Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay
to think of the right or wrong of anything. Moreover, the Church
emphasised the lack of rights in unbelievers, and gave her blessing
on their annihilation.[26] The whole Christian world was filled with
the idea of a spiritual universal monarchy. Not such as that in
the minds of Greek and Jew and Roman who had been able to picture
international peace only under the form of a great national and
exclusive empire. In this great Christian state there were to be no
distinctions between nations; its sphere was bounded by the universe.
But, here, there was no room or recognition for independent national
states with equal and personal rights. This recognition, opposed
by the Roman Church, is the real basis of international law. The
Reformation was the means by which the personality of the peoples,
the unity and independence of the state were first openly admitted.
On this foundation, mainly at first in Protestant countries, the new
science developed rapidly. Like the civil state and the Christian
religion, international law may be called a peace institution.
[25] The saying is attributed to Pompey:—“Shall I, when I am
preparing for war, think of the laws?”
[26] This implied, however, the idea of a united Christendom as
against the infidel, with which we may compare the idea of a
united Hellas against Persia. In such things we have the germ not
only of international law, but of the ideal of federation.
_Grotius, Puffendorf and Vattel._
In the beginning of the seventeenth century, Grotius laid the
foundations of a code of universal law (_De Jure Belli et Pacis_,
1625) independent of differences of religion, in the hope that its
recognition might simplify the intercourse between the newly formed
nations. The primary object of this great work, written during the
misery and horrors of the Thirty Years’ war, was expressly to draw
attention to these evils and suggest some methods by which the
severity of warfare might be mitigated. Grotius originally meant to
explain only one chapter of the law of nations:[27] his book was
to be called _De Jure Belli_, but there is scarcely any subject of
international law which he leaves untouched. He obtained, moreover,
a general recognition for the doctrine of the Law of Nature which
exerted so strong an influence upon succeeding centuries; indeed,
between these two sciences, as between international law and
ethics, he draws no very sharp line of demarcation, although, on
the whole, in spite of an unscientific, scholastic use of quotation
from authorities, his treatment of the new field is clear and
comprehensive. Grotius made the attempt to set up an ethical
principle of right, in the stead of such doctrines of self-interest
as had been held by many of the ancient writers. There was a law, he
held, established in each state purely with a view to the interests
of that state, but, besides this, there was another higher law in
the interest of the whole society of nations. Its origin was divine;
the reason of man commanded his obedience. This was what we call
international law.[28]
[27] See Maine’s _Ancient Law_, pp. 50-53: pp. 96-101. Grotius
wrongly understood “Jus Gentium,” (“a collection of rules
and principles, determined by observation to be common to
the institutions which prevailed among the various Italian
tribes”) to mean “Jus _inter_ gentes.” The Roman expression for
International Law was not “Jus Gentium,” but “Jus Feciale.”
“Having adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults,” says Maine,
“the position that the Jus Gentium and the Jus Naturæ were
identical, Grotius, with his immediate predecessors and his
immediate successors, attributed to the Law of Nature an
authority which would never perhaps have been claimed for it,
if “Law of Nations” had not in that age been an ambiguous
expression. They laid down unreservedly that Natural Law is the
code of states, and thus put in operation a process which has
continued almost down to our own day, the process of engrafting
on the international system rules which are supposed to have
been evolved from the unassisted contemplation of the conception
of Nature. There is, too, one consequence of immense practical
importance to mankind which, though not unknown during the early
modern history of Europe, was never clearly or universally
acknowledged till the doctrines of the Grotian school had
prevailed. If the society of nations is governed by Natural
Law, the atoms which compose it must be absolutely equal. Men
under the sceptre of Nature are all equal, and accordingly
commonwealths are equal if the international state be one of
nature. The proposition that independent communities, however
different in size and power, are all equal in the view of the Law
of Nations, has largely contributed to the happiness of mankind,
though it is constantly threatened by the political tendencies
of each successive age. It is a doctrine which probably would
never have obtained a secure footing at all if International Law
had not been entirely derived from the majestic claims of Nature
by the Publicists who wrote after the revival of letters.” (_Op.
cit._, p. 100.)
[28] The name “International Law” was first given to the law of
nations by Bentham. (_Principles of Morals and Legislation, XIX._
§ xxv.)
Grotius distinctly holds, like Kant and Rousseau, and unlike Hobbes,
that the state can never be regarded as a unity or institution
separable from the people; the terms _civitas_, _communitas_,
_coetus_, _populus_, he uses indiscriminately. But these nations,
these independent units of society cannot live together side by side
just as they like; they must recognise one another as members of a
European society of states.[29] Law, he said, stands above force
even in war, “which may only be begun to pursue the right;” and the
beginning and manner of conduct of war rests on fixed laws and can be
justified only in certain cases. War is not to be done away with:
Grotius accepts it as fact,[30] (as Hobbes did later) as the natural
method for settling the disputes which were bound constantly to
arise between so many independent and sovereign nations. A terrible
scourge it must ever remain, but as the only available form of legal
procedure, it is sanctioned by the practice of states and not less by
the law of nature and of nations. Grotius did not advance beyond this
position. Every violation of the law of nations can be settled but in
one way—by war, the force of the stronger.
[29] In the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, the balance of power in
Europe was recognised on the basis of terms such as these.
[30] Grotius, however, is a painstaking student of Scripture, and
is willing to say something in favour of peace—not a permanent
peace, that is to say, the idea of which would scarcely be
likely to occur to anyone in the early years of the seventeenth
century—but a plea for fewer, shorter wars. “If therefore,”
he says, “a peace sufficiently safe can be had, it is not
ill secured by the condonation of offenses, and damages, and
expenses: especially among Christians, to whom the Lord has given
his peace as his legacy. And so St. Paul, his best interpreter,
exhorts us to live at peace with all men.... May God write these
lessons—He who alone can—on the hearts of all those who have
the affairs of Christendom in their hands.” (_De Jure Belli et
Pacis_, III. Ch. XXV., Whewell’s translation.)
See also _op. cit._, II., Ch. XXIII., Sect. VIII., where
Grotius recommends that Congresses of Christian Powers should
be held with a view to the peaceful settlement of international
differences.
The necessary distinction between law and ethics was drawn by
Puffendorf,[31] a successor of Grotius who gave an outwardly
systematic form to the doctrine of the great jurist, without adding
to it either strength or completeness. His views, when they were
not based upon the system of Grotius, were strongly influenced by
the speculation of Hobbes, his chronological predecessor, to whom we
shall have later occasion to refer. In the works of Vattel,[32] who
was, next to Rousseau, the most celebrated of Swiss publicists, we
find the theory of the customs and practice in war widely developed,
and the necessity for humanising its methods and limiting its
destructive effects upon neutral countries strongly emphasised.
Grotius and Puffendorf, while they recommend acts of mercy, hold that
there is legally no right which requires that a conquered enemy shall
be spared. This is a matter of humanity alone. It is to the praise
of Vattel that he did much to popularise among the highest and most
powerful classes of society, ideas of humanity in warfare, and of
the rights and obligations of nations. He is, moreover, the first to
make a clear separation between this science and the Law of Nature.
What, he asks, is international law as distinguished from the Law
of Nature? What are the powers of a state and the duties of nations
to one another? What are the causes of quarrel among nations, and
what the means by which they can be settled without any sacrifice of
dignity?
[31] Puffendorf’s best known work, _De Jure Naturæ et Gentium_,
was published in 1672.
[32] _Le Droit des Gens_ was published in 1758 and translated
into English by Joseph Chitty in 1797, (2nd ed., 1834).
They are, in the first place, a friendly conciliatory attitude; and
secondly, such means of settlement as mediation, arbitration and
Peace Congresses. These are the refuges of a peace-loving nation, in
cases where vital interests are not at stake. “Nature gives us no
right to use force, except where mild and conciliatory measures are
useless.” (_Law of Nations_, II. Ch. xviii. § 331.) “Every power owes
it in this matter to the happiness of human society to show itself
ready for every means of reconciliation, in cases where the interests
at stake are neither vital nor important.” (_ibid._ § 332.) At the
same time, it is never advisable that a nation should forgive an
insult which it has not the power to resent.
_The Dream of a Perpetual Peace._
But side by side with this development and gradual popularisation
of the new science of International Law, ideas of a less practical,
but not less fruitful kind had been steadily making their way and
obtaining a strong hold upon the popular mind. The Decree of Eternal
Pacification of 1495 had abolished private war, one of the heavy
curses of the Middle Ages. Why should it not be extended to banish
warfare between states as well? Gradually one proposal after another
was made to attain this end, or, at least, to smooth the way for
its future realisation. The first of these in point of time is to
be found in a somewhat bare, vague form in Sully’s _Memoirs_,[33]
said to have been published in 1634. Half a century later the Quaker
William Penn suggested an international tribunal of arbitration in
the interests of peace.[34] But it was by the French Abbé St. Pierre
that the problem of perpetual peace was fairly introduced into
political literature: and this, in an age of cabinet and dynastic
wars, while the dreary cost of the war of the Spanish succession was
yet unpaid. St. Pierre was the first who really clearly realised and
endeavoured to prove that the establishment of a permanent state of
peace is not only in the interest of the weaker, but is required
by the European society of nations and by the reason of man. From
the beginning of the history of humanity, poets and prophets had
cherished the “sweet dream” of a peaceful civilisation: it is in the
form of a practical project that this idea is new.
[33] _Mémoires ou Œconomies Royales D’Estat, Domestiques,
Politiques et Militaires de Henri le Grand, par Maximilian de