Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
days, and to get an order there for troops to move elsewhere would have
taken at least two days. Memphis therefore was practically isolated
from the balance of the command. But it was in Sherman's hands. Then
too the troops were well intrenched and the gunboats made a valuable
auxiliary.
During the two months after the departure of General Halleck there was
much fighting between small bodies of the contending armies, but these
encounters were dwarfed by the magnitude of the main battles so as to be
now almost forgotten except by those engaged in them. Some of them,
however, estimated by the losses on both sides in killed and wounded,
were equal in hard fighting to most of the battles of the Mexican war
which attracted so much of the attention of the public when they
occurred. About the 23d of July Colonel Ross, commanding at Bolivar,
was threatened by a large force of the enemy so that he had to be
reinforced from Jackson and Corinth. On the 27th there was skirmishing
on the Hatchie River, eight miles from Bolivar. On the 30th I learned
from Colonel P. H. Sheridan, who had been far to the south, that Bragg
in person was at Rome, Georgia, with his troops moving by rail (by way
of Mobile) to Chattanooga and his wagon train marching overland to join
him at Rome. Price was at this time at Holly Springs, Mississippi, with
a large force, and occupied Grand Junction as an outpost. I proposed to
the general-in-chief to be permitted to drive him away, but was informed
that, while I had to judge for myself, the best use to make of my troops
WAS NOT TO SCATTER THEM, but hold them ready to reinforce Buell.
The movement of Bragg himself with his wagon trains to Chattanooga
across country, while his troops were transported over a long
round-about road to the same destination, without need of guards except
when in my immediate front, demonstrates the advantage which troops
enjoy while acting in a country where the people are friendly. Buell
was marching through a hostile region and had to have his communications
thoroughly guarded back to a base of supplies. More men were required
the farther the National troops penetrated into the enemy's country. I,
with an army sufficiently powerful to have destroyed Bragg, was purely
on the defensive and accomplishing no more than to hold a force far
inferior to my own.
On the 2d of August I was ordered from Washington to live upon the
country, on the resources of citizens hostile to the government, so far
as practicable. I was also directed to "handle rebels within our lines
without gloves," to imprison them, or to expel them from their homes and
from our lines. I do not recollect having arrested and confined a
citizen (not a soldier) during the entire rebellion. I am aware that a
great many were sent to northern prisons, particularly to Joliet,
Illinois, by some of my subordinates with the statement that it was my
order. I had all such released the moment I learned of their arrest;
and finally sent a staff officer north to release every prisoner who was
said to be confined by my order. There were many citizens at home who
deserved punishment because they were soldiers when an opportunity was
afforded to inflict an injury to the National cause. This class was not
of the kind that were apt to get arrested, and I deemed it better that a
few guilty men should escape than that a great many innocent ones should
suffer.
On the 14th of August I was ordered to send two more divisions to Buell.
They were sent the same day by way of Decatur. On the 22d Colonel
Rodney Mason surrendered Clarksville with six companies of his regiment.
Colonel Mason was one of the officers who had led their regiments off
the field at almost the first fire of the rebels at Shiloh. He was by
nature and education a gentleman, and was terribly mortified at his
action when the battle was over. He came to me with tears in his eyes
and begged to be allowed to have another trial. I felt great sympathy
for him and sent him, with his regiment, to garrison Clarksville and
Donelson. He selected Clarksville for his headquarters, no doubt
because he regarded it as the post of danger, it being nearer the enemy.
But when he was summoned to surrender by a band of guerillas, his
constitutional weakness overcame him. He inquired the number of men the
enemy had, and receiving a response indicating a force greater than his
own he said if he could be satisfied of that fact he would surrender.
Arrangements were made for him to count the guerillas, and having
satisfied himself that the enemy had the greater force he surrendered
and informed his subordinate at Donelson of the fact, advising him to do
the same. The guerillas paroled their prisoners and moved upon
Donelson, but the officer in command at that point marched out to meet
them and drove them away.
Among other embarrassments, at the time of which I now write, was the
fact that the government wanted to get out all the cotton possible from
the South and directed me to give every facility toward that end. Pay
in gold was authorized, and stations on the Mississippi River and on the
railroad in our possession had to be designated where cotton would be
received. This opened to the enemy not only the means of converting
cotton into money, which had a value all over the world and which they
so much needed, but it afforded them means of obtaining accurate and
intelligent information in regard to our position and strength. It was
also demoralizing to the troops. Citizens obtaining permits from the
treasury department had to be protected within our lines and given
facilities to get out cotton by which they realized enormous profits.
Men who had enlisted to fight the battles of their country did not like
to be engaged in protecting a traffic which went to the support of an
enemy they had to fight, and the profits of which went to men who shared
none of their dangers.
On the 30th of August Colonel M. D. Leggett, near Bolivar, with the 20th
and 29th Ohio volunteer infantry, was attacked by a force supposed to be
about 4,000 strong. The enemy was driven away with a loss of more than
one hundred men. On the 1st of September the bridge guard at Medon was
attacked by guerillas. The guard held the position until reinforced,
when the enemy were routed leaving about fifty of their number on the
field dead or wounded, our loss being only two killed and fifteen
wounded. On the same day Colonel Dennis, with a force of less than 500
infantry and two pieces of artillery, met the cavalry of the enemy in
strong force, a few miles west of Medon, and drove them away with great
loss. Our troops buried 179 of the enemy's dead, left upon the field.
Afterwards it was found that all the houses in the vicinity of the
battlefield were turned into hospitals for the wounded. Our loss, as
reported at the time, was forty-five killed and wounded. On the 2d of
September I was ordered to send more reinforcements to Buell. Jackson
and Bolivar were yet threatened, but I sent the reinforcements. On the
4th I received direct orders to send Granger's division also to
Louisville, Kentucky.
General Buell had left Corinth about the 10th of June to march upon
Chattanooga; Bragg, who had superseded Beauregard in command, sent one
division from Tupelo on the 27th of June for the same place. This gave
Buell about seventeen days' start. If he had not been required to repair
the railroad as he advanced, the march could have been made in eighteen
days at the outside, and Chattanooga must have been reached by the
National forces before the rebels could have possibly got there. The
road between Nashville and Chattanooga could easily have been put in
repair by other troops, so that communication with the North would have
been opened in a short time after the occupation of the place by the
National troops. If Buell had been permitted to move in the first
instance, with the whole of the Army of the Ohio and that portion of the
Army of the Mississippi afterwards sent to him, he could have thrown
four divisions from his own command along the line of road to repair and
guard it.
Granger's division was promptly sent on the 4th of September. I was at
the station at Corinth when the troops reached that point, and found
General P. H. Sheridan with them. I expressed surprise at seeing him
and said that I had not expected him to go. He showed decided
disappointment at the prospect of being detained. I felt a little
nettled at his desire to get away and did not detain him.
Sheridan was a first lieutenant in the regiment in which I had served
eleven years, the 4th infantry, and stationed on the Pacific coast when
the war broke out. He was promoted to a captaincy in May, 1861, and
before the close of the year managed in some way, I do not know how, to
get East. He went to Missouri. Halleck had known him as a very
successful young officer in managing campaigns against the Indians on
the Pacific coast, and appointed him acting-quartermaster in south-west
Missouri. There was no difficulty in getting supplies forward while
Sheridan served in that capacity; but he got into difficulty with his
immediate superiors because of his stringent rules for preventing the
use of public transportation for private purposes. He asked to be
relieved from further duty in the capacity in which he was engaged and
his request was granted. When General Halleck took the field in April,
1862, Sheridan was assigned to duty on his staff. During the advance on
Corinth a vacancy occurred in the colonelcy of the 2d Michigan cavalry.
Governor Blair, of Michigan, telegraphed General Halleck asking him to
suggest the name of a professional soldier for the vacancy, saying he
would appoint a good man without reference to his State. Sheridan was
named; and was so conspicuously efficient that when Corinth was reached
he was assigned to command a cavalry brigade in the Army of the
Mississippi. He was in command at Booneville on the 1st of July with
two small regiments, when he was attacked by a force full three times
as numerous as his own. By very skilful manoeuvres and boldness of
attack he completely routed the enemy. For this he was made a
brigadier-general and became a conspicuous figure in the army about
Corinth. On this account I was sorry to see him leaving me. His
departure was probably fortunate, for he rendered distinguished services
in his new field.
Granger and Sheridan reached Louisville before Buell got there, and on
the night of their arrival Sheridan with his command threw up works
around the railroad station for the defence of troops as they came from
the front.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
ADVANCE OF VAN DORN AND PRICE--PRICE ENTERS IUKA--BATTLE OF IUKA.
At this time, September 4th, I had two divisions of the Army of the
Mississippi stationed at Corinth, Rienzi, Jacinto and Danville. There
were at Corinth also Davies' division and two brigades of McArthur's,
besides cavalry and artillery. This force constituted my left wing, of
which Rosecrans was in command. General Ord commanded the centre, from
Bethel to Humboldt on the Mobile and Ohio railroad and from Jackson to
Bolivar where the Mississippi Central is crossed by the Hatchie River.
General Sherman commanded on the right at Memphis with two of his
brigades back at Brownsville, at the crossing of the Hatchie River by
the Memphis and Ohio railroad. This made the most convenient
arrangement I could devise for concentrating all my spare forces upon
any threatened point. All the troops of the command were within
telegraphic communication of each other, except those under Sherman. By
bringing a portion of his command to Brownsville, from which point there
was a railroad and telegraph back to Memphis, communication could be had