Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay
know that history has not supported Rousseau’s contention. Dynastic
wars are now no more. The Great Powers have shown themselves able
to impose their own conditions, where the welfare and security of
Europe have seemed to demand it. Such a development seemed impossible
enough in the eighteenth century. In the military organisation
of the nations of Europe and in the necessity of making their
internal development subordinate to the care for their external
security, Rousseau saw the cause of all the defects in their
administration.[47] The formation of unions on the model of the Swiss
Confederation or the German _Bund_ would, he thought, be in the
interest of all rulers. But great obstacles seemed to him to lie in
the way of the realisation of such a project as that of St. Pierre.
“Without doubt,” says Rousseau in conclusion, “the proposal of a
perpetual peace is at present an absurd one.... It can only be put
into effect by methods which are violent in themselves and dangerous
to humanity. One cannot conceive of the possibility of a federative
union being established, except by a revolution. And, that granted,
who among us would venture to say whether this European federation is
to be desired or to be feared? It would work, perhaps, more harm in a
moment than it would prevent in the course of centuries.” (_Jugement
sur la Paix Perpétuelle._)
[45] “C’est un livre solide et sensé,” says Rousseau (_Jugement
sur la Paix Perpétuelle_), “et il est très important qu’il
existe.” [This _Jugement_ is appended to Rousseau’s _Extrait du
Projet de Paix Perpétuelle de Monsieur l’Abbé de Saint-Pierre_,
1761.]
[46] Cf. Cowper: _The Winter Morning Walk_:—
“Great princes have great playthings. Some have play’d
At hewing mountains into men, and some
At building human wonders mountain high.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Some seek diversion in the tented field,
And make the sorrows of mankind their sport.
But war’s a game, which, were their subjects wise,
Kings should not play at. Nations would do well
T’extort their truncheons from the puny hands
Of heroes, whose infirm and baby minds
Are gratified with mischief, and who spoil,
Because men suffer it, their toy the world.”
[47] “Les troupes réglées, peste et dépopulation de l’Europe,
ne sont bonnes qu’a deux fins: ou pour attaquer et conquérir
les voisins, ou pour enchâiner et asservir les citoyens.”
(_Gouvernement de Pologne_, Ch. XII.)
_The Position of Hobbes._
The most profound and searching analysis of this problem comes
from Immanuel Kant, whose indebtedness in the sphere of politics
to Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu and Rousseau it is difficult to
overestimate. Kant’s doctrine of the sovereignty of the people comes
to him from Locke through Rousseau. His explanation of the origin
of society is practically that of Hobbes. The direct influence on
politics of this philosopher, apart from his share in moulding the
Kantian theory of the state, is one we cannot afford to neglect. His
was a great influence on the new science just thrown on the world
by Grotius, and his the first clear and systematic statement we
have of the nature of society and the establishment of the state.
The natural state of man, says Hobbes, is a state of war,[48] a
_bellum omnium contra omnes_, where all struggle for honour and for
preferment and the prizes to which every individual is by natural
right equally entitled, but which can of necessity fall only to the
few, the foremost in the race. Men hate and fear the society of their
kind, but through this desire to excel are forced to seek it: only
where there are many can there be a first. This state of things, this
apparent sociability which is brought about by and coupled with the
least sociable of instincts, becomes unendurable. “It is necessary to
peace,” writes Hobbes (_On Dominion_, Ch. VI. 3) “that a man be so
far forth protected against the violence of others, that he may live
securely; that is, that he may have no just cause to fear others, so
long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe
from mutual harms, so as they cannot be hurt or injuriously killed,
is impossible; and, therefore, comes not within deliberation.” But to
protect them so far as is possible the state is formed. Hobbes has no
great faith in human contracts or promises. Man’s nature is malicious
and untrustworthy. A coercive power is necessary to guarantee this
long-desired security within the community. “We must therefore,” he
adds, “provide for our security, not by compacts, but by punishments;
and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great
punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a
greater evil to have done it, than not to have done it. For all men,
by a necessity of nature, choose that which to them appears to be the
less evil.” (_Op. cit._, Ch. VI. 4.)
[48] Hobbes realises clearly that there probably never was such a
state of war all over the world nor a state of nature conforming
to a common type. The case is parallel to the use of the term
“original contract” as an explanation of the manner in which the
civil state came to be formed. (Cf. p. 52, _note_.)
See also Hume (_Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,_
Sect. III. Part I.). “This _poetical_ fiction of the _golden age_
is, in some respects, of a piece with the _philosophical_ fiction
of the _state of nature_; only that the former is represented
as the most charming and most peaceable condition, which can
possibly be imagined; whereas the latter is painted out as a
state of mutual war and violence, attended with the most extreme
necessity.” This fiction of a state of nature as a state of war,
says Hume, (in a note to this passage) is not the invention of
Hobbes. Plato (_Republic_, II. III. IV.) refutes a hypothesis
very like it, and Cicero (_Pro Sext._ l. 42) regards it as a fact
universally acknowledged.
Cf. also Spinoza (_Tract. Pol._ c. ii. § 14): “Homines ex natura
hostes.” And (c. v. § 2): “Homines civiles non nascuntur sed
fiunt.” These expressions are to be understood, says Bluntschli
(_Theory of the State_, IV. Ch. vi., p. 284, _note_ a), “rather
as a logical statement of what _would be_ the condition of
man apart from civil society, than as distinctly implying a
historical theory.”
While starting from the same premises, Spinoza carries Hobbes’
political theories to their logical conclusion. If we admit that
right lies with might, then right is with the people in any
revolution successfully carried out. (But see Hobbes’ Preface to
the _Philosophical Rudiments_ and Kant’s _Perpetual Peace_, p.
188, _note_.) Spinoza, in a letter, thus alludes to this point of
difference:—“As regards political theories, the difference which
you inquire about between Hobbes and myself, consists in this,
that I always preserve natural right intact, and only allot to
the chief magistrates in every state a right over their subjects
commensurate with the excess of their power over the power of
the subjects. This is what always takes place in the state of
nature.” (Epistle 50, _Works_, Bohn’s ed., Vol. II.)
These precautions secure that relative peace within the state which
is one of the conditions of the safety of the people. But it is,
besides, the duty of a sovereign to guarantee an adequate protection
to his subjects against foreign enemies. A state of defence as
complete and perfect as possible is not only a national duty, but an
absolute necessity. The following statement of the relation of the
state to other states shows how closely Hobbes has been followed by
Kant. “There are two things necessary,” says Hobbes, (_On Dominion_,
Ch. XIII. 7) “for the people’s defence; to be warned and to be
forearmed. _For the state of commonwealths considered in themselves,
is natural, that is to say, hostile._[49] Neither, if they cease from
fighting, is it therefore to be called peace; but rather a breathing
time, in which one enemy observing the motion and countenance of the
other, values his security not according to pacts, but the forces and
counsels of his adversary.”
[49] The italics are mine.—[Tr.]
Hobbes is a practical philosopher: no man was less a dreamer, a
follower after ideals than he. He is, moreover, a pessimist, and
his doctrine of the state is a political absolutism,[50] the form
of government which above all has been, and is, favourable to war.
He would no doubt have ridiculed the idea of a perpetual peace
between nations, had such a project as that of St. Pierre—a practical
project, counting upon a realisation in the near future—been brought
before him. He might not even have accepted it in the very much
modified form which Kant adopts, that of an ideal—an unattainable
ideal—towards which humanity could not do better than work. He
expected the worst possible from man the individual. _Homo homini
lupus._ The strictest absolutism, amounting almost to despotism,
was required to keep the vicious propensities of the human animal
in check. States he looked upon as units of the same kind, members
also of a society. They had, and openly exhibited, the same faults
as individual men. They too might be driven with a strong enough
coercive force behind them, but not without it; and such a coercive
force as this did not exist in a society of nations. Federation and
federal troops are terms which represent ideas of comparatively
recent origin. Without something of this kind, any enduring peace
was not to be counted upon. International relations were and
must remain at least potentially warlike in character. Under no
circumstances could ideal conditions be possible either between the
members of a state or between the states themselves. Human nature
could form no satisfactory basis for a counsel of perfection.
[50] Professor Paulsen (_Immanuel Kant_, 2nd ed., 1899, p.
359—Eng. trans., p. 353) points out that pessimism and absolutism
usually go together in the doctrines of philosophers. He gives as
instances Hobbes, Kant and Schopenhauer.
Hobbes (_On Dominion_, Ch. X. 3, _seq._) regarded an absolute
monarchy as the only proper form of government, while in the
opinion of Locke, (_On Civil Government_, II. Ch. VII. §§ 90,
91) it was no better than a state of nature. Kant would not have
gone quite so far. As a philosopher, he upheld the sovereignty
of the people and rejected a monarchy which was not governed in
accordance with republican principles; as a citizen, he denied
the right of resistance to authority. (Cf. _Perpetual Peace_, pp.
126, 188, _note_.)
Hence Hobbes never thought of questioning the necessity of war.
It was in his eyes the natural condition of European society; but
certain rules were necessary both for its conduct and, where this
was compatible with a nation’s dignity and prosperity, for its
prevention. He held that international law was only a part of the
Law of Nature, and that this Law of Nature laid certain obligations
upon nations and their kings. Mediation must be employed between
disputants as much as possible, the person of the mediators of
peace being held inviolate; an umpire ought to be chosen to decide
a controversy, to whose judgment the parties in dispute agree to
submit themselves; such an arbiter must be impartial. These are all
what Hobbes calls precepts of the Law of Nature. And he appeals to
the Scriptures in confirmation of his assertion that peace is the
way of righteousness and that the laws of nature of which these are
a few are also laws of the heavenly kingdom. But peace is like the
straight path of Christian endeavour, difficult to find and difficult