Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay
for, if a man gives up office, he lays down with it his official
rank and falls back into the rank of his fellows.
Now the republican constitution apart from the soundness of its
origin, since it arose from the pure source of the concept of right,
has also the prospect of attaining the desired result, namely,
perpetual peace. And the reason is this. If, as must be so under this
constitution, the consent of the subjects is required to determine
whether there shall be war or not, nothing is more natural than that
they should weigh the matter well, before undertaking such a bad
business. For in decreeing war, they would of necessity be resolving
to bring down the miseries of war upon their country. This implies:
they must fight themselves; they must hand over the costs of the war
out of their own property; they must do their poor best to make good
the devastation which it leaves behind; and finally, as a crowning
ill, they have to accept a burden of debt which will embitter even
peace itself, and which they can never pay off on account of the new
wars which are always impending. On the other hand, in a government
where the subject is not a citizen holding a vote, (_i.e._ in a
constitution which is not republican), the plunging into war is the
least serious thing in the world. For the ruler is not a citizen,
but the owner of the state, and does not lose a whit by the war,
while he goes on enjoying the delights of his table or sport, or
of his pleasure palaces and gala days. He can therefore decide on
war for the most trifling reasons, as if it were a kind of pleasure
party.[120] Any justification of it that is necessary for the sake of
decency he can leave without concern to the diplomatic corps who are
always only too ready with their services.
[120] Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:—
“But is it fit, or can it bear the shock
Of rational discussion, that a man,
Compounded and made up like other men
Of elements tumultuous, . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Should when he pleases, and on whom he will,
Wage war, with any or with no pretence
Of provocation giv’n or wrong sustain’d,
And force the beggarly last doit, by means
That his own humour dictates, from the clutch
Of poverty, that thus he may procure
His thousands, weary of penurious life,
A splendid opportunity to die?”
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
“He deems a thousand or ten thousand lives
Spent in the purchase of renown for him,
An easy reckoning.” [Tr.]
* * * * *
The following remarks must be made in order that we may not fall into
the common error of confusing the republican with the democratic
constitution. The forms of the state (_civitas_)[121] may be
classified according to either of two principles of division:—the
difference of the persons who hold the supreme authority in the
state, and the manner in which the people are governed by their
ruler whoever he may be. The first is properly called the form
of sovereignty (_forma imperii_), and there can be only three
constitutions differing in this respect: where, namely, the supreme
authority belongs to only one, to several individuals working
together, or to the whole people constituting the civil society. Thus
we have autocracy or the sovereignty of a monarch, aristocracy or
the sovereignty of the nobility, and democracy or the sovereignty
of the people. The second principle of division is the form of
government (_forma regiminis_), and refers to the way in which the
state makes use of its supreme power: for the manner of government
is based on the constitution, itself the act of that universal will
which transforms a multitude into a nation. In this respect the form
of government is either republican or despotic. Republicanism is the
political principle of severing the executive power of the government
from the legislature. Despotism is that principle in pursuance of
which the state arbitrarily puts into effect laws which it has itself
made: consequently it is the administration of the public will, but
this is identical with the private will of the ruler. Of these three
forms of a state, democracy, in the proper sense of the word, is
of necessity despotism, because it establishes an executive power,
since all decree regarding—and, if need be, against—any individual
who dissents from them. Therefore the “whole people”, so-called, who
carry their measure are really not all, but only a majority: so that
here the universal will is in contradiction with itself and with the
principle of freedom.
[121] Cf. Hobbes: _On Dominion_, Ch. VII. § 1. “As for the
difference of cities, it is taken from the difference of the
persons to whom the supreme power is committed. This power is
committed either to _one man_, or _council_, or some _one court_
consisting of many men.” [Tr.]
Every form of government in fact which is not representative is
really no true constitution at all, because a law-giver may no more
be, in one and the same person, the administrator of his own will,
than the universal major premise of a syllogism may be, at the same
time, the subsumption under itself of the particulars contained
in the minor premise. And, although the other two constitutions,
autocracy and aristocracy, are always defective in so far as
they leave the way open for such a form of government, yet there
is at least always a possibility in these cases, that they may
take the form of a government in accordance with the spirit of a
representative system. Thus Frederick the Great used at least to
_say_ that he was “merely the highest servant of the state.”[122] The
democratic constitution, on the other hand, makes this impossible,
because under such a government every one wishes to be master. We
may therefore say that the smaller the staff of the executive—that
is to say, the number of rulers—and the more real, on the other
hand, their representation of the people, so much the more is the
government of the state in accordance with a possible republicanism;
and it may hope by gradual reforms to raise itself to that standard.
For this reason, it is more difficult under an aristocracy than
under a monarchy—while under a democracy it is impossible except by
a violent revolution—to attain to this, the one perfectly lawful
constitution. The kind of government,[123] however, is of infinitely
more importance to the people than the kind of constitution,
although the greater or less aptitude of a people for this ideal
greatly depends upon such external form. The form of government,
however, if it is to be in accordance with the idea of right, must
embody the representative system in which alone a republican form
of administration is possible and without which it is despotic
and violent, be the constitution what it may. None of the ancient
so-called republics were aware of this, and they necessarily slipped
into absolute despotism which, of all despotisms, is most endurable
under the sovereignty of one individual.
[122] The lofty appellations which are often given to a
ruler—such as the Lord’s Anointed, the Administrator of the
Divine Will upon earth and Vicar of God—have been many times
censured as flattery gross enough to make one giddy. But it
seems to me without cause. Far from making a prince arrogant,
names like these must rather make him humble at heart, if he has
any intelligence—which we take for granted he has—and reflects
that he has undertaken an office which is too great for any
human being. For, indeed, it is the holiest which God has on
earth—namely, the right of ruling mankind: and he must ever live
in fear of injuring this treasure of God in some respect or other.
[123] Mallet du Pan boasts in his seemingly brilliant but shallow
and superficial language that, after many years experience, he
has come at last to be convinced of the truth of the well known
saying of Pope [_Essay on Man_, III. 303]:—
“For Forms of Government let fools contest;
Whate’er is best administered is best.”
If this means that the best administered government is best
administered, then, in Swift’s phrase, he has cracked a nut to
find a worm in it. If it means, however, that the best conducted
government is also the best kind of government,—that is, the
best form of political constitution,—then it is utterly false:
for examples of wise administration are no proof of the kind of
government. Who ever ruled better than Titus and Marcus Aurelius,
and yet the one left Domitian, the other Commodus, as his
successor? This could not have happened where the constitution
was a good one, for their absolute unfitness for the position was
early enough known, and the power of the emperor was sufficiently
great to exclude them.
SECOND DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACE
II.—“The law of nations shall be founded on a federation of free
states.”
Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, living in the
natural state of society—that is to say, uncontrolled by external
law—injure one another through their very proximity.[124] Every
state, for the sake of its own security, may—and ought to—demand
that its neighbour should submit itself to conditions, similar to
those of the civil society where the right of every individual is
guaranteed. This would give rise to a federation of nations which,
however, would not have to be a State of nations.[125] That would
involve a contradiction. For the term “state” implies the relation of
one who rules to those who obey—that is to say, of law-giver to the
subject people: and many nations in one state would constitute only
one nation, which contradicts our hypothesis, since here we have to
consider the right of one nation against another, in so far as they
are so many separate states and are not to be fused into one.
[124] “For as amongst masterless men, there is perpetual war, of
every man against his neighbour; no inheritance, to transmit to
the son, nor to expect from the father; no propriety of goods,
or lands; no security; but a full and absolute liberty in every
particular man: so in states, and commonwealths not dependent on
one another, every commonwealth, not every man, has an absolute
liberty, to do what it shall judge, that is to say, what that
man, or assembly that representeth it, shall judge most conducing
to their benefit. But withal, they live in the condition of
a perpetual war, and upon the confines of battle, with their
frontiers armed, and cannons planted against their neighbours
round about.” (Hobbes: _Leviathan_, II. Ch. XXI.) [Tr.]
[125] But see p. 136, where Kant seems to speak of a State of
nations as the ideal. Kant expresses himself, on this point, more
clearly in the _Rechtslehre_, Part. II. § 61:—“The natural state
of nations,” he says here, “like that of individual men, is a
condition which must be abandoned, in order that they may enter a
state regulated by law. Hence, before this can take place, every
right possessed by these nations and every external “mine” and
“thine” [_id est_, symbol of possession] which states acquire or
preserve through war are merely _provisional_, and can become
_peremptorily_ valid and constitute a true state of peace only
in a universal _union of states_, by a process analogous to that
through which a people becomes a state. Since, however, the too
great extension of such a State of nations over vast territories
must, in the long run, make the government of that union—and
therefore the protection of each of its members—impossible, a
multitude of such corporations will lead again to a state of war.