Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
sovereigns of Continental Europe should be his juniors, applied for
contingents of troops from the States to which I was accredited. The
Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin was to furnish a regiment of 1800 men,
and the other little States, such as Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-Strelitz,
were to furnish regiments of less amount. All Europe was required to
rise in arms to second the gigantic projects of the new sovereign.
This demand for contingents, and the positive way in which the Emperor
insisted upon them, gave rise to an immense correspondence, which,
however, was unattended by any result. The notes and orders remained in
the portfolios, and the contingents stayed at home.
M. Metternich, whose talent has since been so conspicuously displayed,
had been for upwards of a year Ambassador from Austria to Paris. Even
then he excelled in the art of guiding men's minds, and of turning
to the advantage of his policy his external graces and the favour he
acquired in the drawing-room. His father, a clever man, brought up in
the old diplomatic school of Thugut and Kaunitz, had early accustomed
him to the task of making other Governments believe, by means of agents,
what might lead them into error and tend to the advantage of his own
Government. His manoeuvres tended to make Austria assume a discontented
and haughty tone; and wishing, as she said, to secure her independence,
she publicly declared her intention of protecting herself against any
enterprise similar to those of which she had so often been the victim.
This language, encouraged by the complete evacuation of Germany, and the
war in Spain, the unfortunate issue of which was generally foreseen, was
used--in time of peace between the two empires, and when France was not
threatening war to Austria.
--[Metternich arrived in Paris as Ambassador on 4th August 1806,
after Austria had been vanquished at Austerlitz. It does not seem
probable, either from his views or his correspondence, that he
advised the rash attempt of Austria to attack Napoleon by herself;
compare Metternich tome 1. p. 69, on the mistake of Prussia in 1805
and 1806; see also tome ii. p. 221, "To provoke a war with France
would be madness" (1st July 1808). On the other hand, the tone of
his correspondence in 1808 seams calculated to make Austria believe
that war was inevitable, and that her forces, "so inferior to those
of France before the insurrection in Spain, will at least be equal
to them immediately after that event" (tome ii. p. 808). What is
curious is that Metternich's conduct towards Napoleon while
Ambassador had led even such men as Duke Dalberg to believe that he
was really so well disposed towards Napoleon as to serve his cause
more than that of Austria.
M. Metternich, who had instructions from his Court, gave no satisfactory
explanation of those circumstances to Napoleon, who immediately raised a
conscription, and brought soldiers from Spain into Germany.
It was necessary, also, to come to an understanding with Russia, who,
being engaged with her war in Finland and Turkey, appeared desirous
neither to enter into alliance with Austria nor to afford her support.
What, in fact, was the Emperor Alexander's situation with respect to
France? He had signed a treaty of peace at Tilsit which he felt had been
forced upon him, and he knew that time alone would render it possible
for him to take part in a contest which it was evident would again be
renewed either with Prussia or Austria.
Every person of common sense must have perceived that Austria, in taking
up arms, reckoned, if not on the assistance, at least on the neutrality
of Russia. Russia was then engaged with two enemies, the Swedes and the
Turks, over whom she hoped to triumph. She therefore rejoiced to see
France again engage in a struggle with Austria, and there was no doubt
that she would take advantage of any chances favourable to the latter
power to join her in opposing the encroachments of France. I never could
conceive how, under those circumstances, Napoleon could be so blind as
to expect assistance from Russia in his quarrel with Austria. He must,
indeed, have been greatly deceived as to the footing on which the two
Courts stood with reference to each other--their friendly footing and
their mutual agreement to oppose the overgrowing ambition of their
common enemy.
The English, who had been compelled to quit Spain, now returned there.
They landed in Portugal, which might be almost regarded as their own
colony, and marched against Marshal Soult, who left Spain to meet them.
Any other man than Soult would perhaps have been embarrassed by the
obstacles which he had to surmount. A great deal has been said about
his wish to make himself King of Portugal. Bernadotte told me, when he
passed through Hamburg, that the matter had been the subject of much
conversation at headquarters after the battle of Wagram. Bernadotte
placed no faith in the report, and I am pretty sure that Napoleon also
disbelieved it. However, this matter is still involved in the obscurity
from which it will only be drawn when some person acquainted with the
intrigue shall give a full explanation of it.
Since I have, with reference to Soult, touched upon the subject of
his supposed ambition, I will mention here what I know of Murat's
expectation of succeeding the Emperor. When Romanzow returned from his
useless mission of mediation to London the Emperor proceeded to Bayonne.
Bernadotte, who had an agent in Paris whom he paid highly, told me one
day that he had received a despatch informing him that Murat entertained
the idea of one day succeeding the Emperor. Sycophants, expecting to
derive advantage from it, encouraged Murat in this chimerical hope. I
know not whether Napoleon was acquainted with this circumstance, nor
what he said of it, but Bernadotte spoke of it to me as a certain fact.
It would, however, have been very wrong to attach great importance to an
expression which, perhaps, escaped Murat in a moment of ardour, for his
natural temperament sometimes betrayed him into acts of imprudence, the
result of which, with a man like Napoleon, was always to be dreaded.
It was in the midst of the operations of the Spanish war, which Napoleon
directed in person, that he learned Austria had for the first time
raised the landwehr. I obtained some very curious documents respecting
the armaments of Austria from the Editor of the Hamburg 'Correspondent'.
This paper, the circulation of which amounted to not less than 60,000,
paid considerable sums to persons in different parts of Europe who were
able and willing to furnish the current news. The Correspondent paid
6000 francs a year to a clerk in the war department at Vienna, and it
was this clerk who supplied the intelligence that Austria was preparing
for war, and that orders had been issued in all directions to collect
and put in motion all the resources of that powerful monarchy. I
communicated these particulars to the French Government, and suggested
the necessity of increased vigilance and measures of defence. Preceding
aggressions, especially that of 1805, were not to be forgotten. Similar
information probably reached the French Government from many quarters.
Be that as it may, the Emperor consigned the military operations in
Spain to his generals, and departed for Paris, where he arrived at the
end of January 1809. He had been in Spain only since the beginning of
November 1808,' and his presence there had again rendered our banners
victorious. But though the insurgent troops were beaten the inhabitants
showed themselves more and more unfavourable to Joseph's cause; and it
did not appear very probable that he could ever seat himself tranquilly
on the throne of Madrid.
--[The successes obtained by Napoleon during his stay of about three
months in Spain were certainly very great, and mainly resulted from
his own masterly genius and lightning-like rapidity. The Spanish
armies, as yet unsupported by British troops, were defeated at
Gomenal, Espinosa, Reynosa, Tudela, and at the pass of the Somo
sierra Mountains, and at an early hour of the morning of the 4th
December Madrid surrendered. On the 20th of December Bonaparte
marched with far superior forces against the unfortunate Sir John
Moore, who had been sent to advance into Spain both by the wrong
route and at a wrong time. On the 29th, from the heights of
Benevento, his eyes were delighted by seeing the English in full
retreat. But a blow struck him from another quarter, and leaving
Soult to follow up Moore he took the road to Paris.]--
The Emperor Francis, notwithstanding his counsellors, hesitated about
taking the first step; but at length, yielding to the solicitations of
England and the secret intrigues of Russia, and, above all, seduced by
the subsidies of Great Britain, Austria declared hostilities, not at
first against France, but against her allies of the Confederation of
the Rhine. On the 9th of April Prince Charles, who was appointed
commander-in-chief of the Austrian troops, addressed a note to the
commander-in-chief of the French army in Bavaria, apprising him of the
declaration of war.
A courier carried the news of this declaration to Strasburg with the
utmost expedition, from whence it was transmitted by telegraph to
Paris. The Emperor, surprised but not disconcerted by this intelligence,
received it at St. Cloud on the 11th of April, and two hours after he
was on the road to Germany. The complexity of affairs in which he was
then involved seemed to give a new impulse to his activity. When he
reached the army neither his troops nor his Guard had been able to come
up, and under those circumstances he placed himself at the head of the
Bavarian troops, and, as it were, adopted the soldiers of Maximilian.
Six days after his departure from Paris the army of Prince Charles,
which had passed the Inn, was threatened. The Emperor's headquarters
were at Donauwerth, and from thence he addressed to his soldiers one
of those energetic and concise proclamations which made them perform so
many prodigies, and which was soon circulated in every language by the
public journals. This complication of events could not but be fatal to
Europe and France, whatever might be its result, but it presented an
opportunity favourable to the development of the Emperor's genius. Like
his favourite poet Ossian, who loved best to touch his lyre midst the
howlings of the tempest, Napoleon required political tempests for the
display of his abilities.
During the campaign of 1809, and particularly at its commencement,
Napoleon's course was even more rapid than it had been in the campaign
of 1805. Every courier who arrived at Hamburg brought us news, or rather
prodigies. As soon as the Emperor was informed of the attack made by the
Austrians upon Bavaria orders were despatched to all the generals having
troops under their command to proceed with all speed to the theatre of
the war. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo was summoned to join the Grand Army
with the Saxon troops under his command and for the time he resigned the
government of the Hanse Towns. Colonel Damas succeeded him at Hamburg
during that period, but merely as commandant of the fortress; and he
never gave rise to any murmur or complaint. Bernadotte was not satisfied
with his situation, and indeed the Emperor, who was never much
disposed to bring him forward, because he could not forgive him for his
opposition on the 18th Brumaire, always appointed him to posts in
which but little glory was to be acquired, and placed as few troops as
possible under his command.
It required all the promptitude of the Emperor's march upon Vienna to
defeat the plots which were brewing against his government, for in the