Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
sailors, who had been repulsed in their assault on the bastion, rendered
the best service they could by reinforcing Terry's northern line--thus
enabling him to send a detachment to the assistance of Ames. The fleet
kept up a continuous fire upon that part of the fort which was still
occupied by the enemy. By means of signals they could be informed where
to direct their shots.
During the succeeding nights the enemy blew up Fort Caswell on the
opposite side of Cape Fear River, and abandoned two extensive works on
Smith's Island in the river.
Our captures in all amounted to 169 guns, besides small-arms, with full
supplies of ammunition, and 2,083 prisoners. In addition to these,
there were about 700 dead and wounded left there. We had lost 110
killed and 536 wounded.
In this assault on Fort Fisher, Bell, one of the brigade commanders, was
killed, and two, Curtis and Pennypacker, were badly wounded.
Secretary Stanton, who was on his way back from Savannah, arrived off
Fort Fisher soon after it fell. When he heard the good news he promoted
all the officers of any considerable rank for their conspicuous
gallantry. Terry had been nominated for major-general, but had not been
confirmed. This confirmed him; and soon after I recommended him for a
brigadier-generalcy in the regular army, and it was given to him for
this victory.
CHAPTER LXII.
SHERMAN'S MARCH NORTH--SHERIDAN ORDERED TO LYNCHBURG--CANBY ORDERED TO
MOVE AGAINST MOBILE--MOVEMENTS OF SCHOFIELD AND THOMAS--CAPTURE OF
COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA--SHERMAN IN THE CAROLINAS.
When news of Sherman being in possession of Savannah reached the North,
distinguished statesmen and visitors began to pour in to see him. Among
others who went was the Secretary of War, who seemed much pleased at the
result of his campaign. Mr. Draper, the collector of customs of New
York, who was with Mr. Stanton's party, was put in charge of the public
property that had been abandoned and captured. Savannah was then turned
over to General Foster's command to hold, so that Sherman might have his
own entire army free to operate as might be decided upon in the future.
I sent the chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac (General Barnard)
with letters to General Sherman. He remained some time with the
general, and when he returned brought back letters, one of which
contained suggestions from Sherman as to what ought to be done in
co-operation with him, when he should have started upon his march
northward.
I must not neglect to state here the fact that I had no idea originally
of having Sherman march from Savannah to Richmond, or even to North
Carolina. The season was bad, the roads impassable for anything except
such an army as he had, and I should not have thought of ordering such a
move. I had, therefore, made preparations to collect transports to
carry Sherman and his army around to the James River by water, and so
informed him. On receiving this letter he went to work immediately to
prepare for the move, but seeing that it would require a long time to
collect the transports, he suggested the idea then of marching up north
through the Carolinas. I was only too happy to approve this; for if
successful, it promised every advantage. His march through Georgia had
thoroughly destroyed all lines of transportation in that State, and had
completely cut the enemy off from all sources of supply to the west of
it. If North and South Carolina were rendered helpless so far as
capacity for feeding Lee's army was concerned, the Confederate garrison
at Richmond would be reduced in territory, from which to draw supplies,
to very narrow limits in the State of Virginia; and, although that
section of the country was fertile, it was already well exhausted of
both forage and food. I approved Sherman's suggestion therefore at
once.
The work of preparation was tedious, because supplies, to load the
wagons for the march, had to be brought from a long distance. Sherman
would now have to march through a country furnishing fewer provisions
than that he had previously been operating in during his march to the
sea. Besides, he was confronting, or marching toward, a force of the
enemy vastly superior to any his troops had encountered on their
previous march; and the territory through which he had to pass had now
become of such vast importance to the very existence of the Confederate
army, that the most desperate efforts were to be expected in order to
save it.
Sherman, therefore, while collecting the necessary supplies to start
with, made arrangements with Admiral Dahlgren, who commanded that part
of the navy on the South Carolina and Georgia coast, and General Foster,
commanding the troops, to take positions, and hold a few points on the
sea coast, which he (Sherman) designated, in the neighborhood of
Charleston.
This provision was made to enable him to fall back upon the sea coast,
in case he should encounter a force sufficient to stop his onward
progress. He also wrote me a letter, making suggestions as to what he
would like to have done in support of his movement farther north. This
letter was brought to City Point by General Barnard at a time when I
happened to be going to Washington City, where I arrived on the 21st of
January. I cannot tell the provision I had already made to co-operate
with Sherman, in anticipation of his expected movement, better than by
giving my reply to this letter.
HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D. C., Jan. 21,
1865.
MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, Commanding Mill Div. of the Mississippi.
GENERAL:--Your letters brought by General Barnard were received at City
Point, and read with interest. Not having them with me, however, I
cannot say that in this I will be able to satisfy you on all points of
recommendation. As I arrived here at one P.M., and must leave at six
P.M., having in the meantime spent over three hours with the Secretary
and General Halleck, I must be brief. Before your last request to have
Thomas make a campaign into the heart of Alabama, I had ordered
Schofield to Annapolis, Md., with his corps. The advance (six thousand)
will reach the seaboard by the 23d, the remainder following as rapidly
as railroad transportation can be procured from Cincinnati. The corps
numbers over twenty-one thousand men. I was induced to do this because
I did not believe Thomas could possibly be got off before spring. His
pursuit of Hood indicated a sluggishness that satisfied me that he would
never do to conduct one of your campaigns. The command of the advance
of the pursuit was left to subordinates, whilst Thomas followed far
behind. When Hood had crossed the Tennessee, and those in pursuit had
reached it, Thomas had not much more than half crossed the State, from
whence he returned to Nashville to take steamer for Eastport. He is
possessed of excellent judgment, great coolness and honesty, but he is
not good on a pursuit. He also reported his troops fagged, and that it
was necessary to equip up. This report and a determination to give the
enemy no rest determined me to use his surplus troops elsewhere.
Thomas is still left with a sufficient force surplus to go to Selma
under an energetic leader. He has been telegraphed to, to know whether
he could go, and, if so, which of the several routes he would select.
No reply is yet received. Canby has been ordered to act offensively
from the sea-coast to the interior, towards Montgomery and Selma.
Thomas's forces will move from the north at an early day, or some of his
troops will be sent to Canby. Without further reinforcements Canby will
have a moving column of twenty thousand men.
Fort Fisher, you are aware, has been captured. We have a force there of
eight thousand effective. At New Bern about half the number. It is
rumored, through deserters, that Wilmington also has fallen. I am
inclined to believe the rumor, because on the 17th we knew the enemy
were blowing up their works about Fort Caswell, and that on the 18th
Terry moved on Wilmington.
If Wilmington is captured, Schofield will go there. If not, he will be
sent to New Bern. In either event, all the surplus forces at the two
points will move to the interior toward Goldsboro' in co-operation with
your movements. From either point, railroad communications can be run
out, there being here abundance of rolling-stock suited to the gauge of
those roads.
There have been about sixteen thousand men sent from Lee's army south.
Of these, you will have fourteen thousand against you, if Wilmington is
not held by the enemy, casualties at Fort Fisher having overtaken about
two thousand.
All these troops are subject to your orders as you come in communication
with them. They will be so instructed. From about Richmond I will
watch Lee closely, and if he detaches much more, or attempts to
evacuate, will pitch in. In the meantime, should you be brought to a
halt anywhere, I can send two corps of thirty thousand effective men to
your support, from the troops about Richmond.
To resume: Canby is ordered to operate to the interior from the Gulf.
A. J. Smith may go from the north, but I think it doubtful. A force of
twenty-eight or thirty thousand will co-operate with you from New Bern
or Wilmington, or both. You can call for reinforcements.
This will be handed you by Captain Hudson, of my staff, who will return
with any message you may have for me. If there is anything I can do for
you in the way of having supplies on ship-board, at any point on the
sea-coast, ready for you, let me know it.
Yours truly, U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
I had written on the 18th of January to General Sherman, giving him the
news of the battle of Nashville. He was much pleased at the result,
although, like myself, he had been very much disappointed at Thomas for
permitting Hood to cross the Tennessee River and nearly the whole State
of Tennessee, and come to Nashville to be attacked there. He, however,
as I had done, sent Thomas a warm congratulatory letter.
On the 10th of January, 1865, the resolutions of thanks to Sherman and
his army passed by Congress were approved.
Sherman, after the capture, at once had the debris cleared up,
commencing the work by removing the piling and torpedoes from the river,
and taking up all obstructions. He had then intrenched the city, so
that it could be held by a small garrison. By the middle of January all
his work was done, except the accumulation of supplies to commence his
movement with.
He proposed to move in two columns, one from Savannah, going along by
the river of the same name, and the other by roads farther east,
threatening Charleston. He commenced the advance by moving his right
wing to Beaufort, South Carolina, then to Pocotaligo by water. This
column, in moving north, threatened Charleston, and, indeed, it was not
determined at first that they would have a force visit Charleston.
South Carolina had done so much to prepare the public mind of the South
for secession, and had been so active in precipitating the decision of
the question before the South was fully prepared to meet it, that there
was, at that time, a feeling throughout the North and also largely
entertained by people of the South, that the State of South Carolina,
and Charleston, the hot-bed of secession in particular, ought to have a
heavy hand laid upon them. In fact, nothing but the decisive results
that followed, deterred the radical portion of the people from
condemning the movement, because Charleston had been left out. To pass
into the interior would, however, be to insure the evacuation of the
city, and its possession by the navy and Foster's troops. It is so
situated between two formidable rivers that a small garrison could have