Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
Alexander had a considerable corps of troops in Finland destined to
protect that country against the Sweden, Napoleon having consented to
that occupation in order to gain the provisional consent of Alexander
to the invasion of Spain. What was the course pursued by Napoleon when,
being at war with Russia, he wished to detach Sweden from her
alliance with Alexander? He intimated to Bernadotte that he had a sure
opportunity of retaking Finland, a conquest which would gratify his
subjects and win their attachment to him. By this alliance Napoleon
wished to force Alexander not to withdraw the troops who were in the
north of his Empire, but rather to augment their numbers in order to
cover Finland and St. Petersburg. It was thus that Napoleon endeavoured
to draw the Prince Royal into his coalition. It was of little
consequence to Napoleon whether Bernadotte succeeded or not. The Emperor
Alexander would nevertheless have been obliged to increase his force
in Finland; that was all that Napoleon wished. In the gigantic struggle
upon which France and Russia were about to enter the most trivial
alliance was not to be neglected. In January 1812 Davoust invaded
Swedish Pomerania without any declaration of war, and without any
apparent motive. Was this inconceivable violation of territory likely
to dispose the Prince Royal of Sweden to the proposed alliance, even had
that alliance not been adverse to the interests of his country? That was
impossible; and Bernadotte took the part which was expected of him. He
rejected the offers of Napoleon, and prepared for coming events.
The Emperor Alexander wished to withdraw his force from Finland for the
purpose of more effectively opposing the immense army which threatened
his States. Unwilling to expose Finland to an attack on the part of
Sweden, he had an interview on the 28th of August 1812, at Abo, with
the Prince-Royal, to come to an arrangement with him for uniting their
interests. I know that the Emperor of Russia pledged himself, whatever
might happen, to protect Bernadotte against the fate of the new
dynasties, to guarantee the possession of his throne, and promised that
he should have Norway as a compensation for Finland. He even went so far
as to hint that Bernadotte might supersede Napoleon. Bernadotte adopted
all the propositions of Alexander, and from that moment Sweden made
common cause against Napoleon. The Prince Royal's conduct has been much
blamed, but the question resolved itself into one of mere political
interest. Could Bernadotte, a Swede by adoption, prefer the alliance
of an ambitious sovereign whose vengeance he had to fear, and who had
sanctioned the seizure of Finland to that of a powerful monarch, his
formidable neighbour, his protector in Sweden, and where hostility might
effectually support the hereditary claims of young Gustavus? Sweden,
in joining France, would thereby have declared herself the enemy of
England. Where, then, would have been her navy, her trade and even her
existence?
CHAPTER XXVII.
1812.
Changeableness of Bonaparte's plans and opinions--Articles for the
'Moniteur' dictated by the First Consul--The Protocol of the
Congress of Chatillon--Conversations with Davoust at Hamburg--
Promise of the Viceroyalty of Poland--Hope and disappointment of the
Poles--Influence of illusion on Bonaparte--The French in Moscow--
Disasters of the retreat--Mallet's conspiracy--Intelligence of the
affair communicated to Napoleon at Smolensko--Circumstances detailed
by Rapp--Real motives of Napoleon's return to Paris--Murat, Ney, and
Eugène--Power of the Italians to endure cold--Napoleon's exertions
to repair his losses--Defection of General York--Convocation of a
Privy Council--War resolved on--Wavering of the Pope--Useless
negotiations with Vienna--Maria Louisa appointed Regent.
It may now he asked whether Bonaparte, previous to entering upon the
last campaign, had resolved on restoring Poland to independence. The
fact is that Bonaparte, as Emperor, never entertained any positive wish
to reestablish the old Kingdom of Poland, though at a previous period
he was strongly inclined to that re-establishment, of which he felt the
necessity. He may have said that he would re-establish the Kingdom of
Poland, but I beg leave to say that that is no reason for believing that
he entertained any such design. He had said, and even sworn, that he
would never aggrandise the territory of the Empire! The changeableness
of Bonaparte's ideas, plans, and projects renders it difficult to master
them; but they may be best understood when it is considered that all
Napoleon's plans and conceptions varied with his fortunes. Thus, it
is not unlikely that he might at one time have considered the
reestablishment of Poland as essential to European policy, and
afterwards have regarded it as adverse to the development of his
ambition. Who can venture to guess what passed in his mind when dazzled
by his glory at Dresden, and whether in one of his dreams he might not
have regarded the Empire of the Jagellons as another gem in the Imperial
diadem? The truth is that Bonaparte, when General-in-Chief of the
army of Egypt and First Consul, had deeply at heart the avenging the
dismemberment of Poland, and I have often conversed with him on this
most interesting subject, upon which we entirely concurred in opinion.
But times and circumstances were changed since we walked together on the
terrace of Cairo and mutually deplored the death of young Sulkowski. Had
Sulkowski lived Napoleon's favourable intentions with respect to Poland
might perhaps have been confirmed. A fact which explains to me the
coolness, I may almost say the indifference, of Bonaparte to the
resurrection of Poland is that the commencement of the Consulate was the
period at which that measure particularly occupied his attention. How
often did he converse on the subject with me and other persons who may
yet recollect his sentiments! It was the topic on which he most loved
to converse, and on which he spoke with feeling and enthusiasm. In the
'Moniteur' of the period here alluded to I could point out more than one
article without signature or official character which Napoleon dictated
to me, and the insertion of which in that journal, considering the
energy of certain expressions, sufficiently proves that they could have
emanated from none but Bonaparte. It was usually in the evening that he
dictated to me these articles. Then, when the affairs of the day were
over, he would launch into the future, and give free scope to his
vast projects. Some of these articles were characterised by so little
moderation that the First Consul would very often destroy them in the
morning, smiling at the violent ebullitions of the preceding night. At
other times I took the liberty of not sending them to the 'Moniteur'
on the night on which they were dictated, and though he might earnestly
wish their insertion I adduced reasons good or bad, to account for the
delay. He would then read over the article in question, and approve of
my conduct; but he would sometimes add, "It is nevertheless true that
with an independent Kingdom of Poland, and 150,000 disposable troops in
the east of France, I should always be master of Russia, Prussia, and
Austria."--"General," I would reply, "I am entirely of your opinion; but
wherefore awaken the suspicions of the interested parties. Leave all to
time and circumstances."
The reader may have to learn, and not, perhaps, without some surprise,
that in the protocol of the sittings of the Congress of Chatillon
Napoleon put forward the spoliation of Poland by the three principal
powers allied against him as a claim to a more advantageous peace, and
to territorial indemnities for France. In policy he was right, but the
report of foreign cannon was already loud enough to drown the best of
arguments.
After the ill-timed and useless union of the Hanse Towns to France I
returned to Hamburg in the spring of 1811 to convey my family to France.
I then had some conversation with Davoust. On one occasion I said to him
that if his hopes were realised, and my sad predictions respecting
the war with Russia overthrown, I hoped to see the restoration of the
Kingdom of Poland. Davoust replied that that event was probable, since
he had Napoleon's promise of the Viceroyalty of that Kingdom, and as
several of his comrades had been promised starosties. Davoust made no
secret of this, and it was generally known throughout Hamburg and the
north of Germany.
But notwithstanding what Davoust said respecting. Napoleon's intentions
I considered that these promises had been conditional rather than
positive.
On Napoleon's arrival in Poland the Diet of Warsaw, assured, as there
seemed reason to be, of the Emperor's sentiments, declared the Kingdom
free and independent. The different treaties of dismemberment were
pronounced to be null; and certainly the Diet had a right so to act, for
it calculated upon his support. But the address of the Diet to Napoleon,
in which these principles were declared, was ill received. His answer
was full of doubt and indecision, the motive of which could not be
blamed. To secure the alliance of Austria against Russia he had just
guaranteed to his father-in-law the integrity of his dominions. Napoleon
therefore declared that he could take no part in any movement or
resolution which might disturb Austria in the possession of the Polish
provinces forming a part of her Empire. To act otherwise, he said, would
be to separate himself from his alliance with Austria, and to throw
her into the arms of Russia. But with regard to the Polish-Russian
provinces, Napoleon declared he would see what he could do, should
Providence favour the good cause. These vague and obscure expressions
did not define what he intended to do for the Poles in the event of
success crowning his vast enterprises. They excited the distrust of the
Poles, and had no other result. On this subject, however, an observation
occurs which is of some force as an apology for Napoleon. Poland was
successively divided between three powers, Russia, Austria, and Prussia,
with each of which Napoleon had been at war, but never with all three
at once. He had therefore never been able to take advantage of his
victories to re-establish Poland without injuring the interests of
neutral powers or of his allies. Hence it may be concluded not only
that he never had the positive will which would have triumphed over
all obstacles, but also that there never was a possibility of realising
those dreams and projects of revenge in which he had indulged on
the banks of the Nile, as it were to console the departed spirit of
Sulkowski.
Bonaparte's character presents many unaccountable incongruities.
Although the most positive man that perhaps ever existed, yet there
never was one who more readily yielded to the charm of illusion. In
many circumstances the wish and the reality were to him one and the same
thing. He never indulged in greater illusions than at the beginning of
the campaign of Moscow. Even before the approach of the disasters which
accompanied the most fatal retreat recorded in history, all sensible
persons concurred in the opinion that the Emperor ought to have passed
the winter of 1812-13 in Poland, and have resumed his vast enterprises
in the spring. But his natural impatience impelled him forward as
it were unconsciously, and he seemed to be under the influence of an
invisible demon stronger than even his own strong will. This demon was
ambition. He who knew so well the value of time, never sufficiently
understood its power, and how much is sometimes gained by delay. Yet
Caesar's Commentaries, which were his favourite study, ought to have