Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
rebel line was terrific. Cannon and musket balls filled the air: but
the damage done was in small proportion to the ammunition expended. The
pursuit continued until the crest was reached, and soon our men were
seen climbing over the Confederate barriers at different points in front
of both Sheridan's and Wood's divisions. The retreat of the enemy along
most of his line was precipitate and the panic so great that Bragg and
his officers lost all control over their men. Many were captured, and
thousands threw away their arms in their flight.
Sheridan pushed forward until he reached the Chickamauga River at a
point above where the enemy crossed. He met some resistance from troops
occupying a second hill in rear of Missionary Ridge, probably to cover
the retreat of the main body and of the artillery and trains. It was
now getting dark, but Sheridan, without halting on that account pushed
his men forward up this second hill slowly and without attracting the
attention of the men placed to defend it, while he detached to the right
and left to surround the position. The enemy discovered the movement
before these dispositions were complete, and beat a hasty retreat,
leaving artillery, wagon trains, and many prisoners in our hands. To
Sheridan's prompt movement the Army of the Cumberland, and the nation,
are indebted for the bulk of the capture of prisoners, artillery, and
small-arms that day. Except for his prompt pursuit, so much in this way
would not have been accomplished.
While the advance up Mission Ridge was going forward, General Thomas
with staff, General Gordon Granger, commander of the corps making the
assault, and myself and staff occupied Orchard Knob, from which the
entire field could be observed. The moment the troops were seen going
over the last line of rebel defences, I ordered Granger to join his
command, and mounting my horse I rode to the front. General Thomas left
about the same time. Sheridan on the extreme right was already in
pursuit of the enemy east of the ridge. Wood, who commanded the
division to the left of Sheridan, accompanied his men on horseback in
the charge, but did not join Sheridan in the pursuit. To the left, in
Baird's front where Bragg's troops had massed against Sherman, the
resistance was more stubborn and the contest lasted longer. I ordered
Granger to follow the enemy with Wood's division, but he was so much
excited, and kept up such a roar of musketry in the direction the enemy
had taken, that by the time I could stop the firing the enemy had got
well out of the way. The enemy confronting Sherman, now seeing
everything to their left giving way, fled also. Sherman, however, was
not aware of the extent of our success until after nightfall, when he
received orders to pursue at daylight in the morning.
As soon as Sherman discovered that the enemy had left his front he
directed his reserves, Davis's division of the Army of the Cumberland,
to push over the pontoon-bridge at the mouth of the Chickamauga, and to
move forward to Chickamauga Station. He ordered Howard to move up the
stream some two miles to where there was an old bridge, repair it during
the night, and follow Davis at four o'clock in the morning. Morgan L.
Smith was ordered to reconnoitre the tunnel to see if that was still
held. Nothing was found there but dead bodies of men of both armies.
The rest of Sherman's command was directed to follow Howard at daylight
in the morning to get on to the railroad towards Graysville.
Hooker, as stated, was detained at Chattanooga Creek by the destruction
of the bridge at that point. He got his troops over, with the exception
of the artillery, by fording the stream at a little after three o'clock.
Leaving his artillery to follow when the bridge should be reconstructed,
he pushed on with the remainder of his command. At Rossville he came
upon the flank of a division of the enemy, which soon commenced a
retreat along the ridge. This threw them on Palmer. They could make
but little resistance in the position they were caught in, and as many
of them as could do so escaped. Many, however, were captured. Hooker's
position during the night of the 25th was near Rossville, extending east
of the ridge. Palmer was on his left, on the road to Graysville.
During the night I telegraphed to Willcox that Bragg had been defeated,
and that immediate relief would be sent to Burnside if he could hold
out; to Halleck I sent an announcement of our victory, and informed him
that forces would be sent up the valley to relieve Burnside.
Before the battle of Chattanooga opened I had taken measures for the
relief of Burnside the moment the way should be clear. Thomas was
directed to have the little steamer that had been built at Chattanooga
loaded to its capacity with rations and ammunition. Granger's corps was
to move by the south bank of the Tennessee River to the mouth of the
Holston, and up that to Knoxville accompanied by the boat. In addition
to the supplies transported by boat, the men were to carry forty rounds
of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and four days' rations in
haversacks.
In the battle of Chattanooga, troops from the Army of the Potomac, from
the Army of the Tennessee, and from the Army of the Cumberland
participated. In fact, the accidents growing out of the heavy rains and
the sudden rise in the Tennessee River so mingled the troops that the
organizations were not kept together, under their respective commanders,
during the battle. Hooker, on the right, had Geary's division of the
12th corps, Army of the Potomac; Osterhaus's division of the 15th corps,
Army of the Tennessee; and Cruft's division of the Army of the
Cumberland. Sherman had three divisions of his own army, Howard's corps
from the Army of the Potomac, and Jefferson C. Davis's division of the
Army of the Cumberland. There was no jealousy--hardly rivalry. Indeed,
I doubt whether officers or men took any note at the time of the fact of
this intermingling of commands. All saw a defiant foe surrounding them,
and took it for granted that every move was intended to dislodge him,
and it made no difference where the troops came from so that the end was
accomplished.
The victory at Chattanooga was won against great odds, considering the
advantage the enemy had of position, and was accomplished more easily
than was expected by reason of Bragg's making several grave mistakes:
first, in sending away his ablest corps commander with over twenty
thousand troops; second, in sending away a division of troops on the eve
of battle; third, in placing so much of a force on the plain in front of
his impregnable position.
It was known that Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Bragg on Missionary
Ridge a short time before my reaching Chattanooga. It was reported and
believed that he had come out to reconcile a serious difference between
Bragg and Longstreet, and finding this difficult to do, planned the
campaign against Knoxville, to be conducted by the latter general. I
had known both Bragg and Longstreet before the war, the latter very
well. We had been three years at West Point together, and, after my
graduation, for a time in the same regiment. Then we served together in
the Mexican War. I had known Bragg in Mexico, and met him occasionally
subsequently. I could well understand how there might be an
irreconcilable difference between them.
Bragg was a remarkably intelligent and well-informed man, professionally
and otherwise. He was also thoroughly upright. But he was possessed of
an irascible temper, and was naturally disputatious. A man of the
highest moral character and the most correct habits, yet in the old army
he was in frequent trouble. As a subordinate he was always on the
lookout to catch his commanding officer infringing his prerogatives; as
a post commander he was equally vigilant to detect the slightest
neglect, even of the most trivial order.
I have heard in the old army an anecdote very characteristic of Bragg.
On one occasion, when stationed at a post of several companies commanded
by a field officer, he was himself commanding one of the companies and
at the same time acting as post quartermaster and commissary. He was
first lieutenant at the time, but his captain was detached on other
duty. As commander of the company he made a requisition upon the
quartermaster--himself--for something he wanted. As quartermaster he
declined to fill the requisition, and endorsed on the back of it his
reasons for so doing. As company commander he responded to this, urging
that his requisition called for nothing but what he was entitled to, and
that it was the duty of the quartermaster to fill it. As quartermaster
he still persisted that he was right. In this condition of affairs
Bragg referred the whole matter to the commanding officer of the post.
The latter, when he saw the nature of the matter referred, exclaimed:
"My God, Mr. Bragg, you have quarrelled with every officer in the army,
and now you are quarrelling with yourself!"
Longstreet was an entirely different man. He was brave, honest,
intelligent, a very capable soldier, subordinate to his superiors, just
and kind to his subordinates, but jealous of his own rights, which he
had the courage to maintain. He was never on the lookout to detect a
slight, but saw one as soon as anybody when intentionally given.
It may be that Longstreet was not sent to Knoxville for the reason
stated, but because Mr. Davis had an exalted opinion of his own military
genius, and thought he saw a chance of "killing two birds with one
stone." On several occasions during the war he came to the relief of
the Union army by means of his SUPERIOR MILITARY GENIUS.
I speak advisedly when I saw Mr. Davis prided himself on his military
capacity. He says so himself, virtually, in his answer to the notice of
his nomination to the Confederate presidency. Some of his generals have
said so in their writings since the downfall of the Confederacy.
My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga
were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did;
Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep
across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near
Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the
Cumberland was to assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived,
however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to
Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the
river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown's
Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing
troops upon it. For this reason Hooker's orders were changed by
telegraph back to what they were originally.------
NOTE.--From this point on this volume was written (with the exception of
the campaign in the Wilderness, which had been previously written) by
General Grant, after his great illness in April, and the present
arrangement of the subject-matter was made by him between the 10th and
18th of July, 1885.
CHAPTER XLV.
THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE--HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO NASHVILLE--VISITING
KNOXVILLE-CIPHER DISPATCHES--WITHHOLDING ORDERS.
Chattanooga now being secure to the National troops beyond any doubt, I
immediately turned my attention to relieving Knoxville, about the
situation of which the President, in particular, was very anxious.
Prior to the battles, I had made preparations for sending troops to the
relief of Burnside at the very earliest moment after securing
Chattanooga. We had there two little steamers which had been built and
fitted up from the remains of old boats and put in condition to run.
General Thomas was directed to have one of these boats loaded with