Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
and I at once relieved him from the command of the 13th army corps and
ordered him back to Springfield, Illinois. The publication of his order
in the press was in violation of War Department orders and also of mine.
CHAPTER XXXVIII.
JOHNSTON'S MOVEMENTS--FORTIFICATIONS AT HAINES' BLUFF--EXPLOSION OF THE
MINE--EXPLOSION OF THE SECOND MINE--PREPARING FOR THE ASSAULT--THE FLAG
OF TRUCE--MEETING WITH PEMBERTON--NEGOTIATIONS FOR SURRENDER--ACCEPTING
THE TERMS--SURRENDER OF VICKSBURG.
On the 22d of June positive information was received that Johnston had
crossed the Big Black River for the purpose of attacking our rear, to
raise the siege and release Pemberton. The correspondence between
Johnston and Pemberton shows that all expectation of holding Vicksburg
had by this time passed from Johnston's mind. I immediately ordered
Sherman to the command of all the forces from Haines' Bluff to the Big
Black River. This amounted now to quite half the troops about Vicksburg.
Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith's divisions were ordered to hold
themselves in readiness to reinforce Sherman. Haines' Bluff had been
strongly fortified on the land side, and on all commanding points from
there to the Big Black at the railroad crossing batteries had been
constructed. The work of connecting by rifle-pits where this was not
already done, was an easy task for the troops that were to defend them.
We were now looking west, besieging Pemberton, while we were also
looking east to defend ourselves against an expected siege by Johnston.
But as against the garrison of Vicksburg we were as substantially
protected as they were against us. Where we were looking east and north
we were strongly fortified, and on the defensive. Johnston evidently
took in the situation and wisely, I think, abstained from making an
assault on us because it would simply have inflicted loss on both sides
without accomplishing any result. We were strong enough to have taken
the offensive against him; but I did not feel disposed to take any risk
of losing our hold upon Pemberton's army, while I would have rejoiced at
the opportunity of defending ourselves against an attack by Johnston.
From the 23d of May the work of fortifying and pushing forward our
position nearer to the enemy had been steadily progressing. At three
points on the Jackson road, in front of Leggett's brigade, a sap was run
up to the enemy's parapet, and by the 25th of June we had it undermined
and the mine charged. The enemy had countermined, but did not succeed in
reaching our mine. At this particular point the hill on which the rebel
work stands rises abruptly. Our sap ran close up to the outside of the
enemy's parapet. In fact this parapet was also our protection. The
soldiers of the two sides occasionally conversed pleasantly across this
barrier; sometimes they exchanged the hard bread of the Union soldiers
for the tobacco of the Confederates; at other times the enemy threw over
hand-grenades, and often our men, catching them in their hands, returned
them.
Our mine had been started some distance back down the hill; consequently
when it had extended as far as the parapet it was many feet below it.
This caused the failure of the enemy in his search to find and destroy
it. On the 25th of June at three o'clock, all being ready, the mine was
exploded. A heavy artillery fire all along the line had been ordered to
open with the explosion. The effect was to blow the top of the hill off
and make a crater where it stood. The breach was not sufficient to
enable us to pass a column of attack through. In fact, the enemy having
failed to reach our mine had thrown up a line farther back, where most
of the men guarding that point were placed. There were a few men,
however, left at the advance line, and others working in the
countermine, which was still being pushed to find ours. All that were
there were thrown into the air, some of them coming down on our side,
still alive. I remember one colored man, who had been under ground at
work when the explosion took place, who was thrown to our side. He was
not much hurt, but terribly frightened. Some one asked him how high he
had gone up. "Dun no, massa, but t'ink 'bout t'ree mile," was his
reply. General Logan commanded at this point and took this colored man
to his quarters, where he did service to the end of the siege.
As soon as the explosion took place the crater was seized by two
regiments of our troops who were near by, under cover, where they had
been placed for the express purpose. The enemy made a desperate effort
to expel them, but failed, and soon retired behind the new line. From
here, however, they threw hand-grenades, which did some execution. The
compliment was returned by our men, but not with so much effect. The
enemy could lay their grenades on the parapet, which alone divided the
contestants, and roll them down upon us; while from our side they had to
be thrown over the parapet, which was at considerable elevation. During
the night we made efforts to secure our position in the crater against
the missiles of the enemy, so as to run trenches along the outer base of
their parapet, right and left; but the enemy continued throwing their
grenades, and brought boxes of field ammunition (shells), the fuses of
which they would light with portfires, and throw them by hand into our
ranks. We found it impossible to continue this work. Another mine was
consequently started which was exploded on the 1st of July, destroying
an entire rebel redan, killing and wounding a considerable number of its
occupants and leaving an immense chasm where it stood. No attempt to
charge was made this time, the experience of the 25th admonishing us.
Our loss in the first affair was about thirty killed and wounded. The
enemy must have lost more in the two explosions than we did in the
first. We lost none in the second.
From this time forward the work of mining and pushing our position
nearer to the enemy was prosecuted with vigor, and I determined to
explode no more mines until we were ready to explode a number at
different points and assault immediately after. We were up now at three
different points, one in front of each corps, to where only the parapet
of the enemy divided us.
At this time an intercepted dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton informed
me that Johnston intended to make a determined attack upon us in order
to relieve the garrison at Vicksburg. I knew the garrison would make no
formidable effort to relieve itself. The picket lines were so close to
each other--where there was space enough between the lines to post
pickets--that the men could converse. On the 21st of June I was
informed, through this means, that Pemberton was preparing to escape, by
crossing to the Louisiana side under cover of night; that he had
employed workmen in making boats for that purpose; that the men had been
canvassed to ascertain if they would make an assault on the "Yankees" to
cut their way out; that they had refused, and almost mutinied, because
their commander would not surrender and relieve their sufferings, and
had only been pacified by the assurance that boats enough would be
finished in a week to carry them all over. The rebel pickets also said
that houses in the city had been pulled down to get material to build
these boats with. Afterwards this story was verified: on entering the
city we found a large number of very rudely constructed boats.
All necessary steps were at once taken to render such an attempt
abortive. Our pickets were doubled; Admiral Porter was notified, so
that the river might be more closely watched; material was collected on
the west bank of the river to be set on fire and light up the river if
the attempt was made; and batteries were established along the levee
crossing the peninsula on the Louisiana side. Had the attempt been made
the garrison of Vicksburg would have been drowned, or made prisoners on
the Louisiana side. General Richard Taylor was expected on the west
bank to co-operate in this movement, I believe, but he did not come, nor
could he have done so with a force sufficient to be of service. The
Mississippi was now in our possession from its source to its mouth,
except in the immediate front of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson. We had
nearly exhausted the country, along a line drawn from Lake Providence to
opposite Bruinsburg. The roads west were not of a character to draw
supplies over for any considerable force.
By the 1st of July our approaches had reached the enemy's ditch at a
number of places. At ten points we could move under cover to within
from five to one hundred yards of the enemy. Orders were given to make
all preparations for assault on the 6th of July. The debouches were
ordered widened to afford easy egress, while the approaches were also to
be widened to admit the troops to pass through four abreast. Plank, and
bags filled with cotton packed in tightly, were ordered prepared, to
enable the troops to cross the ditches.
On the night of the 1st of July Johnston was between Brownsville and the
Big Black, and wrote Pemberton from there that about the 7th of the
month an attempt would be made to create a diversion to enable him to
cut his way out. Pemberton was a prisoner before this message reached
him.
On July 1st Pemberton, seeing no hope of outside relief, addressed the
following letter to each of his four division commanders:
"Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it
will become necessary very shortly to evacuate the place. I see no
prospect of the former, and there are many great, if not insuperable
obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to
inform me with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your
troops and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues
necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."
Two of his generals suggested surrender, and the other two practically
did the same. They expressed the opinion that an attempt to evacuate
would fail. Pemberton had previously got a message to Johnston
suggesting that he should try to negotiate with me for a release of the
garrison with their arms. Johnston replied that it would be a
confession of weakness for him to do so; but he authorized Pemberton to
use his name in making such an arrangement.
On the 3d about ten o'clock A.M. white flags appeared on a portion of
the rebel works. Hostilities along that part of the line ceased at
once. Soon two persons were seen coming towards our lines bearing a
white flag. They proved to be General Bowen, a division commander, and
Colonel Montgomery, aide-de-camp to Pemberton, bearing the following
letter to me:
"I have the honor to propose an armistice for--hours, with the view to
arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if
agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like
number to be named by yourself at such place and hour to-day as you may
find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion
of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling
myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period.
This communication will be handed you under a flag of truce, by
Major-General John S. Bowen."
It was a glorious sight to officers and soldiers on the line where these
white flags were visible, and the news soon spread to all parts of the
command. The troops felt that their long and weary marches, hard
fighting, ceaseless watching by night and day, in a hot climate,
exposure to all sorts of weather, to diseases and, worst of all, to the
gibes of many Northern papers that came to them saying all their
suffering was in vain, that Vicksburg would never be taken, were at last