would be accomplished. This idea obtained the
greater credit because Bonaparte caused some experiments for embarkation
to be made, in his presence. These experiments, however, led to no
result. About this period a fatal event but too effectually contributed
to strengthen the opinion of the inferiority of our navy. A French
squadron consisting of fifteen ships, fell in with the English fleet
commanded by Admiral Calder, who had only nine vessels under his
command, and in an engagement, which there was every reason to expect
would terminate in our favour, we had the misfortune to lose two ships.
The invasion of England was as little the object of this as of the
previous journey to Boulogne; all Napoleon had in view was to stimulate
the enthusiasm of the troops, and to hold out those threats against
England when conceived necessary for diverting attention from the real
motive of his hostile preparations, which was to invade Germany and
repulse the Russian troops, who had begun their march towards Austria.
Such was the true object of Napoleons last journey to Boulogne.
I had been some time at Hamburg when these events took place, and it was
curious to observe the effect they produced. But I must not forget one
circumstance in which I am personally concerned, and which brings
me back to the time when I was in Paris. My new title of Minister
Plenipotentiary obliged me to see a little more of society than during
the period when prudence required me to live as it were in retirement.
I had received sincere congratulations from Duroc, Rape, and Lauriston,
the three friends who had shown the greatest readiness to serve my
interests with the Emperor; and I had frequent occasion to see M.
Talleyrand, as my functions belonged to his department. The Emperor,
on my farewell audience, having informed me that I was to correspond
directly with the Minister of the General Police, I called on Fouché,
who invited me to spend some days at his estate of Pont-Carre. I
accepted the invitation because I wanted to confer with him, and I spent
Sunday and Monday, the 28th and 29th of April, at Pont-Carre.
Fouché, like the Emperor, frequently revealed what he intended to
conceal; but he had such a reputation for cunning that this sort of
indiscretion was attended by no inconvenience to him. He was supposed
to be such a constant dissembler that those who did not know him well
looked upon the truth when he spoke it merely as an artful snare laid
to entrap them. I, however, knew that celebrated person too well to
confound his cunning with his indiscretion. The best way to get out
of him more than he was aware of was to let him talk on without
interruption. There were very few visitors at Pont-Carre, and during the
two days I spent there I had several conversations with Fouché. He told
me a great deal about the events of 1804, and he congratulated himself
on having advised Napoleon to declare himself Emperor--"I have no
preference," says Fouché, "for one form of government more than another.
Forms signify nothing. The first object of the Revolution was not the
overthrow of the Bourbons, but merely the reform of abuses and the
destruction of prejudices. However, when it was discovered that Louis
XVI. had neither firmness to refuse what he did not wish to grant, nor
good faith to grant what his weakness had led him to promise, it was
evident that the Bourbons could no longer reign over France and things
were carried to such a length that we were under the necessity of
condemning Louis XVI. and resorting to energetic measures. You know all
that passed up to the 18th Brumaire, and after. We all perceived that
a Republic could not exist in France; the question, therefore, was to
ensure the perpetual removal of the Bourbons; and I believed the only
means for so doing was to transfer the inheritance of their throne to
another family. Some time before the 18th Brumaire I had a conversation
with Sieyès and Barras, in which it was proposed, in case of the
Directory being threatened, to recall the Duke of Orleans; and I could
see very well that Barras favoured that suggestion, although he alluded
to it merely as a report that was circulated about, and recommended me
to pay attention to it. Sieyès said nothing, and I settled the question
by observing, that if any such thing had been agitated I must have
been informed of it through the reports of my agents. I added, that the
restoration of the throne to a collateral branch of the Bourbons would
be an impolitic act, and would but temporarily change the position of
those who had brought about the Revolution. I rendered an account of
this interview with Barras to General Bonaparte the first time I had
an opportunity of conversing with him after your return from Egypt.
I sounded him; and I was perfectly convinced that in the state of
decrepitude into which the Directory had fallen he was just the man we
wanted. I therefore adopted such measures with the police as tended to
promote his elevation to the First Magistracy. He soon showed himself
ungrateful, and instead of giving me all his confidence he tried to
outwit me. He put into the hands of a number of persons various matters
of police which were worse than useless. Most of their agents, who were
my creatures, obeyed my instructions in their reports; and it often
happened that the First Consul thought he had discovered, through the
medium of others, information that came from me, and of the falsehood
of which I easily convinced him. I confess I was at fault on the 3d
Nivoise; but are there any human means of preventing two men, who have
no accomplices, from bringing a plot to execution? You saw the First
Consul on his return from the opera; you heard all his declamations. I
felt assured that the infernal machine was the work of the Royalists. I
told the Emperor this, and he was, I am sure, convinced of it; but he,
nevertheless, proscribes a number of men on the mere pretence of their
old opinions. Do you suppose I am ignorant of what he said of me and of
my vote at the National Convention? Most assuredly it ill becomes him
to reproach the Conventionists. It was that vote which placed the crown
upon his head. But for the situation in which we were placed by that
event, which circumstances had rendered inevitable, what should we
have cared for the chance of seeing the Bourbons return? You must have
remarked that the Republicans, who were not Conventionists, were in
general more averse than we to the proceedings of the 18th Brumaire, as,
for example, Bernadotte and Moreau. I know positively that Moreau was
averse to the Consulate; and that it was only from irresolution that
he accepted the custody of the Directory. I know also that he excused
himself to his prisoners for the duty which had devolved upon him. They
themselves told me this."
Fouché entered further into many details respecting his conduct, and
the motives which had urged him to do what he did in favour of the First
Consul. My memory does not enable me to report all he told me, but I
distinctly recollect that the impression made on my mind by what fell
from him was, that he had acted merely with a view to his own interests.
He did not conceal his satisfaction at having outwitted Regnier, and
obliged Bonaparte to recall him, that he set in motion every spring
calculated to unite the conspirators, or rather to convert the
discontented into conspirators, is evident from the following remarks
which fell from him: "With the information I possessed, had I remained
in office it is probable that I might have prevented the conspiracy, but
Bonaparte would still have had to fear the rivalry of Moreau. He would
not have been Emperor; and we should still have had to dread the return
of the Bourbons, of which, thank God, there is now no fear."
During my stay at Pont-Carry I said but little to Fouché about my long
audience with the Emperor. However, I thought I might inform him that
I was authorised to correspond directly with his Majesty. I thought it
useless to conceal this fact, since he would soon learn it through his
agents. I also said a few words about Bonaparte's regret at not having
children. My object was to learn Fouché's opinion on this subject, and
it was not without a feeling of indignation that I heard him say, "It