Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
immediately among our intimate acquaintance." I must add, that when
Napoleon thus spoke to me in the gardens of Malmaison he only repeated
what had often fallen from him in his youth, for his character and his
ideas never varied; the change was in the objects to which they were
applied.
From his boyhood Napoleon was fond of reading the history of the great
men of antiquity; and what he chiefly sought to discover was the means
by which those men had become great. He remarked that military glory
secures more extended fame than the arts of peace and the noble efforts
which contribute to the happiness of mankind. History informs us that
great military talent and victory often give the power, which, in its
turn, procures the means of gratifying ambition. Napoleon was always
persuaded that that power was essential to him, in order to bend men
to his will, and to stifle all discussions on his conduct. It was his
established principle never to sign a disadvantageous peace. To him
a tarnished crown was no longer a crown. He said one day to M. de
Caulaincourt, who was pressing him to consent to sacrifices, "Courage
may defend a crown, but infamy never." In all the last acts of
Napoleon's career I can retrace the impress of his character, as I had
often recognised in the great actions of the Emperor the execution of a
thought conceived by the General-in-Chief of the Army of Italy.
On the opening of the Congress the Duke of Vicenza, convinced that
he could no longer count on the natural limits of France promised
at Frankfort by the Allies, demanded new powers. Those limits were
doubtless the result of reasonable concessions, and they had been
granted even after the battle of Leipsic; but it was now necessary
that Napoleon's Minister should show himself ready to make further
concessions if he wished to be allowed to negotiate. The Congress was
opened on the 5th of February, and on the 7th the Plenipotentiaries of
the Allied powers declared themselves categorically. They inserted in
the protocol that after the successes which had favoured their armies
they insisted on France being restored to her old limits, such as they
were during the monarchy before the Revolution; and that she should
renounce all direct influence beyond her future limits.
This proposition appeared so extraordinary to M. de Caulaincourt that he
requested the sitting might be suspended, since the conditions departed
too far from his instructions to enable him to give an immediate answer.
The Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers acceded to his request, and
the continuation of the sitting was postponed till eight in the evening.
When it was resumed the Duke of Vicenza renewed his promise to make
the greatest sacrifices for the attainment of peace. He added that
the amount of the sacrifices necessarily depended on the amount of the
compensations, and that he could not determine on any concession or
compensation without being made acquainted with the whole. He wished to
have a general plan of the views of the Allies, and he requested that
their Plenipotentiaries would explain themselves decidedly respecting
the number and description of the sacrifices and compensations to be
demanded. It must be acknowledged that the Duke of Vicenza perfectly
fulfilled the views of the Emperor in thus protracting and gaining time
by subtle subterfuges, for all that he suggested had already been done.
On the day after this sitting some advantages gained by the Allies,
who took Chatillon-sur-Marne and Troves, induced Napoleon to direct
Caulaincourt to declare to the Congress that if an armistice were
immediately agreed on he was ready to consent to France being restored
to her old limits. By securing this armistice Napoleon hoped that happy
chances might arise, and that intrigues might be set on foot; but the
Allies would not listen to any such proposition.
At the sitting of the 10th of March the Duke of Vicenza inserted in the
protocol that the last courier he had received had been arrested and
detained a considerable time by several Russian general officers,
who had obliged him to deliver up his despatches, which had not been
returned to him till thirty-six hours after at Chaumont. Caulaincourt
justly complained of this infraction of the law of nations and
established usage, which, he said, was the sole cause of the delay
in bringing the negotiations to a conclusion. After this complaint he
communicated to the Congress the ostensible instructions of Napoleon, in
which he authorised his Minister to accede to the demands of the Allies.
But in making this communication M. de Caulaincourt took care not to
explain the private and secret instructions he had also received.
The Allies rejected the armistice because it would have checked their
victorious advance; but they consented to sign the definitive peace,
which of all things was what the Emperor did not wish.
Napoleon at length determined to make sacrifices, and the Duke of
Vicenza submitted new propositions to the Congress. The Allies replied,
in the same sitting, that these propositions contained no distinct and
explicit declaration on the project presented by them on the 17th
of February; that, having on the 28th of the same month, demanded a
decisive answer within the term of ten days, they were about to break up
the negotiations Caulaincourt then declared verbally:
1st. That the Emperor Napoleon was ready to renounce all pretension or
influence whatever in countries beyond the boundaries of France.
2d. To recognise the independence of Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany,
and Holland, and that as to England, France would make such concessions
as might be deemed necessary in consideration of a reasonable
equivalent.
Upon this the sitting was immediately broken up without a reply. It must
be remarked that this singular declaration was verbal, and consequently
not binding, and that the limits of France were mentioned without being
specified. It cannot be doubted that Napoleon meant the limits conceded
at Frankfort, to which he was well convinced the Allies would not
consent, for circumstances were now changed. Besides, what could be
meant by the reasonable equivalent from England? Is it astonishing that
this obscurity and vagueness should have banished all confidence on the
part of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers? Three days after
the sitting of the 10th of March they declared they could not even enter
into a discussion of the verbal protocol of the French Minister. They
requested that M. de Caulaincourt would declare whether he would accept
or reject the project of a treaty presented by the Allied Sovereigns, or
offer a counter-project.
The Duke of Vicenza, who was still prohibited, by secret instructions
from coming to any conclusion on the proposed basis, inserted in the
protocol of the sitting of the 13th of March a very ambiguous note. The
Plenipotentiaries of the Allies; in their reply, insisted upon receiving
another declaration from the French Plenipotentiary, which should
contain an acceptance or refusal of their project of a treaty presented
in the conference of the 7th of February, or a counter-project. After
much discussion Caulaincourt agreed to draw up a counter-project, which
he presented on the 15th, under the following title: "Project of a
definitive Treaty between France and the Allies." In this extraordinary
project, presented after so much delay, M. de Caulaincourt, to the great
astonishment of the Allies, departed in no respect from the declarations
of the 10th of March. He replied again to the ultimatum of the Allies,
or what he wished to regard as such, by defending a multitude of petty
interests, which were of no importance in so great a contest; but in
general the conditions seemed rather those of a conqueror dictating to
his enemies than of a man overwhelmed by misfortune: As may readily be
imagined, they were, for the most part, received with derision by the
Allies.
Everything tends to prove that the French Plenipotentiary had received
no positive instructions from the 5th of February, and that, after all
the delay which Napoleon constantly created, Caulaincourt never had it
in his power to answer, categorically, the propositions of the Allies.
Napoleon never intended to make peace at Chatillon on the terms
proposed. He always hoped that some fortunate event would enable him to
obtain more favourable conditions.
On the 18th of March, that is to say, three days after the presentation
of this project of a treaty, the Plenipotentiaries of the Allies
recorded in the protocol their reasons for rejecting the extraordinary
project of the French Minister. For my part, I was convinced, for the
reasons I have mentioned, that the Emperor would never agree to sign the
conditions proposed in the ultimatum of the Allies, dated the 13th of
March, and I remember having expressed that opinion to M. de Talleyrand.
I saw him on the 14th, and found him engaged in perusing some
intelligence he had just received from the Duke of Vicenza, announcing,
as beyond all doubt, the early signature of peace. Caulaincourt had
received orders to come to a conclusion. Napoleon, he said, had given
him a carte blanche to save the capital, and avoid a battle, by which
the last resources of the nation would be endangered. This seemed pretty
positive, to be sure; but even this assurance did not, for a moment,
alter my opinion. The better to convince me, M. de Talleyrand gave me
Caulaincourt's letter to read. After reading it I confidently said,
"He will never sign the conditions." M. de Talleyrand could not help
thinking me very obstinate in my opinion, for he judged of what the
Emperor would do by his situation, while I judged by his character.
I told M. de Talleyrand that Caulaincourt might have received written
orders to sign; for the sake of showing them to the Plenipotentiaries of
the Allies, but that I had no doubt he had been instructed to postpone
coming to a conclusion, and to wait for final orders. I added, that I
saw no reason to change my opinion, and that I continued to regard
the breaking up of the Congress as nearer than appearances seemed to
indicate. Accordingly, three days afterwards, the Allies grew tired of
the delay and the conferences were broken up. Thus Napoleon sacrificed
everything rather than his glory. He fell from a great height, but he
never, by his signature, consented to any dismemberment of France.
The Plenipotentiaries of the Allies, convinced that these renewed
difficulties and demands had no other object but to gain time, stated
that the Allied powers, faithful to their principles, and in conformity
with their previous declarations, regarded the negotiations at Chatillon
as terminated by the French Government. This rupture of the conferences
took place on the 19th of March, six days after the presentation of the
ultimatum of the Allied powers. The issue of these long discussions
was thus left to be decided by the chances of war, which were not very
favourable to the man who boldly contended against armed Europe. The
successes of the Allies during the conferences at Chatillon had
opened to their view the road to Paris, while Napoleon shrunk from the
necessity of signing his own disgrace. In these circumstances was to
be found the sole cause of his ruin, and he might have said, "Tout est
perdu, fors la gloire." His glory is immortal.
--[The conviviality and harmony that reigned between the Ministers
made the society and Intercourse at Chatillon most agreeable. The
diplomatists dined alternately with each other; M. de Caulaincourt
liberally passing for all the Ministers, through the French advanced
posts, convoys of all the good cheer in epicurean wises, etc., that
Paris could afford; nor was female society wanting to complete the