Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
until the 21st of that month. The first of these decrees abrogated all
changes in the courts of justice and tribunals which had taken place
during the absence of Napoleon. The second banished anew all emigrants
who had returned to France before 1814 without proper authority, and
displaced all officers belonging to the class of emigrants introduced
into the army by the King. The third suppressed the Order of St. Louis,
the white flag, cockade, and other Royal emblems, and restored the
tri-coloured banner and the Imperial symbols of Bonaparte's authority.
The same decree abolished the Swiss Guard and the Household troops of
the King. The fourth sequestered the effects of the Bourbons. A similar
Ordinance sequestered the restored property of emigrant families.
The fifth decree of Lyons suppressed the ancient nobility and feudal
titles, and formally confirmed proprietors of national domains in
their possessions. (This decree was very acceptable to the majority of
Frenchmen). The sixth declared sentence of exile against all emigrants
not erased by Napoleon from the list previously to the accession of the
Bourbons, to which was added confiscation of their property. The seventh
restored the Legion of Honour in every respect as it had existed under
the Emperor; uniting to its funds the confiscated revenues of the
Bourbon order of St. Louis. The eighth and last decree was the most
important of all. Under pretence that emigrants who had borne arms
against France had been introduced into the Chamber of Peers, and that
the Chamber of Deputies had already sat for the legal time, it dissolved
both Chambers, and convoked the Electoral Colleges of the Empire,
in order that they might hold, in the ensuing month of May, an
extraordinary assembly--the Champ-de-Mai.
This National Convocation, for which Napoleon claimed a precedent in the
history of the ancient Franks, was to have two objects: first, to
make such alterations and reforms in the Constitution of the Empire
as circumstances should render advisable; secondly, to assist at the
coronation of the Empress Maria Louisa. Her presence, and that of
her son, was spoken of as something that admitted of no doubt, though
Bonaparte knew there was little hope of their return from Vienna. These
various enactments were well calculated to serve Napoleon's cause. They
flattered the army, and at the same time stimulated their resentment
against the emigrants, by insinuating that they had been sacrificed by
Louis to the interest of his followers. They held out to the Republicans
a prospect of confiscation, proscription, and, revolution of government,
while, the Imperialists were gratified with a view of ample funds for
pensions, offices, and honorary decorations. To proprietors of the
national domains security was promised, to the Parisians the grand
spectacle of the Champ-de-Mai, and to. France peace and tranquillity,
since the arrival of the Empress and her son, confidently asserted to be
at hand, was taken as a pledge of the friendship of Austria.
Napoleon at the same time endeavoured to make himself popular with the
common people--the mob of the Faubourg St. Antoine and other obscure
quarters of Paris. On the first evening of his return, as he walked
round the glittering circle met to welcome him, in the State apartments
of the Tuileries, he kept repeating, "Gentlemen, it is to the poor and
disinterested mass of the people that I owe everything; it is they who
have brought me back to the capital. It is the poor subaltern officers
and common soldiers that have done all this. I owe everything to the
common people and the ranks of the army. Remember that! I owe everything
to the army and the people!" Some time after he took occasional rides
through the Faubourg St. Antoine, but the demonstrations of the mob gave
him little pleasure, and, it was easy to detect a sneer in his
addresses to them. He had some slight intercourse with the men of the
Revolution--the fierce, blood-thirsty Jacobins--but even now he could
not conceal his abhorrence of them, and, be it said to his honour, he
had as little to do with them as possible.
When Napoleon, departed for the summer campaign he took care beforehand
to leave large sums of money for the 'federes'; in the hands of the
devoted Real; under whose management the mob was placed. These sums were
to be distributed at appropriate seasons, to make the people cry in
the streets of Paris, "Napoleon or death." He also left in the hands of
Davoust a written authority for the publication of his bulletins, many
clauses of which were written long before the battles were fought
that they were to describe. He gave to the same Marshal a plan of his
campaign, which he had arranged for the defensive. This was not confided
to him without an injunction of the strictest secrecy, but it is said
that Davoust communicated the plan to Fouché. Considering Davoust's
character this is very unlikely, but if so, it is far from improbable
that Fouché communicated the plan to the Allies with whom, and more
particularly with Prince Metternich, he is well known to have been
corresponding at the time.
Shortly after the Emperor's arrival in Paris Benjamin Constant, a
moderate and candid man, was deputed by the constitutional party to
ascertain Napoleon's sentiments and intentions. Constant was a lover of
constitutional liberty, and an old opponent of Napoleon, whose headlong
career of despotism, cut out by the sword, he had vainly endeavoured to
check by the eloquence of his pen.
The interview took place at the Tuileries. The Emperor, as was his wont,
began the conversation, and kept it nearly all to himself during the
rest of the audience. He did not affect to disguise either his past
actions or present dispositions.
"The nation," he said, "has had a respite of twelve years from every
kind of political agitation, and for one year has enjoyed a respite
from war. This double repose has created a craving after activity. It
requires, or fancies it requires, a Tribune and popular assemblies. It
did not always require them. The people threw themselves at my feet when
I took the reins of government. You ought to recollect this, who made a
trial of opposition. Where was your support--your strength? Nowhere. I
assumed less authority than I was invited to assume. Now all is changed.
A feeble government, opposed to the national interests, has given to
these interests the habit of standing on the defensive and evading
authority. The taste for constitutions, for debates, for harangues,
appears to have revived. Nevertheless it is but the minority that wishes
all this, be assured. The people, or if you like the phrase better; the
multitude, wish only for me. You would say so if you had only seen this
multitude pressing eagerly on my steps, rushing down from the tops of
the mountains, calling on me, seeking me out, saluting me. On my way
from Cannes hither I have not conquered--I have administered. I am not
only (as has been pretended) the Emperor of the soldiers; I am that of
the peasants of the plebeians of France. Accordingly, in spite of all
that has happened, you see the people come back to me. There is sympathy
between us. It is not as with the privileged classes. The noblesse have
been in my service; they thronged in crowds into my antechambers. There
is no place that they have not accepted or solicited. I have had the
Montmorencys, the Noailles, the Rohans, the Beauveaus, the Montemarts,
in my train. But there never was any cordiality between us. The steed
made his curvets--he was well broken in, but I felt him quiver under me.
With the people it is another thing. The popular fibre responds to mine.
I have risen from the ranks of the people: my voice sets mechanically
upon them. Look at those conscripts, the sons of peasants: I never
flattered them; I treated them roughly. They did not crowd round me the
less; they did not on that account cease to cry, 'Vive l'Empereur!' It
is that between them and me there is one and the same nature. They look
to me as their support, their safeguard against the nobles. I have but
to make a sign, or even to look another way, and the nobles would be
massacred in every province. So well have they managed matters in the
last ten months! but I do not desire to be the King of a mob. If there
are the means to govern by a constitution well and good. I wished for
the empire of the world, and to ensure it complete liberty of action
was necessary to me. To govern France merely it is possible that a
constitution may be better. I wished for the empire of the world, as who
would not have done in my place? The world invited me to rule over it.
Sovereigns and subjects alike emulously bowed the neck under my
sceptre. I have seldom met with opposition in France, but still I have
encountered more of it from some obscure and unarmed Frenchmen than from
all these Kings so resolute, just now, no longer to have a man of the
people for their equal! See then what appears to you possible; let
me know your ideas. Public discussion, free elections, responsible
ministers, the liberty of the press, I have no objection to all that,
the liberty of the press especially; to stifle it is absurd. I am
convinced on this point. I am the man of the people: if the people
really wish for liberty let them have it. I have acknowledged their
sovereignty. It is just that I should lend an ear to their will, nay,
even to their caprices. I have never been disposed to oppress them for
my pleasure. I conceived great designs; but fate has been against me; I
am no longer a conqueror, nor can I be one. I know what is possible
and what is not.--I have no further object than to raise up France and
bestow on her a government suitable to her. I have no hatred to liberty,
I have set it aside when it obstructed my path, but I understand what
it means; I was brought up in its school: besides, the work of fifteen
years is overturned, and it is not possible to recommence it. It would
take twenty years, and the lives of 2,000,000 of men to be sacrificed to
it. As for the rest, I desire peace, but I can only obtain it by means
of victory. I would not inspire you with false expectations. I permit it
to be said that negotiations are going on; there are none. I foresee
a hard struggle, a long war. To support it I must be seconded by the
nation, but in return I believe they will expect liberty. They shall
have it: the circumstances are new. All I desire is to be informed of
the truth. I am getting old. A man is no longer at forty-five what he
was at thirty. The repose enjoyed by a constitutional king may suit me:
it will still more certainly be the best thing, for my son."
From this remarkable address. Benjamin Constant concluded that no
change had taken place in Bonaparte's views or feelings in matters of
government, but, being convinced that circumstances had changed, he had
made up his mind to conform to them. He says, and we cannot doubt it,
"that he listened to Napoleon with the deepest interest, that there was
a breadth and grandeur of manner as he spoke, and a calm serenity seated
on a brow covered with immortal laurels."
Whilst believing the utter incompatibility of Napoleon and
constitutional government we cannot in fairness omit mentioning that the
causes which repelled him from the altar and sanctuary of freedom
were strong: the real lovers of a rational and feasible liberty--the
constitutional monarchy men were few--the mad ultra-Liberals, the
Jacobins, the refuse of one revolution and the provokers of another,
were numerous, active, loud, and in pursuing different ends these two
parties, the respectable and the disreputable, the good and the bad, got
mixed and confused with one another.
On the 14th of May, when the 'federes' were marshalled in processional