Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
about one hundred men. Humphreys reached Dabney's Mill, and was pushing
on when last heard from.
"I now feel like ending the matter, if it is possible to do so, before
going back. I do not want you, therefore, to cut loose and go after the
enemy's roads at present. In the morning push around the enemy, if you
can, and get on to his right rear. The movements of the enemy's cavalry
may, of course, modify your action. We will act all together as one
army here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy. The
signal-officer at Cobb's Hill reported, at half-past eleven A.M., that a
cavalry column had passed that point from Richmond towards Petersburg,
taking forty minutes to pass.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL P. H. SHERIDAN."
From the night of the 29th to the morning of the 31st the rain fell in
such torrents as to make it impossible to move a wheeled vehicle, except
as corduroy roads were laid in front of them. During the 30th, Sheridan
advanced from Dinwiddie Court House towards Five Forks, where he found
the enemy in full force. General Warren advanced and extended his line
across the Boydton Plank Road to near the White Oak Road, with a view of
getting across the latter; but, finding the enemy strong in his front
and extending beyond his left, was directed to hold on where he was, and
fortify. General Humphreys drove the enemy from his front into his main
line on the Hatcher, near Burgess's Mills. Generals Ord, Wright, and
Parke made examinations in their fronts to determine the feasibility of
an assault on the enemy's lines. The two latter reported favorably.
The enemy confronting us as he did, at every point from Richmond to our
extreme left, I conceived his lines must be weakly held, and could be
penetrated if my estimate of his forces was correct. I determined,
therefore, to extend our line no farther, but to reinforce General
Sheridan with a corps of infantry, and thus enable him to cut loose and
turn the enemy's right flank, and with the other corps assault the
enemy's lines. The result of the offensive effort of the enemy the week
before, when he assaulted Fort Stedman, particularly favored this. The
enemy's intrenched picket-line captured by us at that time threw the
lines occupied by the belligerents so close together at some points that
it was but a moment's run from one to the other. Preparations were at
once made to relieve General Humphreys's corps, to report to General
Sheridan; but the condition of the roads prevented immediate movement.
On the morning of the 31st, General Warren reported favorably to getting
possession of the White Oak Road, and was directed to do so. To
accomplish this, he moved with one division, instead of his whole corps,
which was attacked by the enemy in superior force and driven back on the
2d division before it had time to form, and it, in turn, forced back
upon the 3d division, when the enemy was checked. A division of the 2d
corps was immediately sent to his support, the enemy driven back with
heavy loss, and possession of the White Oak Road gained. Sheridan
advanced, and with a portion of his cavalry got possession of the Five
Forks; but the enemy, after the affair with the 5th corps, reinforced
the rebel cavalry, defending that point with infantry, and forced him
back towards Dinwiddie Court House. Here General Sheridan displayed
great generalship. Instead of retreating with his whole command on the
main army, to tell the story of superior forces encountered, he deployed
his cavalry on foot, leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of
the horses. This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of
wooded and broken country, and made his progress slow. At this juncture
he dispatched to me what had taken place, and that he was dropping back
slowly on Dinwiddie Court House. General Mackenzie's cavalry and one
division of the 5th corps were immediately ordered to his assistance.
Soon after receiving a report from General Meade that Humphreys could
hold our position on the Boydton Road, and that the other two divisions
of the 5th corps could go to Sheridan, they were so ordered at once.
Thus the operations of the day necessitated the sending of Warren,
because of his accessibility, instead of Humphreys, as was intended, and
precipitated intended movements. On the morning of the 1st of April,
General Sheridan, reinforced by General Warren, drove the enemy back on
Five Forks, where, late in the evening, he assaulted and carried his
strongly fortified position, capturing all his artillery and between
five and six thousand prisoners.
About the close of this battle, Brevet Major-General Charles Griffin
relieved Major-General Warren in command of the 5th corps. The report
of this reached me after nightfall. Some apprehensions filled my mind
lest the enemy might desert his lines during the night, and by falling
upon General Sheridan before assistance could reach him, drive him from
his position and open the way for retreat. To guard against this,
General Miles's division of Humphreys's corps was sent to reinforce him,
and a bombardment was commenced and kept up until four o'clock in the
morning (April 2), when an assault was ordered on the enemy's lines.
General Wright penetrated the lines with his whole corps, sweeping
everything before him, and to his left towards Hatcher's Run, capturing
many guns and several thousand prisoners. He was closely followed by
two divisions of General Ord's command, until he met the other division
of General Ord's that had succeeded in forcing the enemy's lines near
Hatcher's Run. Generals Wright and Ord immediately swung to the right,
and closed all of the enemy on that side of them in Petersburg, while
General Humphreys pushed forward with two divisions and joined General
Wright on the left. General Parke succeeded in carrying the enemy's
main line, capturing guns and prisoners, but was unable to carry his
inner line. General Sheridan being advised of the condition of affairs,
returned General Miles to his proper command. On reaching the enemy's
lines immediately surrounding Petersburg, a portion of General Gibbon's
corps, by a most gallant charge, captured two strong inclosed works--the
most salient and commanding south of Petersburg--thus materially
shortening the line of investment necessary for taking in the city. The
enemy south of Hatcher's Run retreated westward to Sutherland's Station,
where they were overtaken by Miles's division. A severe engagement
ensued, and lasted until both his right and left flanks were threatened
by the approach of General Sheridan, who was moving from Ford's Station
towards Petersburg, and a division sent by General Meade from the front
of Petersburg, when he broke in the utmost confusion, leaving in our
hands his guns and many prisoners. This force retreated by the main
road along the Appomattox River. During the night of the 2d the enemy
evacuated Petersburg and Richmond, and retreated towards Danville. On
the morning of the 3d pursuit was commenced. General Sheridan pushed
for the Danville Road, keeping near the Appomattox, followed by General
Meade with the 2d and 6th corps, while General Ord moved for
Burkesville, along the South Side Road; the 9th corps stretched along
that road behind him. On the 4th, General Sheridan struck the Danville
Road near Jetersville, where he learned that Lee was at Amelia Court
House. He immediately intrenched himself and awaited the arrival of
General Meade, who reached there the next day. General Ord reached
Burkesville on the evening of the 5th.
On the morning of the 5th, I addressed Major-General Sherman the
following communication:
"WILSON'S STATION, April 5, 1865.
"GENERAL: All indications now are that Lee will attempt to reach
Danville with the remnant of his force. Sheridan, who was up with him
last night, reports all that is left, horse, foot, and dragoons, at
twenty thousand, much demoralized. We hope to reduce this number
one-half. I shall push on to Burkesville, and if a stand is made at
Danville, will in a very few days go there. If you can possibly do so,
push on from where you are, and let us see if we cannot finish the job
with Lee's and Johnston's armies. Whether it will be better for you to
strike for Greensboro', or nearer to Danville, you will be better able
to judge when you receive this. Rebel armies now are the only strategic
points to strike at.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN."
On the morning of the 6th, it was found that General Lee was moving west
of Jetersville, towards Danville. General Sheridan moved with his
cavalry (the 5th corps having been returned to General Meade on his
reaching Jetersville) to strike his flank, followed by the 6th corps,
while the 2d and 5th corps pressed hard after, forcing him to abandon
several hundred wagons and several pieces of artillery. General Ord
advanced from Burkesville towards Farmville, sending two regiments of
infantry and a squadron of cavalry, under Brevet Brigadier-General
Theodore Read, to reach and destroy the bridges. This advance met the
head of Lee's column near Farmville, which it heroically attacked and
detained until General Read was killed and his small force overpowered.
This caused a delay in the enemy's movements, and enabled General Ord to
get well up with the remainder of his force, on meeting which, the enemy
immediately intrenched himself. In the afternoon, General Sheridan
struck the enemy south of Sailors' Creek, captured sixteen pieces of
artillery and about four hundred wagons, and detained him until the 6th
corps got up, when a general attack of infantry and cavalry was made,
which resulted in the capture of six or seven thousand prisoners, among
whom were many general officers. The movements of the 2d corps and
General Ord's command contributed greatly to the day's success.
On the morning of the 7th the pursuit was renewed, the cavalry, except
one division, and the 5th corps moving by Prince Edward's Court House;
the 6th corps, General Ord's command, and one division of cavalry, on
Farmville; and the 2d corps by the High Bridge Road. It was soon found
that the enemy had crossed to the north side of the Appomattox; but so
close was the pursuit, that the 2d corps got possession of the common
bridge at High Bridge before the enemy could destroy it, and immediately
crossed over. The 6th corps and a division of cavalry crossed at
Farmville to its support.
Feeling now that General Lee's chance of escape was utterly hopeless, I
addressed him the following communication from Farmville:
"April 7, 1865.
"GENERAL--The result of the last week must convince you of the
hopelessness of further resistance on the part of the Army of Northern
Virginia in this struggle. I feel that it is so, and regard it as my
duty to shift from myself the responsibility of any further effusion of
blood, by asking of you the surrender of that portion of the Confederate
States army known as the Army of Northern Virginia.
"U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.
"GENERAL R. E. LEE."
Early on the morning of the 8th, before leaving, I received at Farmville
the following:
"April 7, 1865.
"GENERAL: I have received your note of this date. Though not
entertaining the opinion you express on the hopelessness of further
resistance on the part of the Army of Northern Virginia, I reciprocate
your desire to avoid useless effusion of blood, and therefore, before
considering your proposition, ask the terms you will offer on condition
of its surrender.
"R. E. LEE, General.
"LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT."
To this I immediately replied:
"April 8, 1865.
"GENERAL:--Your note of last evening, in reply to mine of same date,