Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition
further than what he carried with him.
But the move had to be made, and I relied upon Lee's not seeing my
danger as I saw it. Besides we had armies on both sides of the James
River and not far from the Confederate capital. I knew that its safety
would be a matter of the first consideration with the executive,
legislative and judicial branches of the so-called Confederate
government, if it was not with the military commanders. But I took all
the precaution I knew of to guard against all dangers.
Sheridan was sent with two divisions, to communicate with Hunter and to
break up the Virginia Central Railroad and the James River Canal, on the
7th of June, taking instructions to Hunter to come back with him (*35).
Hunter was also informed by way of Washington and the Valley that
Sheridan was on the way to meet him. The canal and Central Road, and
the regions penetrated by them, were of vast importance to the enemy,
furnishing and carrying a large per cent. of all the supplies for the
Army of Northern Virginia and the people of Richmond. Before Sheridan
got off on the 7th news was received from Hunter reporting his advance
to Staunton and successful engagement with the enemy near that place on
the 5th, in which the Confederate commander, W. S. Jones, was killed.
On the 4th of June the enemy having withdrawn his left corps, Burnside
on our right was moved up between Warren and Smith. On the 5th Birney
returned to Hancock, which extended his left now to the Chickahominy,
and Warren was withdrawn to Cold Harbor. Wright was directed to send
two divisions to the left to extend down the banks of that stream to
Bottom's Bridge. The cavalry extended still farther east to Jones's
Bridge.
On the 7th Abercrombie--who was in command at White House, and who had
been in command at our base of supplies in all the changes made from the
start--was ordered to take up the iron from the York River Railroad and
put it on boats, and to be in readiness to move by water to City Point.
On the 8th Meade was directed to fortify a line down the bank
overlooking the Chickahominy, under cover of which the army could move.
On the 9th Abercrombie was directed to send all organized troops
arriving at White House, without debarking from their transports, to
report to Butler. Halleck was at this time instructed to send all
reinforcements to City Point.
On the 11th I wrote:
COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11, 1864.
MAJOR-GEN. B. F. BUTLER, Commanding Department of Va. and N. C.
The movement to transfer this army to the south side of the James River
will commence after dark to-morrow night. Col. Comstock, of my staff,
was sent specially to ascertain what was necessary to make your position
secure in the interval during which the enemy might use most of his
force against you, and also, to ascertain what point on the river we
should reach to effect a crossing if it should not be practicable to
reach this side of the river at Bermuda Hundred. Colonel Comstock has
not yet returned, so that I cannot make instructions as definite as I
would wish, but the time between this and Sunday night being so short in
which to get word to you, I must do the best I can. Colonel Dent goes
to the Chickahominy to take to you the 18th corps. The corps will leave
its position in the trenches as early in the evening, tomorrow, as
possible, and make a forced march to Cole's Landing or Ferry, where it
should reach by ten A.M. the following morning. This corps numbers now
15,300 men. They take with them neither wagons nor artillery; these
latter marching with the balance of the army to the James River. The
remainder of the army will cross the Chickahominy at Long Bridge and at
Jones's, and strike the river at the most practicable crossing below
City Point.
I directed several days ago that all reinforcements for the army should
be sent to you. I am not advised of the number that may have gone, but
suppose you have received from six to ten thousand. General Smith will
also reach you as soon as the enemy could, going by the way of Richmond.
The balance of the force will not be more than one day behind, unless
detained by the whole of Lee's army, in which case you will be strong
enough.
I wish you would direct the proper staff officers, your chief-engineer
and your chief-quartermaster, to commence at once the collection of all
the means in their reach for crossing the army on its arrival. If there
is a point below City Point where a pontoon bridge can be thrown, have
it laid.
Expecting the arrival of the 18th corps by Monday night, if you deem it
practicable from the force you have to seize and hold Petersburg, you
may prepare to start, on the arrival of troops to hold your present
lines. I do not want Petersburg visited, however, unless it is held,
nor an attempt to take it, unless you feel a reasonable degree of
confidence of success. If you should go there, I think troops should
take nothing with them except what they can carry, depending upon
supplies being sent after the place is secured. If Colonel Dent should
not succeed in securing the requisite amount of transportation for the
18th corps before reaching you, please have the balance supplied.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
P. S.--On reflection I will send the 18th corps by way of White House.
The distance which they will have to march will be enough shorter to
enable them to reach you about the same time, and the uncertainty of
navigation on the Chickahominy will be avoided.
U. S. GRANT.
COLD HARBOR, VA., June 11,1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL G. G. MEADE, Commanding Army of the Potomac.
Colonel Comstock, who visited the James River for the purpose of
ascertaining the best point below Bermuda Hundred to which to march the
army has not yet returned. It is now getting so late, however, that all
preparations may be made for the move to-morrow night without waiting
longer.
The movement will be made as heretofore agreed upon, that is, the 18th
corps make a rapid march with the infantry alone, their wagons and
artillery accompanying the balance of the army to Cole's Landing or
Ferry, and there embark for City Point, losing no time for rest until
they reach the latter point.
The 5th corps will seize Long Bridge and move out on the Long Bridge
Road to its junction with Quaker Road, or until stopped by the enemy.
The other three corps will follow in such order as you may direct, one
of them crossing at Long Bridge, and two at Jones's Bridge. After the
crossing is effected, the most practicable roads will be taken to reach
about Fort Powhattan. Of course, this is supposing the enemy makes no
opposition to our advance. The 5th corps, after securing the passage of
the balance of the army, will join or follow in rear of the corps which
crosses the same bridge with themselves. The wagon trains should be
kept well east of the troops, and if a crossing can be found, or made
lower down than Jones's they should take it.
U. S. GRANT, Lieut.-General.
P. S.--In view of the long march to reach Cole's Landing, and the
uncertainty of being able to embark a large number of men there, the
direction of the 18th corps may be changed to White House. They should
be directed to load up transports, and start them as fast as loaded
without waiting for the whole corps or even whole divisions to go
together.
U. S. GRANT.
About this time word was received (through the Richmond papers of the
11th) that Crook and Averell had united and were moving east. This,
with the news of Hunter's successful engagement near Staunton, was no
doubt known to Lee before it was to me. Then Sheridan leaving with two
divisions of cavalry, looked indeed threatening, both to Lee's
communications and supplies. Much of his cavalry was sent after
Sheridan, and Early with Ewell's entire corps was sent to the Valley.
Supplies were growing scarce in Richmond, and the sources from which to
draw them were in our hands. People from outside began to pour into
Richmond to help eat up the little on hand. Consternation reigned
there.
On the 12th Smith was ordered to move at night to White House, not to
stop until he reached there, and to take boats at once for City Point,
leaving his trains and artillery to move by land.
Soon after dark some of the cavalry at Long Bridge effected a crossing
by wading and floundering through the water and mud, leaving their
horses behind, and drove away the cavalry pickets. A pontoon bridge was
speedily thrown across, over which the remainder of the army soon passed
and pushed out for a mile or two to watch and detain any advance that
might be made from the other side. Warren followed the cavalry, and by
the morning of the 13th had his whole corps over. Hancock followed
Warren. Burnside took the road to Jones's Bridge, followed by Wright.
Ferrero's division, with the wagon train, moved farther east, by Window
Shades and Cole's Ferry, our rear being covered by cavalry.
It was known that the enemy had some gunboats at Richmond. These might
run down at night and inflict great damage upon us before they could be
sunk or captured by our navy. General Butler had, in advance, loaded
some vessels with stone ready to be sunk so as to obstruct the channel
in an emergency. On the 13th I sent orders to have these sunk as high
up the river as we could guard them, and prevent their removal by the
enemy.
As soon as Warren's corps was over the Chickahominy it marched out and
joined the cavalry in holding the roads from Richmond while the army
passed. No attempt was made by the enemy to impede our march, however,
but Warren and Wilson reported the enemy strongly fortified in their
front. By the evening of the 13th Hancock's corps was at Charles City
Court House on the James River. Burnside's and Wright's corps were on
the Chickahominy, and crossed during the night, Warren's corps and the
cavalry still covering the army. The material for a pontoon bridge was
already at hand and the work of laying it was commenced immediately,
under the superintendence of Brigadier-General Benham, commanding the
engineer brigade. On the evening of the 14th the crossing commenced,
Hancock in advance, using both the bridge and boats.
When the Wilderness campaign commenced the Army of the Potomac,
including Burnside's--which was a separate command until the 24th of May
when it was incorporated with the main army--numbered about 116,000 men.
During the progress of the campaign about 40,000 reinforcements were
received. At the crossing of the James River June 14th-15th the army
numbered about 115,000. Besides the ordinary losses incident to a
campaign of six weeks' nearly constant fighting or skirmishing, about
one-half of the artillery was sent back to Washington, and many men were
discharged by reason of the expiration of their term of service.* In
estimating our strength every enlisted man and every commissioned
officer present is included, no matter how employed; in bands, sick in
field hospitals, hospital attendants, company cooks and all. Operating
in an enemy's country, and being supplied always from a distant base,
large detachments had at all times to be sent from the front, not only
to guard the base of supplies and the roads to it, but all the roads
leading to our flanks and rear. We were also operating in a country
unknown to us, and without competent guides or maps showing the roads
accurately.
The manner of estimating numbers in the two armies differs materially.
In the Confederate army often only bayonets are taken into account,
never, I believe, do they estimate more than are handling the guns of
the artillery and armed with muskets (*36) or carbines. Generally the