Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
He even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory he held
south and west of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy farther from his
base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when
the battle should begin. Longstreet had a railroad as far as Loudon;
but from there to Knoxville he had to rely on wagon trains. Burnside's
suggestion, therefore, was a good one, and it was adopted. On the 14th
I telegraphed him:
"Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be
ready to move from there by Tuesday at farthest. If you can hold
Longstreet in check until he gets up, or by skirmishing and falling back
can avoid serious loss to yourself and gain time, I will be able to
force the enemy back from here and place a force between Longstreet and
Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes
by every available road, to get to his supplies. Sherman would have
been here before this but for high water in Elk River driving him some
thirty miles up that river to cross."
And again later in the day, indicating my plans for his relief, as
follows:
"Your dispatch and Dana's just received. Being there, you can tell
better how to resist Longstreet's attack than I can direct. With your
showing you had better give up Kingston at the last moment and save the
most productive part of your possessions. Every arrangement is now made
to throw Sherman's force across the river, just at and below the mouth
of Chickamauga Creek, as soon as it arrives. Thomas will attack on his
left at the same time, and together it is expected to carry Missionary
Ridge, and from there push a force on to the railroad between Cleveland
and Dalton. Hooker will at the same time attack, and, if he can, carry
Lookout Mountain. The enemy now seems to be looking for an attack on
his left flank. This favors us. To further confirm this, Sherman's
advance division will march direct from Whiteside to Trenton. The
remainder of his force will pass over a new road just made from
Whiteside to Kelly's Ferry, thus being concealed from the enemy, and
leave him to suppose the whole force is going up Lookout Valley.
Sherman's advance has only just reached Bridgeport. The rear will only
reach there on the 16th. This will bring it to the 19th as the earliest
day for making the combined movement as desired. Inform me if you think
you can sustain yourself until this time. I can hardly conceive of the
enemy breaking through at Kingston and pushing for Kentucky. If they
should, however, a new problem would be left for solution. Thomas has
ordered a division of cavalry to the vicinity of Sparta. I will
ascertain if they have started, and inform you. It will be entirely out
of the question to send you ten thousand men, not because they cannot be
spared, but how would they be fed after they got even one day east from
here?"
Longstreet, for some reason or other, stopped at Loudon until the 13th.
That being the terminus of his railroad communications, it is probable
he was directed to remain there awaiting orders. He was in a position
threatening Knoxville, and at the same time where he could be brought
back speedily to Chattanooga. The day after Longstreet left Loudon,
Sherman reached Bridgeport in person and proceeded on to see me that
evening, the 14th, and reached Chattanooga the next day.
My orders for battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival
(*15), except the dates, which could not be fixed while troops to be
engaged were so far away. The possession of Lookout Mountain was of no
special advantage to us now. Hooker was instructed to send Howard's
corps to the north side of the Tennessee, thence up behind the hills on
the north side, and to go into camp opposite Chattanooga; with the
remainder of the command, Hooker was, at a time to be afterwards
appointed, to ascend the western slope between the upper and lower
palisades, and so get into Chattanooga valley.
The plan of battle was for Sherman to attack the enemy's right flank,
form a line across it, extend our left over South Chickamauga River so
as to threaten or hold the railroad in Bragg's rear, and thus force him
either to weaken his lines elsewhere or lose his connection with his
base at Chickamauga Station. Hooker was to perform like service on our
right. His problem was to get from Lookout Valley to Chattanooga Valley
in the most expeditious way possible; cross the latter valley rapidly to
Rossville, south of Bragg's line on Missionary Ridge, form line there
across the ridge facing north, with his right flank extended to
Chickamauga Valley east of the ridge, thus threatening the enemy's rear
on that flank and compelling him to reinforce this also. Thomas, with
the Army of the Cumberland, occupied the centre, and was to assault
while the enemy was engaged with most of his forces on his two flanks.
To carry out this plan, Sherman was to cross the Tennessee at Brown's
Ferry and move east of Chattanooga to a point opposite the north end of
Mission Ridge, and to place his command back of the foot-hills out of
sight of the enemy on the ridge. There are two streams called
Chickamauga emptying into the Tennessee River east of Chattanooga--North
Chickamauga, taking its rise in Tennessee, flowing south, and emptying
into the river some seven or eight miles east; while the South
Chickamauga, which takes its rise in Georgia, flows northward, and
empties into the Tennessee some three or four miles above the town.
There were now one hundred and sixteen pontoons in the North Chickamauga
River, their presence there being unknown to the enemy.
At night a division was to be marched up to that point, and at two
o'clock in the morning moved down with the current, thirty men in each
boat. A few were to land east of the mouth of the South Chickamauga,
capture the pickets there, and then lay a bridge connecting the two
banks of the river. The rest were to land on the south side of the
Tennessee, where Missionary Ridge would strike it if prolonged, and a
sufficient number of men to man the boats were to push to the north side
to ferry over the main body of Sherman's command while those left on the
south side intrenched themselves. Thomas was to move out from his lines
facing the ridge, leaving enough of Palmer's corps to guard against an
attack down the valley. Lookout Valley being of no present value to us,
and being untenable by the enemy if we should secure Missionary Ridge,
Hooker's orders were changed. His revised orders brought him to
Chattanooga by the established route north of the Tennessee. He was
then to move out to the right to Rossville.
Hooker's position in Lookout Valley was absolutely essential to us so
long as Chattanooga was besieged. It was the key to our line for
supplying the army. But it was not essential after the enemy was
dispersed from our front, or even after the battle for this purpose was
begun. Hooker's orders, therefore, were designed to get his force past
Lookout Mountain and Chattanooga Valley, and up to Missionary Ridge. By
crossing the north face of Lookout the troops would come into
Chattanooga Valley in rear of the line held by the enemy across the
valley, and would necessarily force its evacuation. Orders were
accordingly given to march by this route. But days before the battle
began the advantages as well as the disadvantages of this plan of action
were all considered. The passage over the mountain was a difficult one
to make in the face of an enemy. It might consume so much time as to
lose us the use of the troops engaged in it at other points where they
were more wanted. After reaching Chattanooga Valley, the creek of the
same name, quite a formidable stream to get an army over, had to be
crossed. I was perfectly willing that the enemy should keep Lookout
Mountain until we got through with the troops on Missionary Ridge. By
marching Hooker to the north side of the river, thence up the stream,
and recrossing at the town, he could be got in position at any named
time; when in this new position, he would have Chattanooga Creek behind
him, and the attack on Missionary Ridge would unquestionably cause the
evacuation by the enemy of his line across the valley and on Lookout
Mountain. Hooker's order was changed accordingly. As explained
elsewhere, the original order had to be reverted to, because of a flood
in the river rendering the bridge at Brown's Ferry unsafe for the
passage of troops at the exact juncture when it was wanted to bring all
the troops together against Missionary Ridge.
The next day after Sherman's arrival I took him, with Generals Thomas
and Smith and other officers, to the north side of the river, and showed
them the ground over which Sherman had to march, and pointed out
generally what he was expected to do. I, as well as the authorities in
Washington, was still in a great state of anxiety for Burnside's safety.
Burnside himself, I believe, was the only one who did not share in this
anxiety. Nothing could be done for him, however, until Sherman's troops
were up. As soon, therefore, as the inspection was over, Sherman
started for Bridgeport to hasten matters, rowing a boat himself, I
believe, from Kelly's Ferry. Sherman had left Bridgeport the night
of the 14th, reached Chattanooga the evening of the 15th, made the
above-described inspection on the morning of the 16th, and started back
the same evening to hurry up his command, fully appreciating the
importance of time.
His march was conducted with as much expedition as the roads and season
would admit of. By the 20th he was himself at Brown's Ferry with the
head of column, but many of his troops were far behind, and one division
(Ewing's) was at Trenton, sent that way to create the impression that
Lookout was to be taken from the south. Sherman received his orders at
the ferry, and was asked if he could not be ready for the assault the
following morning. News had been received that the battle had been
commenced at Knoxville. Burnside had been cut off from telegraphic
communications. The President, the Secretary of War, and General
Halleck, were in an agony of suspense. My suspense was also great, but
more endurable, because I was where I could soon do something to relieve
the situation. It was impossible to get Sherman's troops up for the
next day. I then asked him if they could not be got up to make the
assault on the morning of the 22d, and ordered Thomas to move on that
date. But the elements were against us. It rained all the 20th and
21st. The river rose so rapidly that it was difficult to keep the
pontoons in place.
General Orlando B. Willcox, a division commander under Burnside, was at
this time occupying a position farther up the valley than Knoxville
--about Maynardville--and was still in telegraphic communication with the
North. A dispatch was received from him saying that he was threatened
from the east. The following was sent in reply:
"If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our
attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If successful, such a
move will be made as I think will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold
out. Longstreet passing through our lines to Kentucky need not cause
alarm. He would find the country so bare that he would lose his
transportation and artillery before reaching Kentucky, and would meet
such a force before he got through, that he could not return."
Meantime, Sherman continued his crossing without intermission as fast as
his troops could be got up. The crossing had to be effected in full
view of the enemy on the top of Lookout Mountain. Once over, however,
the troops soon disappeared behind the detached hill on the north side,
and would not come to view again, either to watchmen on Lookout Mountain