Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
During the night of the 6th the remainder of Nelson's division, Buell's
army crossed the river and were ready to advance in the morning, forming
the left wing. Two other divisions, Crittenden's and McCook's, came up
the river from Savannah in the transports and were on the west bank
early on the 7th. Buell commanded them in person. My command was thus
nearly doubled in numbers and efficiency.
During the night rain fell in torrents and our troops were exposed to
the storm without shelter. I made my headquarters under a tree a few
hundred yards back from the river bank. My ankle was so much swollen
from the fall of my horse the Friday night preceding, and the bruise was
so painful, that I could get no rest.
The drenching rain would have precluded the possibility of sleep without
this additional cause. Some time after midnight, growing restive under
the storm and the continuous pain, I moved back to the log-house under
the bank. This had been taken as a hospital, and all night wounded men
were being brought in, their wounds dressed, a leg or an arm amputated
as the case might require, and everything being done to save life or
alleviate suffering. The sight was more unendurable than encountering
the enemy's fire, and I returned to my tree in the rain.
The advance on the morning of the 7th developed the enemy in the camps
occupied by our troops before the battle began, more than a mile back
from the most advanced position of the Confederates on the day before.
It is known now that they had not yet learned of the arrival of Buell's
command. Possibly they fell back so far to get the shelter of our tents
during the rain, and also to get away from the shells that were dropped
upon them by the gunboats every fifteen minutes during the night.
The position of the Union troops on the morning of the 7th was as
follows: General Lew. Wallace on the right; Sherman on his left; then
McClernand and then Hurlbut. Nelson, of Buell's army, was on our
extreme left, next to the river.
Crittenden was next in line after Nelson and on his right, McCook
followed and formed the extreme right of Buell's command. My old
command thus formed the right wing, while the troops directly under
Buell constituted the left wing of the army. These relative positions
were retained during the entire day, or until the enemy was driven from
the field.
In a very short time the battle became general all along the line. This
day everything was favorable to the Union side. We had now become the
attacking party. The enemy was driven back all day, as we had been the
day before, until finally he beat a precipitate retreat. The last point
held by him was near the road leading from the landing to Corinth, on
the left of Sherman and right of McClernand. About three o'clock, being
near that point and seeing that the enemy was giving way everywhere
else, I gathered up a couple of regiments, or parts of regiments, from
troops near by, formed them in line of battle and marched them forward,
going in front myself to prevent premature or long-range firing. At
this point there was a clearing between us and the enemy favorable for
charging, although exposed. I knew the enemy were ready to break and
only wanted a little encouragement from us to go quickly and join their
friends who had started earlier. After marching to within musket-range
I stopped and let the troops pass. The command, CHARGE, was given, and
was executed with loud cheers and with a run; when the last of the enemy
broke. (*7)
CHAPTER XXV.
STRUCK BY A BULLET--PRECIPITATE RETREAT OF THE CONFEDERATES
--INTRENCHMENTS AT SHILOH--GENERAL BUELL--GENERAL JOHNSTON--REMARKS ON
SHILOH.
During this second day of the battle I had been moving from right to
left and back, to see for myself the progress made. In the early part
of the afternoon, while riding with Colonel McPherson and Major Hawkins,
then my chief commissary, we got beyond the left of our troops. We were
moving along the northern edge of a clearing, very leisurely, toward the
river above the landing. There did not appear to be an enemy to our
right, until suddenly a battery with musketry opened upon us from the
edge of the woods on the other side of the clearing. The shells and
balls whistled about our ears very fast for about a minute. I do not
think it took us longer than that to get out of range and out of sight.
In the sudden start we made, Major Hawkins lost his hat. He did not
stop to pick it up. When we arrived at a perfectly safe position we
halted to take an account of damages. McPherson's horse was panting as
if ready to drop. On examination it was found that a ball had struck
him forward of the flank just back of the saddle, and had gone entirely
through. In a few minutes the poor beast dropped dead; he had given no
sign of injury until we came to a stop. A ball had struck the metal
scabbard of my sword, just below the hilt, and broken it nearly off;
before the battle was over it had broken off entirely. There were
three of us: one had lost a horse, killed; one a hat and one a
sword-scabbard. All were thankful that it was no worse.
After the rain of the night before and the frequent and heavy rains for
some days previous, the roads were almost impassable. The enemy
carrying his artillery and supply trains over them in his retreat, made
them still worse for troops following. I wanted to pursue, but had not
the heart to order the men who had fought desperately for two days,
lying in the mud and rain whenever not fighting, and I did (*8) not feel
disposed to positively order Buell, or any part of his command, to
pursue. Although the senior in rank at the time I had been so only a
few weeks. Buell was, and had been for some time past, a department
commander, while I commanded only a district. I did not meet Buell in
person until too late to get troops ready and pursue with effect; but
had I seen him at the moment of the last charge I should have at least
requested him to follow.
I rode forward several miles the day after the battle, and found that
the enemy had dropped much, if not all, of their provisions, some
ammunition and the extra wheels of their caissons, lightening their
loads to enable them to get off their guns. About five miles out we
found their field hospital abandoned. An immediate pursuit must have
resulted in the capture of a considerable number of prisoners and
probably some guns.
Shiloh was the severest battle fought at the West during the war, and
but few in the East equalled it for hard, determined fighting. I saw an
open field, in our possession on the second day, over which the
Confederates had made repeated charges the day before, so covered with
dead that it would have been possible to walk across the clearing, in
any direction, stepping on dead bodies, without a foot touching the
ground. On our side National and Confederate troops were mingled
together in about equal proportions; but on the remainder of the field
nearly all were Confederates. On one part, which had evidently not been
ploughed for several years, probably because the land was poor, bushes
had grown up, some to the height of eight or ten feet. There was not one
of these left standing unpierced by bullets. The smaller ones were all
cut down.
Contrary to all my experience up to that time, and to the experience of
the army I was then commanding, we were on the defensive. We were
without intrenchments or defensive advantages of any sort, and more than
half the army engaged the first day was without experience or even drill
as soldiers. The officers with them, except the division commanders and
possibly two or three of the brigade commanders, were equally
inexperienced in war. The result was a Union victory that gave the men
who achieved it great confidence in themselves ever after.
The enemy fought bravely, but they had started out to defeat and destroy
an army and capture a position. They failed in both, with very heavy
loss in killed and wounded, and must have gone back discouraged and
convinced that the "Yankee" was not an enemy to be despised.
After the battle I gave verbal instructions to division commanders to
let the regiments send out parties to bury their own dead, and to detail
parties, under commissioned officers from each division, to bury the
Confederate dead in their respective fronts and to report the numbers so
buried. The latter part of these instructions was not carried out by
all; but they were by those sent from Sherman's division, and by some of
the parties sent out by McClernand. The heaviest loss sustained by the
enemy was in front of these two divisions.
The criticism has often been made that the Union troops should have been
intrenched at Shiloh. Up to that time the pick and spade had been but
little resorted to at the West. I had, however, taken this subject
under consideration soon after re-assuming command in the field, and, as
already stated, my only military engineer reported unfavorably. Besides
this, the troops with me, officers and men, needed discipline and drill
more than they did experience with the pick, shovel and axe.
Reinforcements were arriving almost daily, composed of troops that had
been hastily thrown together into companies and regiments--fragments of
incomplete organizations, the men and officers strangers to each other.
Under all these circumstances I concluded that drill and discipline were
worth more to our men than fortifications.
General Buell was a brave, intelligent officer, with as much
professional pride and ambition of a commendable sort as I ever knew. I
had been two years at West Point with him, and had served with him
afterwards, in garrison and in the Mexican war, several years more. He
was not given in early life or in mature years to forming intimate
acquaintances. He was studious by habit, and commanded the confidence
and respect of all who knew him. He was a strict disciplinarian, and
perhaps did not distinguish sufficiently between the volunteer who
"enlisted for the war" and the soldier who serves in time of peace. One
system embraced men who risked life for a principle, and often men of
social standing, competence, or wealth and independence of character.
The other includes, as a rule, only men who could not do as well in any
other occupation. General Buell became an object of harsh criticism
later, some going so far as to challenge his loyalty. No one who knew
him ever believed him capable of a dishonorable act, and nothing could
be more dishonorable than to accept high rank and command in war and
then betray the trust. When I came into command of the army in 1864, I
requested the Secretary of War to restore General Buell to duty.
After the war, during the summer of 1865, I travelled considerably
through the North, and was everywhere met by large numbers of people.
Every one had his opinion about the manner in which the war had been
conducted: who among the generals had failed, how, and why.
Correspondents of the press were ever on hand to hear every word
dropped, and were not always disposed to report correctly what did not
confirm their preconceived notions, either about the conduct of the war
or the individuals concerned in it. The opportunity frequently occurred
for me to defend General Buell against what I believed to be most unjust
charges. On one occasion a correspondent put in my mouth the very
charge I had so often refuted--of disloyalty. This brought from General
Buell a very severe retort, which I saw in the New York World some time
before I received the letter itself. I could very well understand his
grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful charges apparently sustained
by an officer who, at the time, was at the head of the army. I replied