Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay
prevent the injustice done from being very great.
3.—=Cosmopolitan Law.= We may pass over this department of right in
silence, for, owing to its analogy with international law, its maxims
are easily specified and estimated.
* * * * *
In this principle of the incompatibility of the maxims of
international law with their publicity, we have a good indication
of the non-agreement between politics and morals, regarded as a
science of right. Now we require to know under what conditions these
maxims do agree with the law of nations. For we cannot conclude that
the converse holds, and that all maxims which can bear publicity
are therefore just. For anyone who has a decided supremacy has no
need to make any secret about his maxims. The condition of a law of
nations being possible at all is that, in the first place, there
should be a law-governed state of things. If this is not so, there
can be no public right, and all right which we can think of outside
the law-governed state,—that is to say, in the state of nature,—is
mere private right. Now we have seen above that something of the
nature of a federation between nations, for the sole purpose of doing
away with war, is the only rightful condition of things reconcilable
with their individual freedom. Hence the agreement of politics and
morals is only possible in a federative union, a union which is
necessarily given _a priori_, according to the principles of right.
And the lawful basis of all politics can only be the establishment
of this union in its widest possible extent. Apart from this end,
all political sophistry is folly and veiled injustice. Now this sham
politics has a casuistry, not to be excelled in the best Jesuit
school. It has its mental reservation (_reservatio mentalis_): as
in the drawing up of a public treaty in such terms as we can, if we
will, interpret when occasion serves to our advantage; for example,
the distinction between the _status quo_ in fact (_de fait_) and
in right (_de droit_). Secondly, it has its probabilism; when it
pretends to discover evil intentions in another, or makes, the
probability of their possible future ascendency a lawful reason for
bringing about the destruction of other peaceful states. Finally, it
has its philosophical sin (_peccatum philosophicum_, _peccatillum_,
_baggatelle_) which is that of holding it a trifle easily pardoned
that a smaller state should be swallowed up, if this be to the gain
of a nation much more powerful; for such an increase in power is
supposed to tend to the greater prosperity of the whole world.[154]
[154] We can find the voucher for maxims such as these in Herr
Hofrichter Garve’s essay, _On the Connection of Morals with
Politics_, 1788. This worthy scholar confesses at the very
beginning that he is unable to give a satisfactory answer to this
question. But his sanction of such maxims, even when coupled with
the admission that he cannot altogether clear away the arguments
raised against them, seems to be a greater concession in favour
of those who shew considerable inclination to abuse them, than it
might perhaps be wise to admit.
Duplicity gives politics the advantage of using one branch or
the other of morals, just as suits its own ends. The love of our
fellowmen is a duty: so too is respect for their rights. But the
former is only conditional: the latter, on the other hand, an
unconditional, absolutely imperative duty; and anyone who would
give himself up to the sweet consciousness of well-doing must be
first perfectly assured that he has not transgressed its commands.
Politics has no difficulty in agreeing with morals in the first sense
of the term, as ethics, to secure that men should give to superiors
their rights. But when it comes to morals, in its second aspect,
as the science of right before which politics must bow the knee,
the politician finds it prudent to have nothing to do with compacts
and rather to deny all reality to morals in this sense, and reduce
all duty to mere benevolence. Philosophy could easily frustrate
the artifices of a politics like this, which shuns the light of
criticism, by publishing its maxims, if only statesmen would have the
courage to grant philosophers the right to ventilate their opinions.
With this end in view, I propose another principle of public right,
which is at once transcendental and affirmative. Its formula would be
as follows:—“All maxims which require publicity, in order that they
may not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both with right
and politics.”
For, if these maxims can only attain the end at which they aim by
being published, they must be in harmony with the universal end of
mankind, which is happiness; and to be in sympathy with this (to
make the people contented with their lot) is the real business of
politics. Now, if this end should be attainable only by publicity, or
in other words, through the removal of all distrust of the maxims of
politics, these must be in harmony with the right of the people; for
a union of the ends of all is only possible in a harmony with this
right.
I must postpone the further development and discussion of this
principle till another opportunity. That it is a transcendental
formula is quite evident from the fact that all the empirical
conditions of a doctrine of happiness, or the _matter_ of law, are
absent, and that it has regard only to the _form_ of universal
conformity to law.
* * * * *
If it is our duty to realise a state of public right, if at the same
time there are good grounds for hope that this ideal may be realised,
although only by an approximation advancing _ad infinitum_, then
perpetual peace, following hitherto falsely so-called conclusions of
peace, which have been in reality mere cessations of hostilities, is
no mere empty idea. But rather we have here a problem which gradually
works out its own solution and, as the periods in which a given
advance takes place towards the realisation of the ideal of perpetual
peace will, we hope, become with the passing of time shorter and
shorter, we must approach ever nearer to this goal.
INDEX
A
Absolutism; of Hobbes, 43, 44;
of Schopenhauer, 43;
according to Kant, 43, 44, 125-128;
to Locke, 44.
Alexander I. of Russia; 80.
Alexander the Great; 31, 103.
Alsace-Lorraine; annexation of, 90, 92, 95.
Ambrose, Saint; 15.
Amphictyonic League; 16, 22.
Aquinas, Thomas; on fighting clergy, 18;
on war, 18, 19.
Arbitration; as a substitute for war, 79, 81, 87;
difficulties settled by, 80;
where it is useless, 82, 83, 86.
Aristotle; on war, 7, 8;
and rights of an enemy, _ib._; 31;
on the relation between politics and ethics, 162.
Assyrians; war among the, 9.
Augustine, Saint; 16.
B
Balance of power; 26, 95.
Bentham, Jeremy; 26, 79, 92.
Bluntschli, J. K.; 41, 73, 74, 80.
C
Caird, Edward; 3, 51.
Calvin, John; 19.
Carnegie, Andrew; 100.
China; a danger to Europe, 92, 93, 140, 141.
Cicero; on the conduct of war, 22, 41.
Clement of Alexandria; 15.
Clergy, fighting; Origen on, 14, 15;
Wycliffe, 18;
Erasmus, _ib._;
Aquinas, _ib._
Cobden, Richard; 64.
Corvinus, Matthias; 109.
Cowper, William; 5, 38, 123.
Crusades, wars of the; 16, 103.
D
Dante, Alighieri; on mediation, 46;
on universal monarchy, 68, 69.
Disarmament; 88-93;
Czar’s proposal of, 90;
practicability of, 90-93.
Dubois, Cardinal; 36.
E
Empire; of Rome, 9, 20, 68;
world-, spiritual, 23, 32, 69;
of Alexander the Great, 31, 68;
Frankish, 69;
Holy Roman 69;
of Napoleon I., 69.
Erasmus, Desiderius; and European peace, 17;
on war, 18, 19;
on fighting clergy, 18, 32.
F
Farrar, J. A.; 18.
Federation; Kant’s idea of, 60, 68, 69, 128-137; 88, 92, 93, 95, 97;
probable results of, 98, 99, 100, 134.
Fichte, J. G.; 69, 99.
Finland; 92, 95.
Fischer, Kuno; 62, 67.
Fleury, Cardinal; 55.
Frederick the Great; 66, 126.
G
Gentilis, Albericus; 21, 32.
Golden Age; 3, 41.
Government; origin of, according to Plato, 5;
according to Hume, 5, 52;
to Cowper, 5, 6;
to Hobbes, 40-42, 118, 119;
to Kant, 51-54, 152-154;
to Rousseau, 52;
to Locke, 53;
representative, 65-68, 120, 121, 124-128.
Greeks; their attitude to other nations, 7;
to an enemy, _ib._;
their Sacred Wars, 16;
the Amphictyonic League, 16.
Grotius, Hugo; his _De Jure Belli et Pacis_, 24-27;
and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25;
and the Law of Nature, 25;
on peace, 27, 32, 40, 131.
H
Hague Conference (1899); 86, 90.
Hegel, G. W. F.; 57;
on war, 71, 72, 75.
Henry IV. of France; 30, 32, 33, 36.
Hobbes, Thomas; his theory of the state of nature and origin of
government, 4, 40-42, 51, 118, 119, 133; 6, 26, 27, 28, 37;
his influence on Kant, 40, 46;
his views on revolution, 41, 188;
of the relations between states, 43-46, 128, 131;
on the conduct of war, 45, 89, 120, 124, 159.
Holls, Fred. W.; 86.
Hooker, Richard; 52;
on the depravity of man, 173.
Hume, David; on the origin of government, 5, 52;
on the state of nature, 40, 41;
on the original contract, 52, 108, 109, 162.
I
International Law; the development of, 20-24;
its connection with the Reformation, 21, 24;
in Greece and Rome, 22, 23.
Intervention; 64, 93, 94, 112, 113.
J
Jews; war among the, 9-11;
their dream of peace, 32.
Justin; 15.
K
Kant, Immanuel; 26, 37;
his indebtedness to earlier political writers, 40, 46;
his theory of human development, 47-49;
and how this is possible, 49-51, 54;
on the foundation of the state, 51-54, 152-154;
the relations between states and individuals, 54, 55, 117-120,
128, 173, 174;
the necessity for reform within the state, 55, 56, 168;
the political and social conditions of his time, 57-59;
his attitude to war, 58, 133, 135, 136, 137, 149-151;
on the growing power of commerce, 59, 65, 142, 157;
his idea of federation, 60, 68, 69, 128-137, 192;
and ideal of perpetual peace, 61, 129, 196;
the conditions of its realization, 62-69;
on representative and other constitutions, 65-68, 120-128, 152,
153, 167;
his opinion of the English constitution, 66;
his disapproval of universal monarchy, 68, 69, 155, 156; 79, 83,
89, 100, 105;
on the right of way, 137-142;
on nature’s guarantee of a perpetual peace, 143-157;
on the relation between politics and morals, 161-196;
on revolution, 167, 168, 186-188.
L
Laveleye, Émile de; 81.
Lawrence, T. J.; 9, 78, 81.
Leibniz, Gottfried W.; 36;
his criticism of St. Pierre, 37, 38, 58, 106.
Locke, John; and the golden age, 3, 4;
on the original contract, 53;
on revolution, 53, 188; 67, 133.
Lorimer, James; 34, 80.
Louis Philippe; 76.
Luther, Martin; on war, 19.
M
Machiavelli, Nicolo; 162.
Maine, Henry; on Grotius and the _Jus Gentium_, 24, 25.
Maistre, Joseph de; 71.
Martineau, James; 102.
Mennonites; and war, 14.
Military service; of Christians, 14, 16, 18, 19;
compulsory, 89;
voluntary, 111.
Mill, John Stuart; 80.
Moltke, Graf von; 71, 73-75.
Monarchy, universal; the ideal of Dante, 68, 69;
disapproved by Kant, 68, 69, 155, 156;
and Fichte, 69.
Montesquieu, Baron de; on self-preservation, 83;
on armed peace, 88, 159.
More, Thomas; 32.
Morley, John; 3.
N