Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
clothed from head to foot. To leave nothing to be wished for, Davoust,
from 1812, established military commissions in all the thirty-second.
military division, before he entered upon the Russian campaign. To
complete these oppressive measures he established at the same time the
High Prevotal Court of the Customs. It was at this time that M. Eudes,
the director of the ordinary customs, a strict but just man, said that
the rule of the ordinary customs would be regretted, "for till now you
have only been on roses.." The professed judgments of this court were
executed without appeal and without delay. From what I have just said
the situation and the misery of the north of Germany, and the consequent
discontent, can be judged.
During my stay in Hamburg, which on this occasion was not very long,
Napoleon's attention was particularly engaged by the campaign of
Portugal, and his discussions with the Pope. At this period the
thunderbolts of Rome were not very alarming. Yet precautions were
taken to keep secret the excommunication which Pius VII. had pronounced
against Napoleon. The event, however, got reported about, and a party
in favour of the Pope speedily rose up among the clergy, and more
particularly among the fanatics. Napoleon sent to Savona the Archbishops
of Nantes, Bourges, Treves, and Tours, to endeavour to bring about
a reconciliation with His Holiness. But all their endeavours were
unavailing, and after staying a month at Savona they returned to Paris
without having done anything. But Napoleon was not discouraged by
this first disappointment, and he shortly afterwards sent a second
deputation, which experienced the same fate as the first. Cardinal
Fesch, Napoleon's uncle, took part with the Pope. For this fact I can
vouch, though I cannot for an answer which he is said to have made
to the Emperor. I have been informed that when Napoleon was one day
speaking to his uncle about the Pope's obstinacy the Cardinal made some
observations to him on his (Bonaparte's) conduct to the Holy Father,
upon which Napoleon flew into a passion, and said that the Pope and he
were two old fools. "As for the Pope," said he, "he is too obstinate to
listen to anything. No, I am determined he shall never have Rome again.
. . . He will not remain at Savona, and where does he wish I should send
him?"--"To Heaven, perhaps," replied the Cardinal.
The truth is, the Emperor was violently irritated against Pius VII.
Observing with uneasiness the differences and difficulties to which all
these dissensions gave rise, he was anxious to put a stop to them. As
the Pope would not listen to any propositions that were made to him,
Napoleon convoked a Council, which assembled in Paris, and at which
several Italian Bishops were present. The Pope insisted that the
temporal and spiritual interests should be discussed together; and,
however disposed a certain number of prelates, particularly the
Italians, might be to separate these two points of discussion, yet the
influence of the Church and well-contrived intrigues gradually gave
preponderance to the wishes of the Pope. The Emperor, having discovered
that a secret correspondence was carried on by several of the Bishops
and Archbishops who had seats in the Council, determined to get rid of
some of them, and the Bishops of Ghent, Troyes, Tournay, and Toulouse
were arrested and sent to Vincennes. They were superseded by others.
He wished to dissolve the Council, which he saw was making no advance
towards the object he had in view, and, fearing that it might adopt some
act at variance with his supreme wish, every member of the Council was
individually required to make a declaration that the proposed changes
were conformable to the laws of the Church. It was said at the time that
they were unanimous in this individual declaration, though it is certain
that in the sittings of the Council opinions were divided. I know not
what His Holiness thought of these written opinions compared with the
verbal opinions that had been delivered, but certain it is though still
a captive at Savona, he refused to adhere to the concessions granted in
the secret declarations.
The conflicts which took place in Spain during the year 1811 were
unattended by any decisive results. Some brilliant events, indeed,
attested the courage of our troops and the skill of our generals.
Such were the battle of Albufera and the taking of Tarragona, while
Wellington was obliged to raise the siege of Badajoz. These advantages,
which were attended only by glory, encouraged Napoleon in the hope of
triumphing in the Peninsula, and enabled him to enjoy the brilliant
fetes which took place at Paris in celebration of the birth of the King
of Rome.
On his return from a tour in Holland at the end of October Napoleon
clearly saw that a rupture with Russia was inevitable. In vain he sent
Lauriston as Ambassador to St. Petersburg to supersede Caulaincourt,
who would no longer remain there: all the diplomatic skill in the world
could effect nothing with a powerful Government which had already formed
its determination. All the Cabinets in Europe were now unanimous in
wishing for the overthrow of Napoleon's power, and the people no less,
ardently wished for an order of things less fatal to their trade
and industry. In the state to which Europe was reduced no one could
counteract the wish of Russia and her allies to go to war with
France--Lauriston no more than Caulaincourt.
The war for which Napoleon was now obliged to prepare forced him to
neglect Spain, and to leave his interests in that country in a state of
real danger. Indeed, his occupation of Spain and his well-known wish to
maintain himself there were additional motives for inducing the powers
of Europe to enter upon a war which would necessarily divide Napoleon's
forces. All at once the troops which were in Italy and the north of
Germany moved towards the frontiers of the Russian Empire. From March
1811 the Emperor had all the military forces of Europe at his disposal.
It was curious to see this union of nations, distinguished by difference
of manners,
--[It should be remarked that Napoleon was far from being anxious
for the war with Russia. Metternich writing on 26th March 1811,
says "Everything seems to indicate that the Emperor Napoleon is at
present still far from desiring a war with Russia. But it is not
less true that the Emperor Alexander has given himself over, 'nolens
volens', to the war party, and that he will bring about war, because
the time is approaching when he will no longer be able to resist the
reaction of the party in the internal affairs of his Empire, or the
temper of his army. The contest between Count Romanzov and the
party opposed to that Minister seems on the point of precipitating a
war between Russia and France." This, from Metternich, is strong
evidence.]--
language, religion, and interests, all ready to fight for one man
against a power who had done nothing to offend them. Prussia herself,
though she could not pardon the injuries he had inflicted upon her,
joined his alliance, but with the intention of breaking it on the first
opportunity. When the war with Russia was first spoken of Savary and I
had frequent conversations on the subject. I communicated to him all the
intelligence I received from abroad respecting that vast enterprise. The
Duc de Rovigo shared all my forebodings; and if he and those who thought
like him had been listened to, the war would probably have been avoided.
Through him I learnt who were the individuals who urged the invasion.
The eager ambition with which they looked forward to Viceroyalties,
Duchies, and endowments blinded them to the possibility of seeing the
Cossacks in Paris.
The gigantic enterprise being determined on, vast preparations were made
for carrying it into effect. Before his departure Napoleon, who was to
take with him all the disposable troops, caused a 'Senatus-consulte' to
be issued for levying the National Guards, who were divided into
three corps. He also arranged his diplomatic affairs by concluding,
in February 1812, a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive,
with Prussia, by virtue of which the two contracting powers mutually
guaranteed the integrity of their own possessions, and the European
possessions of the Ottoman Porte, because that power was then at war
with Russia. A similar treaty was concluded about the beginning of March
with Austria, and about the end of the same month Napoleon renewed
the capitulation of France and Switzerland. At length, in the month of
April, there came to light an evident proof of the success which had
attended M. Czernischeff's intrigues in Paris. It was ascertained that
a clerk in the War Office, named Michel, had communicated to him the
situation of the French forces in Germany. Michel was condemned to
death, for the time was gone by when Bonaparte, confident in his genius
and good fortune, could communicate his plans to the spy of General
Melas.
In March 1812, when I saw that the approaching war would necessarily
take Napoleon from France, weary of the persecutions and even threats
by which I was every day assailed, I addressed to the Emperor a memorial
explaining my conduct and showing the folly and wickedness of my
accusers. Among them was a certain Ogier de la Saussaye, who had sent
a report to the Emperor, in which the principal charge was, that I had
carried off a box containing important papers belonging to the First
Consul. The accusation of Ogier de la Saussaye terminated thus: "I add
to my report the interrogatories of MM. Westphalen, Osy, Chapeau Rouge,
Aukscher, Thierry, and Gumprecht-Mores. The evidence of the latter
bears principally on a certain mysterious box, a secret upon which it is
impossible to throw any light, but the reality of which we are bound to
believe." These are his words. The affair of the mysterious box has
been already explained. I have already informed the reader that I put my
papers into a box, which I buried lest it should be stolen from me. But
for that precaution I should not have been able to lay before the reader
the autograph documents in my possession, and which I imagine form the
most essential part of these volumes. In my memorial to the Emperor I
said, in allusion to the passage above quoted, "This, Sire, is the most
atrocious part of Ogier's report.
"Gumprecht being questioned on this point replies that the accuser has
probably, as well as himself, seen the circumstance mentioned in an
infamous pamphlet which appeared seven or eight years, ago. It was,
I think, entitled 'Le Secret du Cabinet des Tuileries,' and was very
likely at the time of its appearance denounced by the police. In that
libel it is stated, among a thousand other calumnies equally false and
absurd, 'that when I left the First Consul I carried away a box full of
important papers, that I was in consequence sent to the Temple, where
your brother Joseph came to me and offered me my liberation, and a
million of francs, if I would restore the papers, which I refused to
do,' etc. Ogier, instead of looking for this libel in Hamburg, where I
read it, has the impudence to give credit to the charge, the truth of
which could have been ascertained immediately: and he adds, 'This secret
we are bound to believe.' Your Majesty knows whether I was ever in the
Temple, and whether Joseph ever made such an offer to me." I entreated
that the Emperor would do me the favour to bring me to trial; for
certainly I should have regarded that as a favour rather than to remain
as I was, exposed to vague accusations; yet all my solicitations were in
vain. My letter to the Emperor remained unanswered; but though Bonaparte
could not spare a few moments to reply to an old friend, I learned