Memoirs of Napoleon Bonaparte — Complete
learn with pleasure to ensure, etc." On reading the passage over again
he thought he had pledged himself too far in saying that he would
willingly contribute, etc. He therefore scored out the last sentence,
and interlined, "I shall contribute with pleasure to the happiness and
tranquillity of your retirement."
The answer thus scored and interlined could not be sent off, and it lay
on the table with Bonaparte's signature affixed to it.
Some time after he wrote another answer, the three first paragraphs of
which were exactly alike that first quoted; but for the last paragraph
he substituted the following:
"I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family; and I shall
learn with pleasure that you are surrounded with all that can
contribute to the tranquillity of your retirement."
By this means he did not pledge himself in any way, not even in words,
for he himself made no offer of contributing to the tranquillity of the
retirement. Every day which augmented his power and consolidated his
position diminished, he thought, the chances of the Bourbons; and seven
months were suffered to intervene between the date of the King's first
letter and the answer of the First Consul, which was written on the 2d
Vendemiaire, year IX. (24th September 1800) just when the Congress of
Luneville was on the point of opening.
Some days after the receipt of Louis XVIII.'s letter we were walking
in the gardens of Malmaison; he was in good humour, for everything was
going on to his mind. "Has my wife been saying anything more to you
about the Bourbons?" said he.--"No, General."--"But when you converse
with her you concur a little in her opinions. Tell me why you wish the
Bourbons back? You have no interest in their return, nothing to expect
from them. Your family rank is not high enough to enable you to obtain
any great post. You would be nothing under them. Through the patronage
of M. de Chambonas you got the appointment of Secretary of Legation at
Stuttgart; but had it not been for the change you would have remained
all your life in that or some inferior post. Did you ever know men rise
by their own merit under kings? Everything depends on birth, connection,
fortune, and intrigue. Judge things more accurately; reflect more
maturely on the future."--"General," replied I, "I am quite of your
opinion on one point. I never received gift, place, or favour from the
Bourbons; and I have not the vanity to believe that I should ever have
attained any important Appointment. But you must not forget that my
nomination as Secretary of Legation at Stuttgart preceded the overthrow
of the throne only by a few days; and I cannot infer, from what took
place under circumstances unfortunately too certain, what might have
happened in the reverse case. Besides, I am not actuated by personal
feelings; I consider not my own interests, but those of France. I wish
you to hold the reins of government as long as you live; but you have
no children, and it is tolerably certain that you will have none by
Josephine. What will become of us when you are gone? You talk of the
future; but what will be the future fate of France? I have often
heard you say that your brothers are not--"--"You are right," said he,
abruptly interrupting me. "If I do not live thirty years to complete
my work you will have a long series of civil wars after my death.
My brothers will not suit France; you know what they are. A violent
conflict will therefore arise among the most distinguished generals,
each of whom will think himself entitled to succeed me."--"Well,
General, why not take means to obviate the mischief you foresee?"--"Do
you imagine I do not think of it? But look at the difficulties that
stand in my way. How are so many acquired rights and material results
to be secured against the efforts of a family restored to power, and
returning with 80,000 emigrants and the influence of fanaticism? What
would become of those who voted for the death of the King--the men who
acted a conspicuous part in the Revolution--the national domains, and a
multitude of things that have been done during twelve years? Can you see
how far reaction would extend?"--"General, need I remind you that Louis,
in his letter, guarantees the contrary of all you apprehend? I know what
will be your answer; but are you not able to impose whatever conditions
you may think fit? Grant what is asked of you only at that price. Take
three or four years; in that time you may ensure the happiness of France
by institutions conformable to her wants. Custom and habit would give
them a power which it would not be easy to destroy; and even supposing
such a design were entertained, it could not be accomplished. I have
heard you say it is wished you should act the part of Monk; but you well
know the difference between a general opposing the usurper of a
crown, and one whom victory and peace have raised above the ruins of a
subverted throne, and who restores it voluntarily to those who have long
occupied it. You are well aware what you call ideology will not again be
revived; and--"--"I know what you are going to say; but it all
amounts to nothing. Depend upon it, the Bourbons will think they have
reconquered their inheritance, and will dispose of it as they please.
The most sacred pledges, the most positive promises, will be violated.
None but fools will trust them. My resolution is formed; therefore let
us say no more on the subject. But I know how these women torment you.
Let them mind their knitting, and leave me to do what I think right."
Every one knows the adage, 'Si vis pacem para bellum'. Had Bonaparte
been a Latin scholar he would probably have reversed it and said, 'Si
vis bellum para pacem'. While seeking to establish pacific relations
with the powers of Europe the First Consul was preparing to strike a
great blow in Italy. As long as Genoa held out, and Massena continued
there, Bonaparte did not despair of meeting the Austrians in those
fields which not four years before had been the scenes of his success.
He resolved to assemble an army of reserve at Dijon. Where there was
previously nothing he created everything. At that period of his life
the fertility of his imagination and the vigour of his genius must have
commanded the admiration of even his bitterest enemies. I was astonished
at the details into which he entered. While every moment was engrossed
by the most important occupations he sent 24,000 francs to the hospital
of Mont St. Bernard. When he saw that his army of reserve was forming,
and everything was going on to his liking, he said to me, "I hope to
fall on the rear of Melas before he is aware I am in Italy . . . that is
to say, provided Genoa holds out. But MASSENA is defending it."
On the 17th of March, in a moment of gaiety and good humour, he desired
me to unroll Chauchard's great map of Italy. He lay down upon it, and
desired me to do likewise. He then stuck into it pins, the heads of
which were tipped with wax, some red and some black. I silently observed
him; and awaited with no little curiosity the result of this plan of
campaign. When he had stationed the enemy's corps, and drawn up the pins
with red heads on the points where he hoped to bring his own troops,
he said to me, "Where do you think I shall beat Melas?"--"How the devil
should I know?"--"Why, look here, you fool! Melas is at Alessandria with
his headquarters. There he will remain until Genoa surrenders. He has
in Alessandria his magazines, his hospitals, his artillery, and his
reserves. Crossing the Alps here (pointing to the Great Mont St.
Bernard) I shall fall upon Melas, cut off his communications with
Austria, and meet him here in the plains of Scrivia" (placing a red pin
at San Giuliano). Finding that I looked on this manoeuvre of pins as
mere pastime, he addressed to me some of his usual compliments, such
as fool, ninny, etc., and then proceeded to demonstrate his plans more
clearly on the map. At the expiration of a quarter of an hour we rose; I
folded up the map, and thought no more of the matter.
Four months after this, when I was at San Giuliano with Bonaparte's
portfolio and despatches, which I had saved from the rout which had
taken place during the day, and when that very evening I was writing at
Torre di Galifolo the bulletin of the battle to Napoleon's dictation, I
frankly avowed my admiration of his military plans. He himself smiled at
the accuracy of his own foresight.
The First Consul was not satisfied with General Berthier as War
Minister, and he superseded him by Carnot,
--[There were special reasons for the appointment of Carnot,
Berthier was required with his master in Italy, while Carnot, who
had so long ruled the armies of the Republic, was better fitted to
influence Moreau, at this time advancing into Germany. Carnot
probably fulfilled the main object of his appointment when he was
sent to Moreau, and succeeded in getting that general, with natural
reluctance, to damage his own campaign by detaching a large body of
troops into Italy. Berthier was reappointed to the Ministry on the
8th of October 1800,--a very speedy return if he had really been
disgraced.]--
who had given great proofs of firmness and integrity, but who,
nevertheless, was no favourite of Bonaparte, on account of his decided
republican principles. Berthier was too slow in carrying out the
measures ordered, [duplicated line removed here D.W.] and too lenient in
the payment of past charges and in new contracts. Carnot's appointment
took place on the 2d of April 1800; and to console Berthier, who, he
knew, was more at home in the camp than in the office, he dictated to me
the following letter for him:--
PARIS, 2d April 1800.
CITIZEN-GENERAL,--The military talents of which you have given so
many proofs, and the confidence of the Government, call you to the
command of an army. During the winter you have REORGANISED the War
Department, and you have provided, as far as circumstances would
permit, for the wants of our armies. During the spring and summer
it must be your task to lead our troops to victory, which is the
effectual means of obtaining peace and consolidating the Republic.
Bonaparte laughed heartily while he dictated this epistle, especially
when he uttered the word which I have marked in italics [CAPS]. Berthier
set out for Dijon, where he commenced the formation of the army of
reserve.
The Consular Constitution did not empower the First Consul to command an
army out of the territory of France. Bonaparte therefore wished to keep
secret his long-projected plan of placing himself at the head of the
army of Italy, which he then for the first time called the grand army.
I observed that by his choice of Berthier nobody could be deceived,
because it must be evident that he would have made another selection had
he not intended to command in person. He laughed at my observation.
Our departure from Paris was fixed for the 6th of May, or, according to
the republican calendar, the 16th Floréal. Bonaparte had made all his
arrangements and issued all his orders; but still he did not wish it to
be known that he was going to take the command of the army. On the eve
of our departure, being in conference with the two other Consuls and the
Ministers, he said to Lucien, "Prepare, to-morrow morning, a circular to
the prefects, and you, Fouché, will publish it in the journals. Say I am
gone to Dijon to inspect the army of reserve. You may add that I shall
perhaps go as far as Geneva; but you must affirm positively that I shall
not be absent longer than a fortnight. You, Cambacérès, will preside
to-morrow at the Council of State. In my absence you are the Head of
the Government. State that my absence will be but of short duration, but