Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
summoned to the Tuileries at that hour of the night, hastened to
inform me that the King wished to appoint me Prefect of the Police. He
conducted me to the King's chamber, where his Majesty thus addressed me
kindly, but in an impressive manner, "M. de Bourrienne, can we rely
upon you? I expect much from your zeal and fidelity."--"Your Majesty,"
replied I, "shall have no reason to complain of my betraying your
confidence."--"Well, I re-establish the Prefecture of the Police, and I
appoint you Prefect. Do your best, M. de Bourrienne, in the discharge of
your duties; I count upon you."
By a singular coincidence, on the very day (the 13th of March) when I
received this appointment Napoleon, who was at Lyons, signed the decree
which excluded from the amnesty he had granted thirteen individuals,
among whose names mine was inscribed. This decree confirmed me in the
presentiments I had conceived as soon as I heard of the landing of
Bonaparte. On returning home from the Tuileries after receiving my
appointment a multitude of ideas crowded on my mind. At the first moment
I had been prompted only by the wish to serve the cause of the King, but
I was alarmed when I came to examine the extent of the responsibility
I had taken upon myself. However, I determined to meet with courage the
difficulties that presented themselves, and I must say that I had every
reason to be satisfied with the manner in which I was seconded by M.
Foudras, the Inspector-General of the Police.
Even now I am filled with astonishment when I think of the Council that
was held at the Tuileries on the evening of the 13th of March in M.
de Blacas' apartments. The ignorance of the members of that Council
respecting our situation, and their confidence in the useless measures
they had adopted against Napoleon, exceed all conception.
Will it be believed that those great statesmen, who had the control
of the telegraph, the post-office, the police and its agents, money-in
short, everything which constitutes power--asked me to give them
information respecting the advance of Bonaparte? What could I say to
them? I could only repeat the reports which were circulated on the
Exchange, and those which I had collected here and there during the last
twenty-four hours. I did not conceal that the danger was imminent, and
that all their precautions would be of no avail. The question then arose
as to what course should be adapted by the King. It was impossible that
the monarch could remain at the Capital, and yet, where was he to go?
One proposed that he should go to Bordeaux, another to La Vendée, and
a third to Normandy, and a fourth member of the Council was of opinion
that the King should be conducted to Melun. I conceived that if a battle
should take place anywhere it would probably be in the neighbourhood of
that town, but the councillor who made this last suggestion assured us
that the presence of the King in an open carriage and eight horses would
produce a wonderful effect on the minds of the troops. This project
was merely ridiculous; the others appeared to be dangerous and
impracticable. I declared to the Council that, considering the situation
of things, it was necessary to renounce all idea of resistance by force
of arms; that no soldier would fire a musket, and that it was madness
to attempt to take any other view of things. "Defection," said I, "is
inevitable. The soldiers are drinking in their barracks the money which
you have been giving them for some days past to purchase their fidelity.
They say Louis XVIII., is a very decent sort of man, but 'Vive le petit
Caporal!'"
Immediately on the landing of Napoleon the King sent an extraordinary
courier to Marmont, who was at Chatillon whither he had gone to take a
last leave of his dying mother. I saw him one day after he had had an
interview with the King; I think it was on the 6th or 7th of March.
After some conversation on the landing of Napoleon, and the means of
preventing him from reaching Paris, Marmont said to me, "This is what I
dwelt most strongly upon in the interview I have just had with the King.
'Sire,' said I, 'I doubt not Bonaparte's intention of coming to Paris,
and the best way to prevent him doing so would be for your Majesty
to remain here. It is necessary to secure the Palace of the Tuileries
against a surprise, and to prepare it for resisting a siege, in which it
would be indispensable to use cannon. You must shut yourself up in your
palace, with the individuals of your household and the principal public
functionaries, while the Duc d'Angoulome should go to Bordeaux, the Duc
de Berri to La Vendée, and Monsieur to, the Franche-Comte; but they
must set off in open day, and announce that they are going to collect
defenders for your Majesty.--[Monsieur, the brother of the King, the
Comte d'Artois later Charles X.]
". . . This is what I said to the King this morning, and I added that I
would answer for everything if my advice were followed. I am now going
to direct my aide de camp, Colonel Fabvier, to draw up the plan of
defence." I did not concur in Marmont's opinion. It is certainly
probable that had Louis XVIII. remained in his palace the numerous
defections which took place before the 20th of March would have been
checked and some persons would not have found so ready an excuse for
breaking their oaths of allegiance. There can be little doubt, too, but
Bonaparte would have reflected well before he attempted the siege of the
Tuileries.
--[Marmont (tome vii. p. 87) gives the full details of his scheme
for provisioning and garrisoning the Tuileries which the King was to
hold while his family spread themselves throughout the provinces.
The idea had nothing strange in it, for the same advice was given by
General Mathieu Dumas (Souvenirs, tome iii. p. 564), a man not
likely to suggest any rash schemes. Jaucourt, writing to
Talleyrand, obviously believed in the wisdom of the King's
remaining, as did the Czar; see Talleyrand's Correspondence, vol.
ii. pp. 94, 122, 129. Napoleon would certainly have been placed
in a strange difficulty, but a king capable of adopting such a
resolution would never have been required to consider it.]--
Marmont supported his opinion by observing that the admiration and
astonishment excited by the extraordinary enterprise of Napoleon and his
rapid march to Paris would be counterbalanced by the interest inspired
by a venerable monarch defying his bold rival and courageously defending
his throne. While I rendered full justice to the good intentions of the
Duke of Ragusa, yet I did not think that his advice could be adopted.
I opposed it as I opposed all the propositions that were made in the
Council relative to the different places to which the King should
retire. I myself suggested Lille as being the nearest, and as presenting
the greatest degree of safety, especially in the first instance.
It was after midnight when I left the Council of the Tuileries. The
discussion had terminated, and without coming to any precise resolution
it was agreed that the different opinions which had been expressed
should be submitted to Louis XVIII. in order that his Majesty might
adopt that which should appear to him the best. The King adopted my
opinion, but it was not acted upon until five days after.
My appointment to the Prefecture of the Police was, as will be seen, a
late thought of measure, almost as late indeed as Napoleon's proposition
to send me as his Minister Plenipotentiary to Switzerland. In now
accepting office I was well convinced of the inutility of any effort
that might be made to arrest the progress of the fast approaching and
menacing events. Being introduced into the King's cabinet his Majesty
asked me what I thought of the situation of affairs. "I think, Sire,
that Bonaparte will be here in five or six days."--"What, sir?"--"Yes,
Sire."--"But proper measures are taken, the necessary orders given, and
the Marshals are faithful to me."--"Sire, I suspect no man's fidelity;
but I can assure your Majesty that, as Bonaparte has landed, he will be
here within a week. I know him, and your Majesty cannot know him as
well as I do; but I can venture to assure your Majesty with the same
confidence that he will not be here six months hence. He will be hurried
into acts of folly which will ruin him."--"De Bourrienne, I hope the
best from events, but if misfortune again compel me to leave France, and
your second prediction be fulfilled, you may rely on me." During this
short conversation the King appeared perfectly tranquil and resigned.
The next day I again visited the Tuileries, whither I had at those
perilous times frequent occasion to repair. On that day I received a
list of twenty-five persons whom I was ordered to arrest. I took the
liberty to observe that such a proceeding was not only useless but
likely to produce a very injurious effect at that critical moment.
The reasons I urged had not all the effect I expected. However, some
relaxation as to twenty-three of the twenty-five was conceded, but it
was insisted that Fouché and Davoust should be arrested without delay.
The King repeatedly said, "I wish you to arrest Fouché."--"Sire, I
beseech your Majesty to consider the inutility of such a measure."--"I
am resolved upon Fouches arrest. But I am sure you will miss him, for
Andre could not catch him."
My nocturnal installation as Prefect of the Police took place some time
after midnight. I had great repugnance to the arrest of Fouché, but
the order having been given, there was no alternative but to obey it. I
communicated the order to M. Foudras, who very coolly observed, "Since
we are to arrest him you need not be afraid, we shall have him fast
tomorrow."
The next day my agents repaired to the Duke of Otranto's hotel, in the
Rue d'Artois. On showing their warrant Fouché said, "What does this
mean? Your warrant is of no force; it is mere waste-paper. It purports
to come from the Prefect of the Police, but there is no such Prefect."
In my opinion Fouché was right, for my appointment, which took place
during the night, had not been legally announced. Be that as it may, on
his refusal to surrender, one of my agents applied to the staff of the
National Guard, requesting the support, in case of need, of an armed
force. General Dessolles repaired to the Tuileries to take the
King's orders on the subject. Meanwhile Fouché, who never lost his
self-possession, after talking to the police officers who remained with
him, pretended to step aside for some indispensable purpose, but the
door which he opened led into a dark passage through which he slipped,
leaving my unfortunate agents groping about in the obscurity. As for
himself, he speedily gained the Rue Taitbout, where he stepped into a
coach, and drove off. This is the whole history of the notable arrest of
Fouché.
As for Davoust, I felt my hands tied with respect to him. I do not mean
to affect generosity, for I acknowledge the enmity I bore him; but I did
not wish it to be supposed that I was acting towards him from a spirit
of personal vengeance. I therefore merely ordered him to be watched.
The other twenty-three were to me in this matter as if they had never
existed; and some of them, perhaps, will only learn in reading my
Memoirs what dangerous characters they were thought to be.
On the 15th of March, after the conversation which, as I have already
related, I had with Louis XVIII, I went to M. de Blacas and repeated to
him what I had stated to the King on the certainty of Bonaparte's speedy
arrival in Paris. I told him that I found it necessary to devote
the short time still in our power to prevent a reaction against the
Royalists, and to preserve public tranquillity until the departure of