Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
you. You are, like me, the victim of the former inactivity of the
princes of Italy, who ought, at once, to have acted with all their
united forces, while I still possessed Mantua. If Bonaparte's
project be, as I learn, to establish republics in Italy, this is
likely to end in spreading republicanism over the whole country. I
have already commenced negotiations for peace, and the preliminaries
are ratified. If the French observe them as strictly as I do, and
will do, then your situation will be improved; but already the
French are beginning to disregard them. The principal problem which
remains to be solved is, whether the French Directory approve of
Bonaparte's proceedings, and whether the latter, as appears by some
papers distributed through his army, is not disposed to revolt
against his country, which also seems to be probable, from his
severe conduct towards Switzerland, notwithstanding the assurances
of the Directory, that he had been ordered to leave the country
untouched. If this should be the case, new and innumerable
difficulties may arise. Under these circumstances I can, at
present, advise nothing; for, as to myself, it is only time and the
circumstances of the moment which can point out how I am to act.
There is nothing new here. We are all well; but the heat is
extraordinary. Always retain your friendship and love for me.
Make my compliments to your wife, and believe me ever
Your best Friend and Brother,
FRANCIS.
HETZENDORF, July 20, 1797.
CHAPTER VII.
1797.
Unfounded reports--Carnot--Capitulation of Mantua--General Clarke--
The Directory yields to Bonaparte--Berthier--Arrival of Eugène
Beauharnais at Milan--Comte Delannay d'Entraigues--His interview
with Bonaparte--Seizure of his papers--Copy of one describing a
conversation between him and Comte de Montgaillard--The Emperor
Francis--The Prince de Condé and General Pichegru.
While Bonaparte was expressing his opinion on his campaigns and the
injustice with which they had been criticised, it was generally believed
that Carnot dictated to him from a closet in the Luxembourg all the
plans of his operations, and that Berthier was at his right hand,
without whom, notwithstanding Carnot's plans, which were often
mere romances, he would have been greatly embarrassed. This twofold
misrepresentation was very current for some time; and, notwithstanding
it was contrary to the evidence of facts, it met with much credence,
particularly abroad. There was, however, no foundation for the opinion:
Let us render to Caesar that which is Caesar's due. Bonaparte was a
creator in the art of war, and no imitator. That no man was superior to
him in that art is incontestable. At the commencement of the glorious
campaign in Italy the Directory certainly sent out instructions to him;
but he always followed his own plans, and continually, wrote back that
all would be lost if movements conceived at a distance from the scene of
action were to be blindly executed. He also offered to resign. At length
the Directory perceived the impossibility of prescribing operations of
war according to the view of persons in Paris; and when I became the
secretary of the General-in-Chief I saw a despatch of the Directory,
dated May, 1796, committing the whole plan of the campaign to his
judgment; and assuredly there was not a single operation or movement
which did not originate with him. Carnot was obliged to yield to his
firmness. When the Directory, towards the end of 1796, felt disposed to
treat for peace, General Clarke, appointed to conclude the armistice,
was authorised, in case Mantua should not be taken before the
negotiation was brought to a close, to propose leaving the blockade in
statu quo. Had such a condition been adopted it would doubtless had been
stipulated that the Emperor of Austria should be allowed to provision
the garrison and inhabitants of the city day by day. Bonaparte,
convinced that an armistice without Mantua would by no means conduce to
peace, earnestly opposed such a condition. He carried his point; Mantua
capitulated, and the result is well known. Yet he was not blind to the
hazards of war; while preparing, during the blockade, an assault on
Mantua, he wrote thus to the Directory: "A bold stroke of this nature
depends absolutely for success on a dog or a goose." This was about a
question of surprise.
Bonaparte was exceedingly sensitive to the rumours which reached him
respecting Carnot and Berthier. He one day said to me: "What gross
stupidity, is this? It is very well to say to a general, 'Depart for
Italy, gain battles, and sign a peace at Vienna;' but the execution
that is not so easy. I never attached any value to the plans which the
Directory sent me. Too many circumstances occur on the spot to modify
them. The movement of a single corps of the enemy's army may confound a
whole plan arranged by the fireside. Only fools can believe such stuff!
As for Berthier, since you have been with me, you see what he is--he is
a blockhead. Yet it is he who does it all; it is he who gathers a great
part of the glory of the army of Italy." I told him that this erroneous
opinion could not last long; that each person would be allowed his
merit, and that at least posterity would judge rightly. This observation
seemed to please him.
Berthier was a man full of honour, courage, and probity, and exceedingly
regular in the performance of his duties. Bonaparte's attachment to
him arose more from habit than liking. Berthier did not concede with
affability, and refused with harshness. His abrupt, egotistic, and
careless manners did not, however, create him many enemies, but, at the
same time, did not make him many friends. In consequence of our frequent
intercourse he had contracted the friendly practice of speaking to me in
the second person singular; but he never wrote to me in that style.
He was perfectly acquainted with the disposition of all the corps, and
could name their commanders and their respective forces. Day or night he
was always at hand and made out with clearness all the secondary orders
which resulted from the dispositions of the General-in-Chief. In fact,
he was, an excellent head of the staff of an army; but that is all the
praise that can be given, and indeed he wished for no greater. He had
such entire confidence in Bonaparte, and looked up to him with so much
admiration, that he never would have presumed to oppose his plans or
give any advise. Berthier's talent was very limited, and of a special
nature; his character was one of extreme weakness. Bonaparte's
friendship for him and the frequency of his name in the bulletins and
official despatches have unduly elevated his reputation. Bonaparte,
giving his opinion to the Directory respecting the generals employed in
his army, said, "Berthier has talents, activity, courage, character--all
in his favour." This was in 1796. He then made an eagle of him; at St.
Helena he called him a goose. He should neither have, raised him so high
nor sunk him so low.
Berthier neither merited the one nor the other. Bonaparte was a man of
habit; he was much attached to all the people about him, and did not
like new faces. Berthier loved him. He carried out his orders well, and
that enabled him to pass off with his small portion of talent.
It was about this time that young Beauharnais came to Milan. He was
seventeen years old. He had lived in Paris with his mother since the
departure of Bonaparte. On his arrival he immediately entered the
service as 'aide de camp' to the General-in-Chief, who felt for him an
affection which was justified by his good qualities.
Comte Delaunay d'Entraigues, well known in the French Revolution, held
a diplomatic post at Venice when that city was threatened by the French.
Aware of his being considered the agent of all the machinations then
existing against France, and especially against the army of Italy, he
endeavoured to escape; but the city being, surrounded, he was seized,
together with all his papers. The apparently frank manners of the Count
pleased Bonaparte, who treated him with indulgence. His papers were
restored, with the exception of three relating to political subjects. He
afterwards fled to Switzerland, and ungratefully represented himself as
having been oppressed by Bonaparte. His false statements have induced
many writers to make of him an heroic victim. He was assassinated by his
own servant in 1802.
I kept a copy of one of his most interesting papers. It has been much
spoken of, and Fauche-Borel has, I believe, denied its authenticity and
the truth of its contents. The manner in which it fell into the hands of
the General-in-Chief, the importance attached to it by d'Entraigues, the
differences I have observed between the manuscript I copied and versions
which I have since read, and the knowledge of its authenticity, having
myself transcribed it from the handwriting of the Count, who in my
presence vouched for the truth of the facts it details--all these
circumstances induce me to insert it here, and compel me to doubt that
it was, as Fauche-Borel asserted, a fabrication.
This manuscript is entitled, 'My Conversation with Comte de
Montgaillard, on the 4th of December 1796, from Six in the Afternoon
till midnight, in the presence of the Abbe Dumontel.'
[On my copy are written the words, "Extracts from this conversation,
made by me, from the original." I omitted what I thought unimportant,
and transcribed only the most interesting passages. Montgaillard spoke
of his escape, of his flight to England, of his return to France, of his
second departure, and finally of his arrival at Bale in August 1795.]
The Prince de Condé soon afterwards, he said, called me to Mulheim,
and knowing the connections I had had in France, proposed that I
should sound General Pichegru, whose headquarters were at Altkirch,
where he then was, surrounded by four representatives of the
Convention.
I immediately went to Neufchatel, taking with me four or five
hundred Louis. I cast my eyes on Fauche-Borel, the King's printer
at Neufchatel, and also yours and mine, as the instrument by which
to make the first overture, and I selected as his colleague M.
Courant, a native of Neufchatel. I persuaded them to undertake the
business: I supplied them with instructions and passports. They
were foreigners: so I furnished them with all the necessary
documents to enable them to travel in France as foreign merchants
and purchasers of national property. I went to Bale to wait for
news from them.
On the 13th of August Fauche and Courant set out for the
headquarters at Altkirch. They remained there eight days without
finding an opportunity to speak to Pichegru, who was surrounded by
representatives and generals. Pichegru observed them, and seeing
them continually wheresoever he went, he conjectured that they had
something to say to him, and he called out in a loud voice, while
passing them, "I am going to Huningen." Fauche contrived to throw
himself in his way at the end of a corridor. Pichegru observed him,
and fixed his eyes upon him, and although it rained in torrents, he
said aloud, "I am going to dine at the chateau of Madame Salomon."
This chateau was three leagues from Huningen, and Madame Salomon was
Pichegru's mistress.
Fauche set off directly to the chateau, and begged to speak with
General Pichegru. He told the general that, being in the possession
of some of J. J. Rousseau's manuscripts, he wished to publish them
and dedicate them to him. "Very good," said Pichegru; "but I should
like to read them first; for Rousseau professed principles of