Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
the Royal family, and that I would protect the departure of all persons
who had reasons for withdrawing themselves from the scene of the
great and perhaps disastrous events that might ensue. "You may readily
believe, Count," added I, "that considering the great interests with
which I am entrusted, I am not inclined to lose valuable time in
arresting the persons of whose names I have received a list. The
execution of such a measure would be useless; it would lead to nothing,
or rather it would serve to irritate public feeling. My conviction of
this fact has banished from me all idea of keeping under restraint for
four or five days persons whose influence, whether real or supposed,
is nil, since Bonaparte is at Auxerre. Mere supervision appears to
me sufficient, and to that I propose confining myself."--"The King,"
replied M. de Blacas, "relies on you. He knows that though only
forty-eight hours have elapsed since you entered upon your functions,
you have already rendered greater services than you are perhaps
aware of." I then asked M. de Blacas whether he had not received any
intimation of Bonaparte's intended departure from the island of Elba
by letters or by secret agents. "The only positive information we
received," answered the Minister, "was an intercepted letter, dated
Elba, 6th February. It was addressed to M. -----, near Grenoble. I will
show it you." M. de Blacas opened a drawer of his writing-table and
took out the letter, which he gave to me. The writer thanked his
correspondent for the information he had transmitted to "the inhabitant
of Elba." He was informed that everything was ready for departure, and
that the first favourable opportunity would be seized, but that it would
be desirable first to receive answers to some questions contained in
the letter. These questions related to the regiments which had been
sent into the south, and the places of their cantonment. It was inquired
whether the choice of the commanders was conformable to what had been
agreed on in Paris, and whether Labedoyere was at his post. The letter
was rather long and it impressed me by the way in which the plan of a
landing on the coast of Provence was discussed. Precise answers were
requested on all these points. On returning the letter to M. de Blacas I
remarked that the contents of the letter called for the adoption of some
decided measures, and I asked him what had been done. He answered, "I
immediately sent a copy of the letter to M. d'Andre, that he might give
orders for arresting the individual to whom it was addressed."
Having had the opportunity of closely observing the machinery of a
vigilant and active Government, I was, I must confess, not a little
amazed at the insufficiency of the measures adopted to defeat this
well-planned conspiracy. When M. de Blacas informed me of all that had
been done, I could not repress an exclamation of surprise. "Well," said
he, "and what would you have done?"--"In the first place I would not
have lost twenty-four hours, which were an age in such a crisis." I then
explained the plan I would have adopted. A quarter of an hour after the
receipt of the letter I would have sent trustworthy men to Grenoble, and
above all things I would have taken care not to let the matter fall
into the hands of the police. Having obtained all information from the
correspondent at Grenoble, I would have made him write a letter to his
correspondent at Elba to quiet the eagerness of Napoleon, telling him
that the movement of troops he spoke of had not been made, that it
would take eight days to carry it out, and that it was necessary to the
success of the enterprise to delay the embarkation for some days. While
Bonaparte was thus delayed I would have sent to the coast of Provence
a sufficient body of men devoted to the Royal cause, sending off
in another direction the regiments whose chiefs were gained over by
Napoleon, as the correspondence should reveal their names. "You are
perhaps right, sir," said M. de Blacas, "but what could I do? I am
new here. I had not the control of the police, and I trusted to M.
d'Andre."--"Well," said I, "Bonaparte will be here on the 20th of
March." With these words I parted from M. de Blacas. I remarked a
great change in him. He had already lost a vast deal of that hauteur of
favouritism which made him so much disliked.
When I entered upon my duties in the Prefecture of Police the evil was
already past remedy. The incorrigible emigres required another lesson,
and the temporary resurrection of the Empire was inevitable. But,
if Bonaparte was recalled, it was not owing to any attachment to him
personally; it was not from any fidelity to the recollections of the
Empire. It was resolved at any price to get rid of those imbecile
councillors, who thought they might treat France like a country
conquered by the emigrants. The people determined to free themselves
from a Government which seemed resolved to trample on all that was
dear to France. In this state of things some looked upon Bonaparte as a
liberator, but the greater number regarded him as an instrument. In
this last character he was viewed by the old Republicans, and by a new
generation, who thought they caught a glimpse of liberty in promises,
and Who were blind enough to believe that the idol of France would be
restored by Napoleon.
In February 1815, while everything was preparing at Elba for the
approaching departure of Napoleon, Murat applied to the Court of Vienna
for leave to march through the Austrian Provinces of Upper Italy an army
directed on France. It was on the 26th of the same month that Bonaparte
escaped from Elba. These two facts were necessarily connected together,
for, in spite of Murat's extravagant ideas, he never could have
entertained the expectation of obliging the King of France, by the mere
force of arms, to acknowledge his continued possession of the throne of
Naples. Since the return of Louis XVIII. the Cabinet of the Tuileries
had never regarded Murat in any other light than as a usurper, and
I know from good authority that the French Plenipotentiaries at the
Congress of Vienna were especially instructed to insist that the
restoration of the throne of Naples in favour of the Bourbons of the
Two Sicilies should be a consequence of the restoration of the throne of
France. I also know that the proposition was firmly opposed on the part
of Austria, who had always viewed with jealousy the occupation of three
thrones of Europe by the single House of Bourbon.
According to information, for the authenticity of which I can vouch,
the following were the plans which Napoleon conceived at Elba. Almost
immediately after his arrival in France he was to order the Marshals
on whom he could best rely to defend to the utmost the entrances to the
French territory and the approaches to Paris, by pivoting on the triple
line of fortresses which gird the north and east of France. Davoust
was 'in petto' singled out for the defence of Paris. He, was to arm
the inhabitants of the suburbs, and to have, besides, 20,000 men of
the National Guard at his disposal. Napoleon, not being aware of the
situation of the Allies, never supposed that they could concentrate
their forces and march against him so speedily as they did. He hoped to
take them by surprise, and defeat their projects, by making Murat march
upon Milan, and by stirring up insurrections in Italy. The Po being once
crossed, and Murat approaching the capital of Lombardy, Napoleon with
the corps of Suchet, Brune, Grouchy, and Massena, augmented by
troops sent, by forced marches, to Lyons, was to cross the Alps and
revolutionise Piedmont. There, having recruited his army and joined
the Neapolitans in Milan, he was to proclaim the independence of Italy,
unite the whole country under a single chief, and then march at the head
of 100,000 men on Vienna, by the Julian Alps, across which victory had
conducted him in 1797. This was not all: numerous emissaries scattered
through Poland and Hungary were to foment discord and raise the cry
of liberty and independence, to alarm Russia and Austria. It must be
confessed it would have been an extraordinary spectacle to see Napoleon
giving liberty to Europe in revenge for not having succeeded in
enslaving her.
By means of these bold manoeuvres and vast combinations Napoleon
calculated that he would have the advantage of the initiative in
military operations. Perhaps his genius was never more fully developed
than in this vast conception. According to this plan he was to extend
his operations over a line of 500 leagues, from Ostend to Vienna, by the
Alps and Italy, to provide himself with immense resources of every
kind, to prevent the Emperor of Austria from marching his troops
against France, and probably force him to terminate a war from which
the hereditary provinces would have exclusively suffered. Such was the
bright prospect which presented itself to Napoleon when he stepped on
board the vessel which was to convey him from Elba to France. But the
mad precipitation of Murat put Europe on the alert, and the brilliant
illusion vanished like a dream.
After being assured that all was tranquil, and that the Royal family
was secure against every danger, I myself set out at four o'clock on
the morning of the 20th of March, taking the road to Lille.--Nothing
extraordinary occurred until I arrived at the post-office of Fins, in
front of which were drawn up a great number of carriages, which
had arrived before mine, and the owners of which, like myself, were
impatiently waiting for horses. I soon observed that some one called
the postmaster aside in a way which did not appear entirely devoid of
mystery, and I acknowledge I felt some degree of alarm. I was in
the room in which the travellers were waiting, and my attention was
attracted by a large bill fixed against the wall. It was printed in
French and Russian, and it proved to be the order of the day which I
had been fortunate enough to obtain from the Emperor Alexander to exempt
posthorses, etc., from the requisitions of the Allied troops.
I was standing looking at the bill when the postmaster came into the
room and advanced towards me. "Sir," said he, "that is an order of the
day which saved me from ruin."--"Then surely you would not harm the man
by whom it is signed?"--"I know you, sir, I recognised you immediately.
I saw you in Paris when you were Director of the Post-office, and you
granted a just claim which I had upon you. I have now come to tell you
that they are harnessing two horses to your calash, and you may set
off at full speed." The worthy man had assigned to my use the only two
horses at his disposal; his son performed the office of postilion, and
I set off to the no small dissatisfaction of some of the travellers who
had arrived before me, and who, perhaps, had as good reasons as I to
avoid the presence of Napoleon.
We arrived at Lille at eleven o'clock on the night of the 21st. Here I
encountered another vexation, though not of an alarming kind. The gates
of the town were closed, and I was obliged to content myself with a
miserable night's lodging in the suburb.
I entered Lille on the 22d, and Louis XVIII. arrived on the 23d. His
Majesty also found the gates closed, and more than an hour elapsed
before an order could be obtained for opening them, for the Duke of
Orleans, who commanded the town, was inspecting the troops when his
Majesty arrived. The King was perfectly well received at Lille. There
indeed appeared some symptoms of defection, but it must be acknowledged
that the officers of the old army had been so singularly sacrificed to
the promotion of the returned emigrants that it was very natural the
former should hail the return of the man who had so often led them to
victory. I put up at the Hotel de Grand, certainly without forming any