Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
The South, as we all knew, were conscripting every able-bodied man
between the ages of eighteen and forty-five; and now they had passed a
law for the further conscription of boys from fourteen to eighteen,
calling them the junior reserves, and men from forty-five to sixty to be
called the senior reserves. The latter were to hold the necessary
points not in immediate danger, and especially those in the rear.
General Butler, in alluding to this conscription, remarked that they
were thus "robbing both the cradle and the grave," an expression which I
afterwards used in writing a letter to Mr. Washburn.
It was my belief that while the enemy could get no more recruits they
were losing at least a regiment a day, taking it throughout the entire
army, by desertions alone. Then by casualties of war, sickness, and
other natural causes, their losses were much heavier. It was a mere
question of arithmetic to calculate how long they could hold out while
that rate of depletion was going on. Of course long before their army
would be thus reduced to nothing the army which we had in the field
would have been able to capture theirs. Then too I knew from the great
number of desertions, that the men who had fought so bravely, so
gallantly and so long for the cause which they believed in--and as
earnestly, I take it, as our men believed in the cause for which they
were fighting--had lost hope and become despondent. Many of them were
making application to be sent North where they might get employment
until the war was over, when they could return to their Southern homes.
For these and other reasons I was naturally very impatient for the time
to come when I could commence the spring campaign, which I thoroughly
believed would close the war.
There were two considerations I had to observe, however, and which
detained me. One was the fact that the winter had been one of heavy
rains, and the roads were impassable for artillery and teams. It was
necessary to wait until they had dried sufficiently to enable us to move
the wagon trains and artillery necessary to the efficiency of an army
operating in the enemy's country. The other consideration was that
General Sheridan with the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac was
operating on the north side of the James River, having come down from
the Shenandoah. It was necessary that I should have his cavalry with me,
and I was therefore obliged to wait until he could join me south of the
James River.
Let us now take account of what he was doing.
On the 5th of March I had heard from Sheridan. He had met Early between
Staunton and Charlottesville and defeated him, capturing nearly his
entire command. Early and some of his officers escaped by finding
refuge in the neighboring houses or in the woods.
On the 12th I heard from him again. He had turned east, to come to
White House. He could not go to Lynchburg as ordered, because the rains
had been so very heavy and the streams were so very much swollen. He
had a pontoon train with him, but it would not reach half way across
some of the streams, at their then stage of water, which he would have
to get over in going south as first ordered.
I had supplies sent around to White House for him, and kept the depot
there open until he arrived. We had intended to abandon it because the
James River had now become our base of supplies.
Sheridan had about ten thousand cavalry with him, divided into two
divisions commanded respectively by Custer and Devin. General Merritt
was acting as chief of cavalry. Sheridan moved very light, carrying
only four days' provisions with him, with a larger supply of coffee,
salt and other small rations, and a very little else besides ammunition.
They stopped at Charlottesville and commenced tearing up the railroad
back toward Lynchburg. He also sent a division along the James River
Canal to destroy locks, culverts etc. All mills and factories along the
lines of march of his troops were destroyed also.
Sheridan had in this way consumed so much time that his making a march
to White House was now somewhat hazardous. He determined therefore to
fight his way along the railroad and canal till he was as near to
Richmond as it was possible to get, or until attacked. He did this,
destroying the canal as far as Goochland, and the railroad to a point as
near Richmond as he could get. On the 10th he was at Columbia. Negroes
had joined his column to the number of two thousand or more, and they
assisted considerably in the work of destroying the railroads and the
canal. His cavalry was in as fine a condition as when he started,
because he had been able to find plenty of forage. He had captured most
of Early's horses and picked up a good many others on the road. When he
reached Ashland he was assailed by the enemy in force. He resisted
their assault with part of his command, moved quickly across the South
and North Anna, going north, and reached White House safely on the 19th.
The time for Sherman to move had to be fixed with reference to the time
he could get away from Goldsboro where he then was. Supplies had to be
got up to him which would last him through a long march, as there would
probably not be much to be obtained in the country through which he
would pass. I had to arrange, therefore, that he should start from
where he was, in the neighborhood of Goldsboro on the 18th of April, the
earliest day at which he supposed he could be ready.
Sherman was anxious that I should wait where I was until he could come
up, and make a sure thing of it; but I had determined to move as soon as
the roads and weather would admit of my doing so. I had been tied down
somewhat in the matter of fixing any time at my pleasure for starting,
until Sheridan, who was on his way from the Shenandoah Valley to join
me, should arrive, as both his presence and that of his cavalry were
necessary to the execution of the plans which I had in mind. However,
having arrived at White House on the 19th of March, I was enabled to
make my plans.
Prompted by my anxiety lest Lee should get away some night before I was
aware of it, and having the lead of me, push into North Carolina to join
with Johnston in attempting to crush out Sherman, I had, as early as the
1st of the month of March, given instructions to the troops around
Petersburg to keep a sharp lookout to see that such a movement should
not escape their notice, and to be ready strike at once if it was
undertaken.
It is now known that early in the month of March Mr. Davis and General
Lee had a consultation about the situation of affairs in and about and
Petersburg, and they both agreed places were no longer tenable for them,
and that they must get away as soon as possible. They, too, were
waiting for dry roads, or a condition of the roads which would make it
possible to move.
General Lee, in aid of his plan of escape, and to secure a wider opening
to enable them to reach the Danville Road with greater security than he
would have in the way the two armies were situated, determined upon an
assault upon the right of our lines around Petersburg. The night of the
24th of March was fixed upon for this assault, and General Gordon was
assigned to the execution of the plan. The point between Fort Stedman
and Battery No. 10, where our lines were closest together, was selected
as the point of his attack. The attack was to be made at night, and the
troops were to get possession of the higher ground in the rear where
they supposed we had intrenchments, then sweep to the right and left,
create a panic in the lines of our army, and force me to contract my
lines. Lee hoped this would detain me a few days longer and give him an
opportunity of escape. The plan was well conceived and the execution of
it very well done indeed, up to the point of carrying a portion of our
line.
Gordon assembled his troops under the cover of night, at the point at
which they were to make their charge, and got possession of our
picket-line, entirely without the knowledge of the troops inside of our
main line of intrenchments; this reduced the distance he would have to
charge over to not much more than fifty yards. For some time before the
deserters had been coming in with great frequency, often bringing their
arms with them, and this the Confederate general knew. Taking advantage
of this knowledge he sent his pickets, with their arms, creeping through
to ours as if to desert. When they got to our lines they at once took
possession and sent our pickets to the rear as prisoners. In the main
line our men were sleeping serenely, as if in great security. This plan
was to have been executed and much damage done before daylight; but the
troops that were to reinforce Gordon had to be brought from the north
side of the James River and, by some accident on the railroad on their
way over, they were detained for a considerable time; so that it got to
be nearly daylight before they were ready to make the charge.
The charge, however, was successful and almost without loss, the enemy
passing through our lines between Fort Stedman and Battery No. 10. Then
turning to the right and left they captured the fort and the battery,
with all the arms and troops in them. Continuing the charge, they also
carried batteries Eleven and Twelve to our left, which they turned
toward City Point.
Meade happened to be at City Point that night, and this break in his
line cut him off from all communication with his headquarters. Parke,
however, commanding the 9th corps when this breach took place,
telegraphed the facts to Meade's headquarters, and learning that the
general was away, assumed command himself and with commendable
promptitude made all preparations to drive the enemy back. General
Tidball gathered a large number of pieces of artillery and planted them
in rear of the captured works so as to sweep the narrow space of ground
between the lines very thoroughly. Hartranft was soon out with his
division, as also was Willcox. Hartranft to the right of the breach
headed the rebels off in that direction and rapidly drove them back into
Fort Stedman. On the other side they were driven back into the
intrenchments which they had captured, and batteries eleven and twelve
were retaken by Willcox early in the morning.
Parke then threw a line around outside of the captured fort and
batteries, and communication was once more established. The artillery
fire was kept up so continuously that it was impossible for the
Confederates to retreat, and equally impossible for reinforcements to
join them. They all, therefore, fell captives into our hands. This
effort of Lee's cost him about four thousand men, and resulted in their
killing, wounding and capturing about two thousand of ours.
After the recapture of the batteries taken by the Confederates, our
troops made a charge and carried the enemy's intrenched picket line,
which they strengthened and held. This, in turn, gave us but a short
distance to charge over when our attack came to be made a few days
later.
The day that Gordon was making dispositions for this attack (24th of
March) I issued my orders for the movement to commence on the 29th.
Ord, with three divisions of infantry and Mackenzie's cavalry, was to
move in advance on the night of the 27th, from the north side of the
James River and take his place on our extreme left, thirty miles away.
He left Weitzel with the rest of the Army of the James to hold Bermuda
Hundred and the north of the James River. The engineer brigade was to
be left at City Point, and Parke's corps in the lines about Petersburg.
(*42)
Ord was at his place promptly. Humphreys and Warren were then on our
extreme left with the 2d and 5th corps. They were directed on the
arrival of Ord, and on his getting into position in their places, to