Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
acknowledge their justice. The prolonged stay of the French troops
in the bailiwick of Bergdorf, which had all the appearance of an
occupation, might have led to the confiscation of all Hamburg property
in England, to the laying an embargo on the vessels of the Republic,
and consequently to the ruin of a great part of the trade of France and
Holland, which was carried on under the flag of Hamburg. There was no
longer any motive for occupying the bailiwick of Bergdorf when there
were no Prussians in that quarter. It would have been an absurd
misfortune that eighty men stationed in that bailiwick should, for the
sake of a few louis and a few ells of English cloth, have occasioned
the confiscation of Hamburg, French, and Dutch property to the amount of
80,000,000 francs.
Marshal Bernadotte replied to me on the 16th of November, and said, "I
hasten to inform you that I have given orders for the evacuation of the
bailiwick of Bergdorf and all the Hamburg territory. If you could obtain
from the Senate of Hamburg, by the 19th of this month, two or three
thousand pairs of shoes, you would oblige me greatly. They shall be paid
for in goods or in money."
I obtained what Bernadotte required from the Senate, who knew his
integrity, while they were aware that that quality was not the
characteristic of all who commanded the French armies! What extortions
took place during the occupation of Prussia! I will mention one of the
means which, amongst others, was employed at Berlin to procure money.
Bills of exchange were drawn, on which endorsements were forged, and
these bills were presented to the bankers on whom they were purported
to be drawn. One day some of these forged bills to a large amount were
presented to Messrs. Mathiesen and Silleine of Hamburg, who, knowing
the endorsement to be forged, refused to cash them. The persons who
presented the bills carried their impudence so far as to send for the
gendarmes, but the bankers persisted in their refusal. I was informed of
this almost incredible scene, which had drawn together a great number
of people. Indignant at such audacious robbery, I instantly proceeded to
the spot and sent away the gendarmes, telling them it was not their duty
to protect robbers, and that it was my business to listen to any just
claims which might be advanced. Under Clarke's government at Berlin
the inhabitants were subjected to all kinds of oppression and exaction.
Amidst these exactions and infamous proceedings, which are not the
indispensable consequences of war, the Dutch generals distinguished
themselves by a degree of rapacity which brought to mind the period of
the French Republican peculations in Italy. It certainly was not their
new King who set the example of this conduct. His moderation was well
known, and it was as much the result of his disposition as of his
honest principles. Louis Bonaparte, who was a King in spite of himself,
afforded an example of all that a good man could suffer upon a usurped
throne.
When the King of Prussia found himself defeated at every point he
bitterly repented having undertaken a war which had delivered his States
into Napoleon's power in less time than that in which Austria had fallen
the preceding year. He wrote to the Emperor, soliciting a suspension
of hostilities. Rapp was present when Napoleon received the King of
Prussia's letter. "It is too late," said he; "but, no matter, I wish to
stop the effusion of blood; I am ready to agree to anything which is
not prejudicial to the honour or interests of the nation." Then calling
Duroc, he gave him orders to visit the wounded, and see that they wanted
for nothing. He added, "Visit every man on my behalf; give them all the
consolation of which they stand in need; afterwards find the King of
Prussia, and if he offers reasonable proposals let me know them."
Negotiations were commenced, but Napoleon's conditions were of a nature
which was considered inadmissible. Prussia still hoped for assistance
from the Russian forces. Besides, the Emperor's demands extended to
England, who at that moment had no reason to accede to the pretensions
of France. The Emperor wished England to restore to France the colonies
which she had captured since the commencement of the war, that Russia
should restore to the Porte Moldavia and Wallachia, which she then
occupied; in short, he acted upon the advice which some tragedy-king
gives to his ambassador: "Demand everything, that you may obtain
nothing." The Emperor's demands were, in fact, so extravagant that it
was scarcely possible he himself could entertain the hope of their being
accepted. Negotiations, alternately resumed and abandoned, were carried
on with coldness on both sides until the moment when England prevailed
on Russia to join Prussia against France; they then altogether ceased:
and it was for the sake of appearing to wish for their renewal, on bases
still more favourable to France, that Napoleon sent Duroc to the King
of Prussia. Duroc found the King at Osterode, on the other side of the
Vistula. The only answer he received from His Majesty was, "The time
is passed;" which was very much like Napoleon's observation; "It is too
late."
Whilst Duroc was on his mission to the King of Prussia I was myself
negotiating at Hamburg. Bonaparte was very anxious to detach Sweden from
the coalition, and to terminate the war with her by a separate treaty.
Sweden, indeed, was likely to be very useful to him if Prussia, Russia,
and England should collect a considerable mass of troops in the north.
Denmark was already with us, and by gaining over Sweden also the union
of those two powers might create a diversion, and give serious alarm to
the coalition, which would be obliged to concentrate its principal force
to oppose the attack of the grand army in Poland. The opinions of M.
Peyron, the Swedish Minister at Hamburg, were decidedly opposed to the
war in which his sovereign was engaged with France. I was sorry that
this gentleman left Hamburg upon leave of absence for a year just at the
moment I received my instructions from the Emperor upon this subject.
M. Peyron was succeeded by M. Netzel, and I soon had the pleasure of
perceiving that his opinions corresponded in every respect with those of
his predecessor.
As soon as he arrived M. Netzel sought an interview to speak to me on
the subject of the Swedes, who had been taken prisoners on the Drave. He
entreated me to allow the officers to return to Sweden on their parole.
I was anxious to get Netzel's demand acceded to, and availed myself
of that opportunity to lead him gradually to the subject of my
instructions. I had good reason to be satisfied with the manner in which
he received my first overtures. I said nothing to him of the justice
of which he was not previously convinced. I saw he understood that his
sovereign would have everything to gain by a reconciliation with France,
and he told me that all Sweden demanded peace. Thus encouraged, I told
him frankly that I was instructed to treat with him. M. Netzel assured
me that M. de Wetterstedt, the King of Sweden's private secretary, with
whom he was intimate, and from whom he showed me several letters, was
of the same opinion on the subject as himself. He added, that he had
permission to correspond with the King, and that he would; write the
same evening to his sovereign and M.. de Wetterstedt to acquaint them
with our conversation.
It will be perceived, from what I have stated, that no negotiation was
ever commenced under more favourable auspices; but who could foresee
what turn the King of Sweden would take? That unlucky Prince took M.
Netzel's letter in very ill part, and M. de Wetterstedt himself received
peremptory orders to acquaint M. Netzel with his sovereign's displeasure
at his having presumed to visit a French Minster, and, above all, to
enter into a political conversation with him, although it was nothing
more than conversation. The King did not confine himself to reproaches;
M. Netzel came in great distress to inform me he had received orders
to quit Hamburg immediately, without even awaiting the arrival of his
successor. He regarded his disgrace as complete. I had the pleasure of
seeing M. Netzel again in 1809 at Hamburg, where he was on a mission
from King Charles XIII.
CHAPTER IX.
1806
The Continental system--General indignation excited by it--Sale of
licences by the French Government--Custom-house system at Hamburg--
My letter to the Emperor--Cause of the rupture with Russia--
Bernadotte's visit to me--Trial by court-martial for the purchase of
a sugar-loaf--Davoust and the captain "rapporteur"--Influence of the
Continental system on Napoleon's fall.
I have a few remarks to make on the famous Continental system, which
was a subject of such engrossing interest. I had, perhaps, better
opportunities than any other person of observing the fraud and
estimating the fatal consequences of this system. It took its rise
during the war in 1806, and was brought into existence by a decree;
dated from Berlin. The project was conceived by weak counsellors, who;
perceiving the Emperor's just indignation at the duplicity of England,
her repugnance to enter, into negotiations with him, and her constant
endeavours to raise enemies against France, prevailed upon him to issue
the decree, which I could only regard as an act of madness and tyranny.
It was not a decree, but fleets, that were wanting. Without a navy it
was ridiculous to declare the British Isles in a state of blockade,
whilst the English fleets were in fact blockading all the French ports.
This declaration was, however, made in the Berlin Decree. This is what
was called the Continental system! which, in plain terms, was nothing
but a system of fraud and pillage.
One can now scarcely conceive how Europe could for a single day endure
that fiscal tyranny which extorted exorbitant prices for articles which
the habits of three centuries had rendered indispensable to the poor as
well as to the rich. So little of truth is there in the pretence that
this system had for its sole and exclusive object to prevent the sale of
English goods, that licences for their disposal were procured at a high
price by whoever was rich enough to pay for them. The number and quality
of the articles exported from France were extravagantly exaggerated. It
was, indeed, necessary to take out some of the articles is compliance
with the Emperor's wishes, but they were only thrown into the sea. And
yet no one had the honesty to tell the Emperor that England sold on the
continent but bought scarcely anything. The speculation in licences was
carried to a scandalous extent only to enrich a few, and to satisfy the
short-sighted views of the contrivers of the system.
This system proves what is written in the annals of the human heart and
mind, that the cupidity of the one is insatiable, and the errors of the
other incorrigible. Of this I will cite an example, though it refers to
a period posterior to the origin of the Continental system. In Hamburg,
in 1811, under Davoust's government, a poor man had well-nigh been shot
for having introduced into the department of the Elbe a small loaf of
sugar for the use of his family, while at the same moment Napoleon
was perhaps signing a licence for the importation of a million of
sugar-loaves.
--[In this same year (1811) Murat, as King of Naples, not only
winked at the infringement of the Continental system, but almost
openly broke the law himself. His troops in Calabria and all round
his immense line sea coast, carried on an active trade with Sicilian
and English smugglers. This was so much the case that an officer
never set out from Naples to join, without, being, requested by his