Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
The third day arrived without its being possible, anxiously as it was
desired, to come to any conclusion favourable to the preservation of
these unfortunate men. The murmurs in the camp grew louder--the evil
went on increasing--remedy appeared impossible--the danger was real and
imminent. The order for shooting the prisoners was given and executed
on the 10th of March. We did not, as has been stated, separate the
Egyptians from the other prisoners. There were no Egyptians.
Many of the unfortunate creatures composing the smaller division, which
was fired on close to the seacoast, at some distance from the other
column, succeeded in swimming to some reefs of rocks out of the reach
of musket-shot. The soldiers rested their muskets on the sand, and,
to induce the prisoners to return, employed the Egyptian signs of
reconciliation in use in the country. They came back; but as they
advanced they were killed, and disappeared among the waves.
I confine myself to these details of this act of dreadful necessity,
of which I was an eye-witness. Others, who, like myself, saw it,
have fortunately spared me the recital of the sanguinary result. This
atrocious scene, when I think of it, still makes me shudder, as it did
on the day I beheld it; and I would wish it were possible for me to
forget it, rather than be compelled to describe it. All the horrors
imagination can conceive, relative to that day of blood, would fall
short of the reality.
I have related the truth, the whole truth. I was present at all the
discussions, all the conferences, all the deliberations. I had not, as
may be supposed, a deliberative voice; but I am bound to declare that
the situation of the army, the scarcity of food, our small numerical
strength, in the midst of a country where every individual was an enemy,
would have induced me to vote in the affirmative of the proposition
which was carried into effect, if I had a vote to give. It was necessary
to be on the spot in order to understand the horrible necessity which
existed.
War, unfortunately, presents too many occasions on which a law,
immutable in all ages, and common to all nations, requires that private
interests should be sacrificed to a great general interest, and that
even humanity should be forgotten. It is for posterity to judge whether
this terrible situation was that in which Bonaparte was placed. For my
own part, I have a perfect conviction that he could not do otherwise
than yield to the dire necessity of the case. It was the advice of the
council, whose opinion was unanimous in favour of the execution, that
governed him. Indeed I ought in truth to say, that he yielded only
in the last extremity, and was one of those, perhaps, who beheld the
massacre with the deepest pain.
After the siege of Jaffa the plague began to exhibit itself with a
little more virulence. We lost between seven and eight hundred, men by
the contagion during the campaign of Syria.
--[Sir Walter Scott says, that Heaven sent this pestilence amongst
us to avenge the massacre of Jaffa]--
During our march on St. Jean d'Acre, which was commenced on the 14th of
March, the army neither obtained the brilliant triumphs nor encountered
the numerous obstacles spoken of in certain works. Nothing of importance
occurred but a rash skirmish of General Lannes who, in spite of contrary
orders from Bonaparte, obstinately pursued a troop of mountaineers into
the passes of Nablous. On returning, he found the mountaineers placed in
ambush in great numbers amongst rocks, the windings of which they were
well acquainted with, whence they fired close upon our troops, whose
situation rendered them unable to defend themselves. During the time
of this foolish and useless enterprise, especially while the firing was
brisk, Bonaparte exhibited much impatience, and it must be confessed,
his anger was but natural. The Nablousians halted at the openings of
the mountain defiles. Bonaparte reproached Lannes bitterly for having
uselessly exposed himself, and "sacrificed, without any object, a number
of brave men." Lannes excused himself by saying that the mountaineers
had defied him, and he wished to chastise the rabble. "We are not in a
condition to play the swaggerer," replied Napoleon.
In four days we arrived before St. Jean d'Acre, where we learned that
Djezzar had cut off the head of our envoy, Mailly-de-Chateau-Renaud, and
thrown his body into the sea in a sack. This cruel pasha was guilty of
a great number of similar executions. The waves frequently drove dead
bodies towards the coast, and we came upon them whilst bathing.
The details of the siege of Acre are well known. Although surrounded
by a wall, flanked with strong towers, and having, besides, a broad and
deep ditch defended by works this little fortress did not appear
likely to hold out against French valour and the skill of our corps of
engineers and artillery; but the ease and rapidity with which Jaffa
had been taken occasioned us to overlook in some degree the comparative
strength of the two places, and the difference of their respective
situations. At Jaffa we had sufficient artillery: at St. Jean d'Acre we
had not. At Jaffa we had to deal only with a garrison left to itself:
at St. Jean d'Acre we were opposed by a garrison strengthened by
reinforcements of men and supplies of provisions, supported by the
English fleet, and assisted by European Science. Sir Sidney Smith was,
beyond doubt, the man who did us the greatest injury.
--[Sir Sidney Smith was the only Englishman besides the Duke of
Wellington who defeated Napoleon in military operations. The third
Englishman opposed to him, Sir John Moore, was compelled to make a
precipitate retreat through the weakness of his force]--
Much has been said respecting his communications with the
General-in-Chief. The reproaches which the latter cast upon him for
endeavouring to seduce the soldiers and officers of the army by tempting
offers were the more singular, even if they were well founded, inasmuch
as these means are frequently employed by leaders in war.
--[At one time the French General was so disturbed by them as to
endeavour to put a stop to them; which object he effected by
interdicting all communication with the English, and signifying, in
an order of the day, that their Commodore was a madman. This, being
believed in the army, so enraged Sir Sidney Smith, that in his wrath
he sent a challenge to Napoleon. The latter replied, that he had
too many weighty affairs on his hands to trouble himself in so
trifling a matter. Had it, indeed, been the great Marlborough, it
might have been worthy his attention. Still, if the English sailor
was absolutely bent upon fighting, he would send him a bravo from
the army, and show them a small portion of neutral ground, where the
mad Commodore might land, and satisfy his humour to the full.--
(Editor of 1836 edition.)]--
As to the embarking of French prisoners on board a vessel in which
the plague existed, the improbability of the circumstance alone,
but especially the notorious facts of the case, repel this odious
accusation. I observed the conduct of Sir Sidney Smith closely at the
time, and I remarked in him a chivalric spirit, which sometimes hurried
him into trifling eccentricities; but I affirm that his behaviour
towards the French was that of a gallant enemy. I have seen many
letters, in which the writers informed him that they "were very sensible
of the good treatment which the French experienced when they fell
into his hands." Let any one examine Sir Sidney's conduct before the
capitulation of El-Arish, and after its rupture, and then they can judge
of his character.
--[Napoleon, when at St. Helena, in speaking of the siege of Acre,
said,--Sidney Smith is a brave officer. He displayed considerable
ability in the treaty for the evacuation of Egypt by the French. He
took advantage of the discontent which he found to prevail amongst
the French troops at being so long away from France, and other
circumstances. He manifested great honour in sending immediately to
Kléber the refusal of Lord Keith to ratify the treaty, which saved
the French army; if he had kept it a secret seven or eight days
longer, Cairo would have been given up to the Turks, and the French
army necessarily obliged to surrender to the English. He also
showed great humanity and honour in all his proceedings towards the
French who felt into his hands. He landed at Havre, for some
'sottise' of a bet he had made, according to some, to go to the
theatre; others said it was for espionage; however that may be, he
was arrested and confined in the Temple as a spy; and at one time it
was intended to try and execute him. Shortly after I returned from
Italy he wrote to me from his prison, to request that I would
intercede for him; but, under the circumstances in which he was
taken, I could do nothing for him. He is active, intelligent,
intriguing, and indefatigable; but I believe that he is 'mezzo
pazo'.
"The chief cause of the failure at Acre was, that he took all my
battering train, which was on board of several small vessels.
Had it not been for that, I would have taken Acre in spite of him.
He behaved very bravely, and was well seconded by Phillipeaux, a
Frenchman of talent, who had studied with me as an engineer. There
was a Major Douglas also, who behaved very gallantly. The
acquisition of five or six hundred seamen as gunners was a great
advantage to the Turks, whose spirits they revived, and whom they
showed how to defend the fortress. But he committed a great fault
in making sorties, which cost the lives of two or three hundred
brave fellows without the possibility of success. For it was
impossible he could succeed against the number of the French who
were before Acre. I would lay a wage that he lost half of his crew
in them. He dispersed Proclamations amongst my troops, which
certainly shook some of them, and I in consequence published an
order, stating that he was mad, and forbidding all communication
with him. Some days after he sent, by means of a flag of truce,
a lieutenant or a midshipman with a letter containing a challenge to
me to meet him at some place he pointed out in order to fight a
duel. I laughed at this, and sent him back an intimation that when
he brought Marlborough to fight me I would meet him. Notwithstanding
this, I like the character of the man." (Voices from
St. Helena, vol. 4, p. 208).]--
All our manoeuvres, our works, and attacks were made with that levity
and carelessness which over-confidence inspires. Kléber, whilst walking
with me one day in the lines of our camp, frequently expressed his
surprise and discontent. "The trenches," said, he, "do not come up to
my knees." Besieging artillery was, of necessity, required: we commenced
with field artillery. This encouraged the besieged, who perceived the
weakness of our resources. The besieging artillery, consisting only of
three twenty-four pounders and six eighteen pounders, was not brought up
until the end of April, and before that period three assaults had taken
place with very serious loss. On the 4th of May our powder began to
fail us. This cruel event obliged us to slacken our fire. We also wanted
shot; and an order of the day fixed a price to be given for all balls,
according to their calibre, which might be picked up after being
fired from the fortress or the two ships of the line, the 'Tiger' and
'Theseus', which were stationed on each side of the harbour. These two
vessels embarrassed the communication between the camp and the trenches;
but though they made much noise, they did little harm. A ball from one