Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
might be regarded as a general register of the nobility of Europe.
It is commonly said that we may accustom ourselves to anything, but
to me this remark is subject to an exception; for, in spite of the
necessity to which I was reduced of employing spies, I never could
surmount the disgust I felt at them, especially when I saw men destined
to fill a respectable rank in society degrade themselves to that
infamous profession. It is impossible to conceive the artifices to
which these men resort to gain the confidence of those whom they wish to
betray. Of this the following example just now occurs to my mind.
One of those wretches who are employed in certain circumstances, and by
all parties, came to offer his services to me. His name was Butler, and
he had been sent from England to the Continent as a spy upon the French
Government. He immediately came to me, complaining of pretended enemies
and unjust treatment. He told me he had the greatest wish to serve the
Emperor, and that he would make any sacrifice to prove his fidelity.
The real motive of his change of party was, as it is with all such men,
merely the hope of a higher reward. Most extraordinary were the schemes
he adopted to prevent his old employers from suspecting that he was
serving new ones. To me he continually repeated how happy he was to be
revenged on his enemies in London. He asked me to allow him to go to
Paris to be examined by the Minister of Police. The better to keep up
the deception he requested that on his arrival in Paris he might be
confined in the Temple, and that there might be inserted in the French
journals an announcement in the following terms:
"John Butler, commonly called Count Butler, has just been arrested
and sent to Paris under a good escort by the French Minister at
Hamburg."
At the expiration of a few weeks Butler, having received his
instruction's, set out for London, but by way of precaution he said it
would be well to publish in the journals another announcement; which was
as follows:
"John Butler, who has been arrested in Hamburg as an English agent,
and conveyed to Paris, is ordered to quit France and the territories
occupied by the French armies and their allies, and not to appear
there again until the general peace."
In England Butler enjoyed the honours of French prosecution. He was
regarded as a victim who deserved all the confidence of the enemies of
France. He furnished Fouché with a considerable amount of information,
and he was fortunate enough to escape being hanged.
Notwithstanding the pretended necessity of employing secret agents,
Bonaparte was unwilling that, even under that pretext, too many
communications should be established between France and England: Fouché,
nevertheless, actively directed the evolutions of his secret army. Ever
ready to seize on anything that could give importance to the police and
encourage the suspicions of the Emperor, Fouché wrote to me that
the government had received certain--information that many Frenchmen
traveling for commercial houses in France were at Manchester purchasing
articles of English manufacture. This was true; but how was it to be
prevented? These traveling clerks passed through Holland, where they
easily procured a passage to England.
Louis Bonaparte, conceiving that the King of Holland ought to sacrifice
the interests of his new subjects to the wishes of his brother, was at
first very lenient as to the disastrous Continental system. But at this
Napoleon soon manifested his displeasure, and about the end of the
year 1806 Louis was reduced to the necessity of ordering the strict
observance of the blockade. The facility with which the travelers of
French commercial houses passed from Holland to England gave rise to
other alarms on the part of the French Government. It was said that
since Frenchmen could so easily pass from the Continent to Great
Britain, the agents of the English Cabinet might, by the same means,
find their way to the Continent. Accordingly the consuls were directed
to keep a watchful eye, not only upon individuals who evidently came
from England, but upon those who might by any possibility come from
that country. This plan was all very well, but how was it to be put
into execution? . . . The Continent was, nevertheless, inundated with
articles of English manufacture, for this simple reason, that, however
powerful may be the will of a sovereign, it is still less powerful and
less lasting than the wants of a people. The Continental system reminded
me of the law created by an ancient legislator, who, for a crime which
he conceived could not possibly be committed, condemned the person who
should be guilty of it to throw a bull over Mount Taurus.
It is not my present design to trace a picture of the state of Europe at
the close of 1806. I will merely throw together a few facts which came
to my knowledge at the time, and which I find in my correspondence. I
have already mentioned that the Emperor arrived at Warsaw on the 1st
of January. During his stay at Posen he had, by virtue of a treaty
concluded with the Elector of Saxony, founded a new kingdom, and
consequently extended his power in Germany, by the annexation of the
new Kingdom of Saxony to the Confederation of the Rhine. By the terms of
this treaty Saxony, so justly famed for her cavalry, was to furnish the
Emperor with a contingent of 20,000 men and horses.
It was quite a new spectacle to the Princes of Germany, all accustomed
to old habits of etiquette, to see an upstart sovereign treat them as
subjects, and even oblige them to consider themselves as such. Those
famous Saxons, who had made Charlemagne tremble, threw themselves on the
protection of the Emperor; and the alliance of the head of the House of
Saxony was not a matter of indifference to Napoleon, for the new King
was, on account of his age, his tastes, and his character, more revered
than any other German Prince.
From the moment of Napoleon's arrival at Warsaw until the commencement
of hostilities against the Russians he was continually solicited
to reestablish the throne of Poland, and to restore its chivalrous
independence to the ancient empire of the Jagellons. A person who was
at that time in Warsaw told me that the Emperor was in the greatest
uncertainty as to what he should do respecting Poland. He was entreated
to reestablish that ancient and heroic kingdom; but he came to no
decision, preferring, according to custom, to submit to events, that he
might appear to command them. At Warsaw, indeed, the Emperor passed a
great part of his time in fetes and reviews, which, however, did not
prevent him from watching, with his eagle eye, every department of
the public service, both interior and exterior. He himself was in the
capital of Poland, but his vast influence was present everywhere. I
heard Duroc say, when we were conversing together about the campaign
of Tilsit, that Napoleon's activity and intelligence were never more
conspicuously developed.
One very remarkable feature of the imperial wars was, that, with the
exception of the interior police, of which Fouché was the soul, the
whole government of France was at the headquarters of the Emperor. At
Warsaw Napoleon's attention was not only occupied with the affairs of
his army, but he directed the whole machinery of the French Government
just the same as if he had been in Paris. Daily estafettes, and
frequently the useless auditors of the Council of State, brought
him reports more or less correct, and curious disclosures which were
frequently the invention of the police. The portfolios of the Ministers
arrived every week, with the exception of those of the Minister for
Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the War Department; the former had
first stopped at Mayence with the Empress, but had been called on to
Warsaw; and the latter, Clarke, was, for the misfortune of Berlin,
governor of that city. This state of things lasted during the ten months
of the Emperor's absence from Paris. Louis XIV. said, "I am myself the
State." Napoleon did not say this; but, in fact, under his reign the
Government of France was always at his headquarters. This circumstance
had well-nigh proved fatal to him, on the occasion of the extraordinary
conspiracy of Malet, with some points of which I alone, perhaps, am
thoroughly acquainted. The Emperor employed the month of January in
military preparations for the approaching attack of the Russians, but at
the same time he did not neglect the business of the cabinet: with him
nothing was suffered to linger in arrear.
While Napoleon was at Warsaw a battle was not the only thing to be
thought about; affairs were much more complicated than during the
campaign of Vienna. It was necessary, on the one hand, to observe
Prussia, which was occupied; and on the other to anticipate the
Russians, whose movements indicated that they were inclined to strike
the first blow. In the preceding campaign Austria, before the taking of
Vienna, was engaged alone. The case was different now: Austria had had
only soldiers; and Prussia, as Blücher declared to me, was beginning to
have citizens. There was no difficulty in returning from Vienna, but a
great deal in returning from Warsaw, in case of failure, notwithstanding
the creation of the Kingdom of Saxony, and the provisional government
given to Prussia, and to the other States of Germany which we had
conquered. None of these considerations escaped the penetration of
Napoleon: nothing was omitted in the notes, letters, and official
correspondence which came to me from all quarters. Receiving, as I did,
accurate information from my own correspondents of all that was passing
in Germany, it often happened that I transmitted to the Government the
same news which it transmitted to me, not supposing that I previously
knew it. Thus, for example, I thought I was apprising the Government of
the arming of Austria, of which I received information from headquarters
a few days after.
During the Prussian campaign Austria played precisely the same waiting
game which Prussia had played clueing the campaign of Austria. As
Prussia had, before the battle of Austerlitz, awaited the success or
defeat of the French to decide whether she should remain neutral or
declare herself against France, so Austria, doubtless supposing that
Russia would be more fortunate as the ally of Prussia than she had been
as her ally, assembled a corps of 40,000 men in Bohemia. That corps
was called an army of observation; but the nature of these armies
of observation is well known; they belong to the class of armed
neutralities, like the ingenious invention of sanitary cordons. The fact
is, that the 40,000 men assembled in Bohemia were destined to aid and
assist the Russians in case they should be successful (and who can blame
the Austrian Government for wishing to wash away the shame of the Treaty
of Presburg?). Napoleon had not a moment to lose, but this activity
required no spur; he had hastened the battle of Austerlitz to anticipate
Prussia, and he now found it necessary to anticipate Russia in order to
keep Austria in a state of indecision.
The Emperor, therefore, left Warsaw about the end of January, and
immediately gave orders for engaging the Russian army in the beginning
of February; but, in spite of his desire of commencing the attack, he
was anticipated. On the 8th of February, at seven in the morning, he was
attacked by the Russians, who advanced during a terrible storm of snow,
which fell in large flakes. They approached Preussich-Eylau, where the
Emperor was, and the Imperial Guard stopped the Russian column. Nearly
the whole French army was engaged in that battle-one of the most
sanguinary ever fought in Europe. The corps commanded by Bernadotte