Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
this purpose he reckoned on the co-operation of the armies of the
Sambre-et-Meuse and the Rhine. The Directory replied that he must
not reckon on a diversion in Germany, and that the armies of the
Sambre-et-Meuse and the Rhine were not to pass that river. A resolution
so unexpected--a declaration so contrary to what he had constantly
solicited, compelled him to terminate his triumphs, and renounce his
favourite project of planting the standard of the republic on the
ramparts of Vienna, or at least of levying contributions on the suburbs
of that capital.
A law of the 23d of August 1794 forbade the use of any other names than
those in the register of births. I wished to conform to this law, which
very foolishly interfered with old habits. My eldest brother was living,
and I therefore designated myself Fauvelet the younger. This annoyed
General Bonaparte. "Such change of name is absolute nonsense," said he.
"I have known you for twenty years by the name of Bourrienne. Sign as
you still are named, and see what the advocates with their laws will
do."
On the 20th of April, as Bonaparte was returning to Italy, he was
obliged to stop on an island of the Tagliamento, while a torrent passed
by, which had been occasioned by a violent storm. A courier appeared on
the right bank of the river. He reached the island. Bonaparte read in
the despatches of the Directory that the armies of the Sambre-et-Meuse
and the Rhine were in motion; that they were preparing to cross the
Rhine, and had commenced hostilities on the very day of the signing
of the preliminaries. This information arrived seven days after the
Directory had written that "he must not reckon on the co-operation
of the armies of Germany." It is impossible to describe the General's
vexation on reading these despatches. He had signed the preliminaries
only because the Government had represented the co-operation of the
armies of the Rhine as impracticable at that moment, and shortly
afterwards he was informed that the co-operation was about to take
place! The agitation of his mind was so great that he for a moment
conceived the idea of crossing to the left bank of the Tagliamento, and
breaking off the negotiations under some pretext or other. He persisted
for some time in this resolution, which, however, Berthier and some
other generals successfully opposed. He exclaimed, "What a difference
would there have been in the preliminaries, if, indeed, there had been
any!"
His chagrin, I might almost say his despair, increased when, some days
after his entry into the Venetian States, he received a letter from
Moreau, dated the 23d of April, in which that general informed him that,
having passed the Rhine on the 20th with brilliant success, and taken
four thousand prisoners, it would not be long before he joined him. Who,
in fact, can say what would have happened but for the vacillating
and distrustful policy of the Directory, which always encouraged low
intrigues, and participated in the jealousy excited by the renown of
the young conqueror? Because the Directory dreaded his ambition they
sacrificed the glory of our arms and the honour of the nation; for
it cannot be doubted that, had the passage of the Rhine, so urgently
demanded by Bonaparte, taken place some days sooner, he would have been
able, without incurring any risk, to dictate imperiously the conditions
of peace on the spot; or, if Austria were obstinate, to have gone on to
Vienna and signed it there. Still occupied with this idea, he wrote to
the Directory on the 8th of May: "Since I have received intelligence of
the passage of the Rhine by Hoche and Moreau, I much regret that it did
not take place fifteen days sooner; or, at least, that Moreau did not
say that he was in a situation to effect it." (He had been informed to
the contrary.) What, after this, becomes of the unjust reproach against
Bonaparte of having, through jealousy of Moreau, deprived France of the
advantages which a prolonged campaign would have procured her? Bonaparte
was too devoted to the glory of France to sacrifice it to jealousy of
the glory of any individual.
In traversing the Venetian States to return to Milan, he often spoke
to me of Venice. He always assured me that he was originally entirely
unconnected with the insurrections which had agitated that country; that
common sense would show, as his project was to advance into the basin of
the Danube, he had no interest in having his rear disturbed by revolts,
and his communications interrupted or cut off: "Such an idea," said he,
"would be absurd, and could never enter into the mind of a man to whom
even his enemies cannot deny a certain degree of tact." He acknowledged
that he was not vexed that matters had turned out as they had done,
because he had already taken advantage of these circumstances in the
preliminaries and hoped to profit still more from them in the definitive
peace. "When I arrive at Milan," said he, "I will occupy myself with
Venice." It is therefore quite evident to me that in reality the
General-in-Chief had nothing to do with the Venetian insurrections; that
subsequently he was not displeased with them; and that, later still, he
derived great advantage from them.
We arrived at Milan on the 5th of May, by way of Lawbook, Thrust,
Palma-Nova, Padua, Verona, and Mantua. Bonaparte soon took up his
residence at Montebello, a very fine chateau, three leagues from
Milan, with a view over the rich and magnificent plains of Lombard. At
Montebello commenced the negotiations for the definitive peace which
were terminated at Passeriano. The Marquis de Gallo, the Austrian
plenipotentiary, resided half a league from Montebello.
During his residence at Montebello the General-in-Chief made an
excursion to the Lake of Como and to the Ago Maguire. He visited the
Borromean Islands in succession, and occupied himself on his return with
the organization of the towns of Venice, Genoa, and Milan. He sought for
men and found none. "Good God," said he, "how rare men are! There
are eighteen millions in Italy, and I have with difficulty found two,
Dandolo and Melzi."
He appreciated them properly. Dandolo was one of the men who, in those
revolutionary times, reflected the greatest honour upon Italy. After
being a member of the great council of the Cisalpine Republic, he
exercised the functions of Proveditore-General in Dalmatia. It is only
necessary to mention the name of Dandolo to the Dalmatians to learn from
the grateful inhabitants how just and vigorous his administration was.
The services of Melzi are known. He was Chancellor and Keeper of the
Seals of the Italian monarchy, and was created Duke of Lodi.
--[Francesco, Comte de Melzi d'Eryl (1753-1816), vice President of
the Italian Republic, 1802; Chancellor of the Kingdom of Italy,
1805; Duc de Loth, 1807.]--
In those who have seen the world the truth of Napoleon's reproach
excites little astonishment. In a country which, according to
biographies and newspapers, abounds with extraordinary men, a woman of
much talent--(Madame Roland.)--said, "What has most surprised me, since
the elevation of my husband has afforded me the opportunity of knowing
many persons, and particularly those employed in important affairs,
is the universal mediocrity which exists. It surpasses all that the
imagination can conceive, and it is observable in all ranks, from
the clerk to the minister. Without this experience I never could have
believed my species to be so contemptible."
Who does not remember Oxenstiern's remark to his son, who trembled at
going so young to the congress of Munster: "Go, my son. You will see by
what sort of men the world is governed."
CHAPTER VI.
1797.
Napoleon's correspondence--Release of French prisoners at Olmutz--
Negotiations with Austria--Bonaparte's dissatisfaction--Letter of
complaint from Bonaparte to the Executive Directory--Note respecting
the affairs of Venice and the Club of Clichy, written by Bonaparte
and circulated in the army--Intercepted letter of the Emperor
Francis.
During the time when the preliminaries of Leoben suspended military
operations, Napoleon was not anxious to reply immediately to all
letters. He took a fancy to do, not exactly as Cardinal Dubois did, when
he threw into the fire the letters he had received, saying, "There! my
correspondents are answered," but something of the same kind. To satisfy
himself that people wrote too much, and lost, in trifling and useless
answers, valuable time, he told me to open only the letters which came
by extraordinary couriers, and to leave all the rest for three weeks
in the basket. At the end of that time it was unnecessary to reply to
four-fifths of these communications. Some were themselves answers; some
were acknowledgments of letters received; others contained requests
for favours already granted, but of which intelligence had not been
received. Many were filled with complaints respecting provisions, pay,
or clothing, and orders had been issued upon all these points before
the letters were written. Some generals demanded reinforcements, money,
promotion, etc. By not opening their letters Bonaparte was spared the
unpleasing office of refusing. When the General-in-Chief compared the
very small number of letters which it was necessary to answer with the
large number which time alone had answered, he laughed heartily at his
whimsical idea. Would not this mode of proceeding be preferable to that
of causing letters to be opened by any one who may be employed, and
replying to them by a circular to which it is only necessary to attach a
date?
During the negotiations which followed the treaty of Leoben, the
Directory ordered General Bonaparte to demand the liberty of MM. de La
Fayette, Latour-Marbourg, and Bureau de Puzy, detained at Olmutz
since 1792 as prisoners of state. The General-in-Chief executed
this commission with as much pleasure as zeal, but he often met with
difficulties which appeared to be insurmountable. It has been very
incorrectly stated that these prisoners obtained their liberty by one
of the articles of the preliminaries of Leoben. I wrote a great deal
on this subject to the dictation of General Bonaparte, and I joined him
only on the day after the signature of these preliminaries. It was
not till the end of May of the year 1797 that the liberation of these
captives was demanded, and they did not obtain their freedom till the
end of August. There was no article in the treaty, public or secret,
which had reference to them. Neither was it at his own suggestion that
Bonaparte demanded the enlargement of the prisoners, but by order of the
Directory. To explain why they did not go to France immediately after
their liberation from Olmutz, it is necessary to recollect that the
events of the 18th Fructidor occurred between the period when the
first steps were taken to procure their liberty and the date of their
deliverance. It required all Bonaparte's ascendency and vigour of
character to enable him to succeed in his object at the end of three
months.
We had arrived at the month of July, and the negotiations were tediously
protracted. It was impossible to attribute the embarrassment which was
constantly occurring to anything but the artful policy of Austria:
Other affairs occupied Bonaparte. The news from Paris engrossed all
his attention. He saw with extreme displeasure the manner in which the
influential orators of the councils, and pamphlets written in the same
spirit as they spoke, criticised him, his army, his victories, the
affairs of Venice, and the national glory. He was quite indignant at
the suspicions which it was sought to create respecting his conduct and
ulterior views.
The following excerpts, attributed to the pens of Dumouriez or Rivarol,