Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
for a while to see the tent cloth which they were making roll out of the
looms, with "C. S. A." woven in each bolt. There was an immense amount
of cotton, in bales, stacked outside. Finally I told Sherman I thought
they had done work enough. The operatives were told they could leave
and take with them what cloth they could carry. In a few minutes cotton
and factory were in a blaze. The proprietor visited Washington while I
was President to get his pay for this property, claiming that it was
private. He asked me to give him a statement of the fact that his
property had been destroyed by National troops, so that he might use it
with Congress where he was pressing, or proposed to press, his claim. I
declined.
On the night of the 13th Johnston sent the following dispatch to
Pemberton at Edward's station: "I have lately arrived, and learn that
Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It
is important to establish communication, that you may be reinforced. If
practicable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment
would be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble
should be brought. Time is all-important." This dispatch was sent in
triplicate, by different messengers. One of the messengers happened to
be a loyal man who had been expelled from Memphis some months before by
Hurlbut for uttering disloyal and threatening sentiments. There was a
good deal of parade about his expulsion, ostensibly as a warning to
those who entertained the sentiments he expressed; but Hurlbut and the
expelled man understood each other. He delivered his copy of Johnston's
dispatch to McPherson who forwarded it to me.
Receiving this dispatch on the 14th I ordered McPherson to move promptly
in the morning back to Bolton, the nearest point where Johnston could
reach the road. Bolton is about twenty miles west of Jackson. I also
informed McClernand of the capture of Jackson and sent him the following
order: "It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and
cross the Big Black, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow them
to do this. Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make all
dispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road from
wherever they may be on the receipt of this order."
And to Blair I wrote: "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black
and pass down the peninsula between the Big Black and Yazoo rivers. We
must beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the
trains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you,
will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so as
to divide your troops and train."
Johnston stopped on the Canton road only six miles north of Jackson, the
night of the 14th. He sent from there to Pemberton dispatches
announcing the loss of Jackson, and the following order:
"As soon as the reinforcements are all up, they must be united to the
rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be
able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy. Can Grant supply himself
from the Mississippi? Can you not cut him off from it, and above all,
should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him."
The concentration of my troops was easy, considering the character of
the country. McPherson moved along the road parallel with and near the
railroad. McClernand's command was, one division (Hovey's) on the road
McPherson had to take, but with a start of four miles. One (Osterhaus)
was at Raymond, on a converging road that intersected the other near
Champion's Hill; one (Carr's) had to pass over the same road with
Osterhaus, but being back at Mississippi Springs, would not be detained
by it; the fourth (Smith's) with Blair's division, was near Auburn with
a different road to pass over. McClernand faced about and moved
promptly. His cavalry from Raymond seized Bolton by half-past nine in
the morning, driving out the enemy's pickets and capturing several men.
The night of the 15th Hovey was at Bolton; Carr and Osterhaus were about
three miles south, but abreast, facing west; Smith was north of Raymond
with Blair in his rear.
McPherson's command, with Logan in front, had marched at seven o'clock,
and by four reached Hovey and went into camp; Crocker bivouacked just in
Hovey's rear on the Clinton road. Sherman with two divisions, was in
Jackson, completing the destruction of roads, bridges and military
factories. I rode in person out to Clinton. On my arrival I ordered
McClernand to move early in the morning on Edward's station, cautioning
him to watch for the enemy and not bring on an engagement unless he felt
very certain of success.
I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of
his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This,
indeed, I knew he could not do; but I felt sure he would make the
attempt to reach that point. It turned out, however, that he had
decided his superior's plans were impracticable, and consequently
determined to move south from Edward's station and get between me and my
base. I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week
before. On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edward's
station, but the rains had swollen Baker's Creek, which he had to cross
so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away.
This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a good
bridge over Baker's Creek. Some of his troops were marching until
midnight to get there. Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of
his order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a
dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be
expected.
About five o'clock in the morning (16th) two men, who had been employed
on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, were brought to me. They
reported that they had passed through Pemberton's army in the night, and
that it was still marching east. They reported him to have eighty
regiments of infantry and ten batteries; in all, about twenty-five
thousand men.
I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to
complete his work; but getting the above information I sent him orders
to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division with an
ammunition train on the road at once, with directions to its commander
to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Within
an hour after receiving this order Steele's division was on the road.
At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move
with all speed to Edward's station. McClernand was directed to embrace
Blair in his command for the present. Blair's division was a part of
the 15th army corps (Sherman's); but as it was on its way to join its
corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about
and were moving west. The 15th corps, when it got up, would be on our
extreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way
of the troops, and to follow Hovey's division as closely as possible.
McClernand had two roads about three miles apart, converging at Edward's
station, over which to march his troops. Hovey's division of his corps
had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north.
McClernand was directed to move Blair's and A. J. Smith's divisions by
the southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middle
road. Orders were to move cautiously with skirmishers to the front to
feel for the enemy.
Smith's division on the most southern road was the first to encounter
the enemy's pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the
middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found
the enemy's pickets and forced them back to the main line. About the
same time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon
road from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to join
Hovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey's trains occupying the roads. I was
still back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation, and
expressed the wish that I was up. By half-past seven I was on the road
and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in
front of troops off the road. When I arrived Hovey's skirmishing
amounted almost to a battle.
McClernand was in person on the middle road and had a shorter distance
to march to reach the enemy's position than McPherson. I sent him word
by a staff officer to push forward and attack. These orders were
repeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand's
advance.
Champion's Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us,
whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one of
the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in
range. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a
ravine running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker's Creek.
It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it
difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridge
occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns
westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge.
The Bolton and Edward's station wagon-road turns almost due south at
this point and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile;
then turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker's Creek,
nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual
and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when we
were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit west of the road.
From Raymond there is a direct road to Edward's station, some three
miles west of Champion's Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From this
latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half
miles before reaching Bolton and leads direct to the same station. It
was along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand's corps,
and Blair of Sherman's, temporarily under McClernand, were moving.
Hovey of McClernand's command was with McPherson, farther north on the
road from Bolton direct to Edward's station. The middle road comes into
the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west and
descends to Baker's Creek; the southern road is still several miles
south and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edward's
station. Pemberton's lines covered all these roads, and faced east.
Hovey's line, when it first drove in the enemy's pickets, was formed
parallel to that of the enemy and confronted his left.
By eleven o'clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested
battle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him,
had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold his
position and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up his
troops as fast as possible, Logan in front, and posted them on the right
of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reinforced Hovey with
one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west
to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads
would admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on
me for more reinforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up,
to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries
to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy's line, and they
did good execution.
From Logan's position now a direct forward movement carried him over
open fields, in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. He
did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the
belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance.