Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
train. General A. J. Smith happened to have an extra horse at Bruinsburg
which I borrowed, with a saddle-tree without upholstering further than
stirrups. I had no other for nearly a week.
It was necessary to have transportation for ammunition. Provisions could
be taken from the country; but all the ammunition that can be carried on
the person is soon exhausted when there is much fighting. I directed,
therefore, immediately on landing that all the vehicles and draft
animals, whether horses, mules, or oxen, in the vicinity should be
collected and loaded to their capacity with ammunition. Quite a train
was collected during the 30th, and a motley train it was. In it could
be found fine carriages, loaded nearly to the top with boxes of
cartridges that had been pitched in promiscuously, drawn by mules with
plough, harness, straw collars, rope-lines, etc.; long-coupled wagons,
with racks for carrying cotton bales, drawn by oxen, and everything that
could be found in the way of transportation on a plantation, either for
use or pleasure. The making out of provision returns was stopped for
the time. No formalities were to retard our progress until a position
was secured when the time could be spared to observe them.
It was at Port Gibson I first heard through a Southern paper of the
complete success of Colonel Grierson, who was making a raid through
central Mississippi. He had started from La Grange April 17th with
three regiments of about 1,700 men. On the 21st he had detached Colonel
Hatch with one regiment to destroy the railroad between Columbus and
Macon and then return to La Grange. Hatch had a sharp fight with the
enemy at Columbus and retreated along the railroad, destroying it at
Okalona and Tupelo, and arriving in La Grange April 26. Grierson
continued his movement with about 1,000 men, breaking the Vicksburg and
Meridian railroad and the New Orleans and Jackson railroad, arriving at
Baton Rouge May 2d. This raid was of great importance, for Grierson had
attracted the attention of the enemy from the main movement against
Vicksburg.
During the night of the 2d of May the bridge over the North Fork was
repaired, and the troops commenced crossing at five the next morning.
Before the leading brigade was over it was fired upon by the enemy from
a commanding position; but they were soon driven off. It was evident
that the enemy was covering a retreat from Grand Gulf to Vicksburg.
Every commanding position from this (Grindstone) crossing to Hankinson's
ferry over the Big Black was occupied by the retreating foe to delay our
progress. McPherson, however, reached Hankinson's ferry before night,
seized the ferry boat, and sent a detachment of his command across and
several miles north on the road to Vicksburg. When the junction of the
road going to Vicksburg with the road from Grand Gulf to Raymond and
Jackson was reached, Logan with his division was turned to the left
towards Grand Gulf. I went with him a short distance from this
junction. McPherson had encountered the largest force yet met since the
battle of Port Gibson and had a skirmish nearly approaching a battle;
but the road Logan had taken enabled him to come up on the enemy's right
flank, and they soon gave way. McPherson was ordered to hold
Hankinson's ferry and the road back to Willow Springs with one division;
McClernand, who was now in the rear, was to join in this as well as to
guard the line back down the bayou. I did not want to take the chances
of having an enemy lurking in our rear.
On the way from the junction to Grand Gulf, where the road comes into
the one from Vicksburg to the same place six or seven miles out, I
learned that the last of the enemy had retreated past that place on
their way to Vicksburg. I left Logan to make the proper disposition of
his troops for the night, while I rode into the town with an escort of
about twenty cavalry. Admiral Porter had already arrived with his
fleet. The enemy had abandoned his heavy guns and evacuated the place.
When I reached Grand Gulf May 3d I had not been with my baggage since
the 27th of April and consequently had had no change of underclothing,
no meal except such as I could pick up sometimes at other headquarters,
and no tent to cover me. The first thing I did was to get a bath,
borrow some fresh underclothing from one of the naval officers and
get a good meal on the flag-ship. Then I wrote letters to the
general-in-chief informing him of our present position, dispatches to be
telegraphed from Cairo, orders to General Sullivan commanding above
Vicksburg, and gave orders to all my corps commanders. About twelve
o'clock at night I was through my work and started for Hankinson's
ferry, arriving there before daylight. While at Grand Gulf I heard from
Banks, who was on the Red River, and who said that he could not be at
Port Hudson before the 10th of May and then with only 15,000 men. Up to
this time my intention had been to secure Grand Gulf, as a base of
supplies, detach McClernand's corps to Banks and co-operate with him in
the reduction of Port Hudson.
The news from Banks forced upon me a different plan of campaign from the
one intended. To wait for his co-operation would have detained me at
least a month. The reinforcements would not have reached ten thousand
men after deducting casualties and necessary river guards at all high
points close to the river for over three hundred miles. The enemy would
have strengthened his position and been reinforced by more men than
Banks could have brought. I therefore determined to move independently
of Banks, cut loose from my base, destroy the rebel force in rear of
Vicksburg and invest or capture the city.
Grand Gulf was accordingly given up as a base and the authorities at
Washington were notified. I knew well that Halleck's caution would lead
him to disapprove of this course; but it was the only one that gave any
chance of success. The time it would take to communicate with
Washington and get a reply would be so great that I could not be
interfered with until it was demonstrated whether my plan was
practicable. Even Sherman, who afterwards ignored bases of supplies
other than what were afforded by the country while marching through four
States of the Confederacy with an army more than twice as large as mine
at this time, wrote me from Hankinson's ferry, advising me of the
impossibility of supplying our army over a single road. He urged me to
"stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and
then act as quick as possible; for this road will be jammed, as sure as
life." To this I replied: "I do not calculate upon the possibility of
supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it will be
impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect is
to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee and salt we can, and make
the country furnish the balance." We started from Bruinsburg with an
average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own
supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. A delay
would give the enemy time to reinforce and fortify.
McClernand's and McPherson's commands were kept substantially as they
were on the night of the 2d, awaiting supplies sufficient to give them
three days' rations in haversacks. Beef, mutton, poultry and forage
were found in abundance. Quite a quantity of bacon and molasses was
also secured from the country, but bread and coffee could not be
obtained in quantity sufficient for all the men. Every plantation,
however, had a run of stone, propelled by mule power, to grind corn for
the owners and their slaves. All these were kept running while we were
stopping, day and night, and when we were marching, during the night, at
all plantations covered by the troops. But the product was taken by the
troops nearest by, so that the majority of the command was destined to
go without bread until a new base was established on the Yazoo above
Vicksburg.
While the troops were awaiting the arrival of rations I ordered
reconnoissances made by McClernand and McPherson, with the view of
leading the enemy to believe that we intended to cross the Big Black and
attack the city at once.
On the 6th Sherman arrived at Grand Gulf and crossed his command that
night and the next day. Three days' rations had been brought up from
Grand Gulf for the advanced troops and were issued. Orders were given
for a forward movement the next day. Sherman was directed to order up
Blair, who had been left behind to guard the road from Milliken's Bend
to Hard Times with two brigades.
The quartermaster at Young's Point was ordered to send two hundred
wagons with Blair, and the commissary was to load them with hard bread,
coffee, sugar, salt and one hundred thousand pounds of salt meat.
On the 3d Hurlbut, who had been left at Memphis, was ordered to send
four regiments from his command to Milliken's Bend to relieve Blair's
division, and on the 5th he was ordered to send Lauman's division in
addition, the latter to join the army in the field. The four regiments
were to be taken from troops near the river so that there would be no
delay.
During the night of the 6th McPherson drew in his troops north of the
Big Black and was off at an early hour on the road to Jackson, via Rocky
Springs, Utica and Raymond. That night he and McClernand were both at
Rocky Springs ten miles from Hankinson's ferry. McPherson remained
there during the 8th, while McClernand moved to Big Sandy and Sherman
marched from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry. The 9th, McPherson moved
to a point within a few miles west of Utica; McClernand and Sherman
remained where they were. On the 10th McPherson moved to Utica, Sherman
to Big Sandy; McClernand was still at Big Sandy. The 11th, McClernand
was at Five Mile Creek; Sherman at Auburn; McPherson five miles advanced
from Utica. May 12th, McClernand was at Fourteen Mile Creek; Sherman at
Fourteen Mile Creek; McPherson at Raymond after a battle.
After McPherson crossed the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry Vicksburg
could have been approached and besieged by the south side. It is not
probable, however, that Pemberton would have permitted a close
besiegement. The broken nature of the ground would have enabled him to
hold a strong defensible line from the river south of the city to the
Big Black, retaining possession of the railroad back to that point. It
was my plan, therefore, to get to the railroad east of Vicksburg, and
approach from that direction. Accordingly, McPherson's troops that had
crossed the Big Black were withdrawn and the movement east to Jackson
commenced.
As has been stated before, the country is very much broken and the roads
generally confined to the tops of the hills. The troops were moved one
(sometimes two) corps at a time to reach designated points out parallel
to the railroad and only from six to ten miles from it. McClernand's
corps was kept with its left flank on the Big Black guarding all the
crossings. Fourteen Mile Creek, a stream substantially parallel with
the railroad, was reached and crossings effected by McClernand and
Sherman with slight loss. McPherson was to the right of Sherman,
extending to Raymond. The cavalry was used in this advance in
reconnoitring to find the roads: to cover our advances and to find the
most practicable routes from one command to another so they could
support each other in case of an attack. In making this move I
estimated Pemberton's movable force at Vicksburg at about eighteen
thousand men, with smaller forces at Haines' Bluff and Jackson. It
would not be possible for Pemberton to attack me with all his troops at
one place, and I determined to throw my army between his and fight him