Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
powerful protection against his enemies. This alliance gave rise to
great dissatisfaction in Spain, and caused France to be regarded with
an unfavourable eye. The Prince of the Asturias was encouraged and
supported by the complaints of the Spaniards, who wished to see the
overthrow of Godoy's power. Charles IV., on his part, regarded all
opposition to the Prince of the Peace as directed against himself, and
in November 1807 he accused his son of wishing to dethrone him.
The King of Spain did not confine himself to verbal complaints. He, or
rather the Prince of the Peace, acting in his name, arrested the warmest
partisans of the Prince of the Asturias. The latter, understanding the
sentiments of his father, wrote to Napoleon, soliciting his support.
Thus the father and son, at open war, were appealing one against another
for the support of him who wished only to get rid of them both, and to
put one of his brothers in their place, that he might have one junior
more in the college of European kings: but, as I have already mentioned,
this new ambition was not premeditated; and if he gave the throne of
Spain to his brother Joseph it was only on the refusal of his brother
Louis (King of Holland) to accept it.
The Emperor had promised to support Charles IV against his son; and, not
wishing to take part in these family quarrels, he had not answered
the first letters of the Prince of the Asturias. But finding that
the intrigues of Madrid were taking a serious turn, he commenced
provisionally by sending troops to Spain. This gave offence to the
people, who were averse to the interference of France. In the provinces
through which the French troops passed it was asked what was the object:
of the invasion. Some attributed it to the Prince of the Peace, others
to the Prince of the Asturias; but it excited general indignation, and
troubles broke out at Madrid accompanied by all the violence peculiar to
the Spanish character.
In these fearful circumstances Godoy proposed that Charles IV. should
remove to Seville, where he would be the better enabled to visit the
factious with punishment. A proposition from Godoy to his master was,
in fact, a command, and Charles IV. accordingly resolved to depart. The
people now looked upon Godoy as a traitor. An insurrection broke out,
the palace was surrounded, and the Prince of the Peace was on the point
of being massacred in an upper apartment, where he had taken refuge.
--[French troops had appeared in again some months before, on their
way to Portugal, the conquest of which country by Junot was to be
aided by Godoy and a Spanish force of 27,000 men, according to a
treaty (more disgraceful to the Court of Spain than to Bonaparte)
which had been ratified at Fontainebleau on the 27th of October
1807. Charles IV. was little better than an idiot, and Godoy and
the French made him believe that Bonaparte world give part, or the
whole of Portugal, to Spain. At the time of Junot's march on Lisbon
a reserve of 40,000 French troops were assembled at Bayonne--
a pretty clear indication, though the factious infatuated Court of
Madrid would not see it, that Bonaparte intended to seize the whole
of the Peninsula.--Editor of 1838 edition.]--
One of the mob had the presence of mind to invoke in his favour the name
of the Prince of the Asturias: this saved his life.
Charles IV. did not preserve his crown; he was easily intimidated, and
advantage was taken of a moment of alarm to demand that abdication which
he had not spirit to refuse. He surrendered up his rights to his son,
and thus was overthrown the insolent power of the Prince of the Peace;
the favourite was made prisoner, and the Spaniards, who, like all
ignorant people, are easily excited, manifested their joy on the
occasion with barbarous enthusiasm. Meanwhile the unfortunate King,
who had escaped from imaginary rather than real dangers, and who was at
first content with having exchanged the right of reigning for the right
of living, no sooner found himself in safety than he changed, his mind.
He wrote to the Emperor protesting against his abdication, and appealed.
to him as the arbiter of his future fate.
During these internal dissensions the French army was continuing its
march towards the Pyrenees. Those barriers were speedily crossed, and
Murat entered Madrid in the beginning of April 1808. Before I received
any despatch from our Government I learned that Murat's presence
in Madrid, far from producing a good effect, had only increased the
disorder. I obtained this information from a merchant of Lübeck who
came to Hamburg on purpose to show me a letter he had received from
his correspondent in Madrid. In this letter Spain was said to be a prey
which Murat wished to appropriate to himself; and all that afterwards
came to my knowledge served only to prove the accuracy of the writer's
information. It was perfectly true that Murat wished to conquer Spain
for himself, and it is not astonishing that the inhabitants of Madrid
should have understood his designs, for he carried his indiscretion so
far as openly to express his wish to become King of Spain. The Emperor
was informed of this, and gave him to understand, in very significant
terms, that the throne of Spain was not destined for him, but that he
should not be forgotten in the disposal of other crowns.
However, Napoleon's remonstrances were not sufficient to restrain the
imprudence of Murat; and if he did not gain the crown of Spain for
himself he powerfully contributed to make Charles IV. lose it. That
monarch, whom old habits attached to the Prince of the Peace, solicited
the Emperor to liberate his favourite, alleging that he and his family
would be content to live in any place of security provided Godoy were
with them. The unfortunate Charles seemed to be thoroughly disgusted
with greatness.
Both the King and Queen so earnestly implored Godoy's liberation that
Murat, whose vanity was flattered by these royal solicitations, took
the Prince of the Peace under his protection; but he at the same time
declared that, in spite of the abdication of Charles IV., he would
acknowledge none but that Prince as King of Spain until he should
receive contrary orders from the Emperor. This declaration placed Murat
in formal opposition to the Spanish people, who, through their hatred
of Godoy, embraced the cause of the heir of the throne; in whose favour
Charles IV. had abdicated.
It has been remarked that Napoleon stood in a perplexing situation in
this conflict between the King and his son. This is not correct. King
Charles, though he afterwards said that his abdication had been forced
from him by violence and threats, had nevertheless tendered it. By this
act Ferdinand was King, but Charles declared it was done against his
will, and he retracted. The Emperor's recognition was wanting, and he,
could give or withhold it as he pleased.
In this state of things Napoleon arrived at Bayonne. Thither Ferdinand
was also invited to go, under pretence of arranging with the Emperor the
differences between his father and himself. It was some time before
he could form his determination, but at length his ill-advised friends
prevailed on him to set off, and he was caught in the snare. What
happened to him, as well as to his father, who repaired to Bayonne with
his inseparable friend the Prince of the Peace is well known. Napoleon,
who had undertaken to be arbiter between the father and son, thought the
best way of settling the difference was to give the disputed throne to
his brother Joseph, thus verifying the fable of the "Two Lawyers and
the Oyster." The insurrection in Madrid on the 2d of May accelerated the
fate of Ferdinand, who was accused of being the author of it; at least
this suspicion fell on his friends and adherents.
Charles IV., it was said, would not return to Spain, and solicited an
asylum in France. He signed a renunciation of his rights to the crown of
Spain, which renunciation was also signed by the Infantas.
Napoleon now issued a decree, appointing "his dearly beloved brother
Joseph Napoleon, King of Naples and Sicily, to the crowns of Spain and
the Indies." By a subsequent decree, 15th of July, he appointed "his
dearly-beloved cousin, Joachim Murat, Grand Duke of Berg, to the throne
of Naples and Sicily, which remained vacant by the accession of Joseph
Napoleon to the kingdoms of Spain and the Indies." Both these documents
are signed Napoleon, and countersigned by the Minister Secretary of
State, Maret.
The Prince Royal of Sweden, who was at Hamburg at this time, and the
Ministers of all the European power, loudly condemned the conduct
of Napoleon with respect to Spain. I cannot say whether or not M. de
Talleyrand advised the Emperor not to attempt the overthrow of a
branch of the house of Bourbon; his good sense and elevated views might
certainly have suggested that advice. But the general opinion was that,
had he retained the portfolio of foreign affairs, the Spanish revolution
would have terminated with more decorum and good faith than was
exhibited in the tragi-comedy acted at Madrid and Bayonne.
After the Treaty of Tilsit and the bonds of friendship which seemed
likely to produce a permanent union between the Emperors of France
and Russia, the cause of the Bourbons must have been considered
irretrievably lost. Indeed, their only hope consisted in the imprudence
and folly of him who had usurped their throne, and that hope they
cherished. I will here relate what I had the opportunity of learning
respecting the conduct of Louis XVIII. after his departure from France;
this will naturally bring me to the end of November 1807, at which time
I read in the Abeille du Nord published on the 9th of the same month,
that the Comte de Lille and the Duc d'Angouleme had set off for England.
The Comte de Provence, as Louis' title then went, left Paris on the 21st
of June 1791. He constantly expressed his wish of keeping as near as
possible to the frontiers of France. He at first took up his abode at
Coblentz, and I knew from good authority that all the emigrants did
not regard him with a favourable eye. They could not pardon the wise.
principles he had professed at a period when there was yet time to
prevent, by reasonable concession, the misfortunes which imprudent
irritation brought upon France. When the emigrants, after the campaign
of 1792, passed the Rhine, the Comte de Provence resided in the little
town of Ham on the Lippe, where he remained until he was persuaded that
the people of Toulon had called him to Provence. As he could not, of
course, pass through France, Monsieur repaired to the Court of his
father-in-law, the King of Sardinia, hoping to embark at Genoa, and from
thence to reach the coast of Provence. But the evacuation of Toulon,
where the name of Bonaparte was for the first time sounded by the breath
of fame, having taken place before he was able to leave Turin, Monsieur
remained there four months, at the expiration of which time his
father-in-law intimated to him the impossibility of his remaining
longer in the Sardinian States. He was afterwards permitted to reside at
Verona, where he heard of Louis XVI.'s death. After remaining two years
in that city the Senate of Venice forbade his presence in the Venetian
States. Thus forced to quit Italy the Comte repaired to the army of
Condé.
The cold and timid policy of the Austrian Cabinet afforded no asylum to
the Comte de Provence, and he was obliged to pass through Germany;
yet, as Louis XVIII. repeated over and over again, ever since the
Restoration, "He never intended to shed French blood in Germany for
the sake of serving foreign interests." Monsieur had, indeed, too much
penetration not to see that his cause was a mere pretext for the powers