Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, Complete
killing and wounding a good many men. After the battle he formed a
junction at Staunton with Averell and Crook, who had come up from the
Kanawha, or Gauley River. It was supposed, therefore, that General
Hunter would be about Charlottesville, Virginia, by the time Sheridan
could get there, doing on the way the damage that he was sent to do.
I gave Sheridan instructions to have Hunter, in case he should meet him
about Charlottesville, join and return with him to the Army of the
Potomac. Lee, hearing of Hunter's success in the valley, started
Breckinridge out for its defence at once. Learning later of Sheridan's
going with two divisions, he also sent Hampton with two divisions of
cavalry, his own and Fitz-Hugh Lee's.
Sheridan moved to the north side of the North Anna to get out west, and
learned of the movement of these troops to the south side of the same
stream almost as soon as they had started. He pushed on to get to
Trevilian Station to commence his destruction at that point. On the
night of the 10th he bivouacked some six or seven miles east of
Trevilian, while Fitz-Hugh Lee was the same night at Trevilian Station
and Hampton but a few miles away.
During the night Hampton ordered an advance on Sheridan, hoping, no
doubt, to surprise and very badly cripple him. Sheridan, however, by a
counter move sent Custer on a rapid march to get between the two
divisions of the enemy and into their rear. This he did successfully, so
that at daylight, when the assault was made, the enemy found himself at
the same time resisted in front and attacked in rear, and broke in some
confusion. The losses were probably very light on both sides in killed
and wounded, but Sheridan got away with some five hundred prisoners and
sent them to City Point.
During that day, the 11th, Sheridan moved into Trevilian Station, and
the following day proceeded to tear up the road east and west. There
was considerable fighting during the whole of the day, but the work of
destruction went on. In the meantime, at night, the enemy had taken
possession of the crossing which Sheridan had proposed to take to go
north when he left Trevilian. Sheridan learned, however, from some of
the prisoners he had captured here, that General Hunter was about
Lynchburg, and therefore that there was no use of his going on to
Charlottesville with a view to meet him.
Sheridan started back during the night of the 12th, and made his way
north and farther east, coming around by the north side of White House,
and arriving there on the 21st. Here he found an abundance of forage
for his animals, food for his men, and security while resting. He had
been obliged to leave about ninety of his own men in the field-hospital
which he had established near Trevilian, and these necessarily fell into
the hands of the enemy.
White House up to this time had been a depot; but now that our troops
were all on the James River, it was no longer wanted as a store of
supplies. Sheridan was, therefore, directed to break it up; which he
did on the 22d of June, bringing the garrison and an immense wagon train
with him. All these were over the James River by the 26th of the month,
and Sheridan ready to follow.
In the meantime Meade had sent Wilson's division on a raid to destroy
the Weldon and South Side roads. Now that Sheridan was safe and Hampton
free to return to Richmond with his cavalry, Wilson's position became
precarious. Meade therefore, on the 27th, ordered Sheridan over the
river to make a demonstration in favor of Wilson. Wilson got back,
though not without severe loss, having struck both roads, but the damage
done was soon repaired.
After these events comparative quiet reigned about Petersburg until late
in July. The time, however, was spent in strengthening the
intrenchments and making our position generally more secure against a
sudden attack. In the meantime I had to look after other portions of my
command, where things had not been going on so favorably, always, as I
could have wished.
General Hunter who had been appointed to succeed Sigel in the Shenandoah
Valley immediately took up the offensive. He met the enemy on the 5th
of June at Piedmont, and defeated him. On the 8th he formed a junction
with Crook and Averell at Staunton, from which place he moved direct on
Lynchburg, via Lexington, which he reached and invested on the 16th. Up
to this time he was very successful; and but for the difficulty of
taking with him sufficient ordnance stores over so long a march, through
a hostile country, he would, no doubt, have captured Lynchburg. The
destruction of the enemy's supplies and manufactories had been very
great. To meet this movement under General Hunter, General Lee sent
Early with his corps, a part of which reached Lynchburg before Hunter.
After some skirmishing on the 17th and 18th, General Hunter, owing to a
want of ammunition to give battle, retired from before the place.
Unfortunately, this want of ammunition left him no choice of route for
his return but by the way of the Gauley and Kanawha rivers, thence up
the Ohio River, returning to Harper's Ferry by way of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad. A long time was consumed in making this movement.
Meantime the valley was left open to Early's troops, and others in that
quarter; and Washington also was uncovered. Early took advantage of this
condition of affairs and moved on Washington.
In the absence of Hunter, General Lew Wallace, with headquarters at
Baltimore, commanded the department in which the Shenandoah lay. His
surplus of troops with which to move against the enemy was small in
number. Most of these were raw and, consequently, very much inferior to
our veterans and to the veterans which Early had with him; but the
situation of Washington was precarious, and Wallace moved with
commendable promptitude to meet the enemy at the Monocacy. He could
hardly have expected to defeat him badly, but he hoped to cripple and
delay him until Washington could be put into a state of preparation for
his reception. I had previously ordered General Meade to send a
division to Baltimore for the purpose of adding to the defences of
Washington, and he had sent Ricketts's division of the 6th corps
(Wright's), which arrived in Baltimore on the 8th of July. Finding that
Wallace had gone to the front with his command, Ricketts immediately
took the cars and followed him to the Monocacy with his entire division.
They met the enemy and, as might have been expected, were defeated; but
they succeeded in stopping him for the day on which the battle took
place. The next morning Early started on his march to the capital of
the Nation, arriving before it on the 11th.
Learning of the gravity of the situation I had directed General Meade to
also order Wright with the rest of his corps directly to Washington for
the relief of that place, and the latter reached there the very day that
Early arrived before it. The 19th corps, which had been stationed in
Louisiana, having been ordered up to reinforce the armies about
Richmond, had about this time arrived at Fortress Monroe, on their way
to join us. I diverted them from that point to Washington, which place
they reached, almost simultaneously with Wright, on the 11th. The 19th
corps was commanded by Major-General Emory.
Early made his reconnoissance with a view of attacking on the following
morning, the 12th; but the next morning he found our intrenchments,
which were very strong, fully manned. He at once commenced to retreat,
Wright following. There is no telling how much this result was
contributed to by General Lew Wallace's leading what might well be
considered almost a forlorn hope. If Early had been but one day earlier
he might have entered the capital before the arrival of the
reinforcements I had sent. Whether the delay caused by the battle
amounted to a day or not, General Wallace contributed on this occasion,
by the defeat of the troops under him a greater benefit to the cause
than often falls to the lot of a commander of an equal force to render
by means of a victory.
Farther west also the troubles were threatening. Some time before,
Forrest had met Sturgis in command of some of our cavalry in Mississippi
and handled him very roughly, gaining a very great victory over him.
This left Forrest free to go almost where he pleased, and to cut the
roads in rear of Sherman who was then advancing. Sherman was abundantly
able to look after the army that he was immediately with, and all of his
military division so long as he could communicate with it; but it was my
place to see that he had the means with which to hold his rear. Two
divisions under A. J. Smith had been sent to Banks in Louisiana some
months before. Sherman ordered these back, with directions to attack
Forrest. Smith met and defeated him very badly. I then directed that
Smith should hang to Forrest and not let him go; and to prevent by all
means his getting upon the Memphis and Nashville Railroad. Sherman had
anticipated me in this matter, and given the same orders in substance;
but receiving my directions for this order to Smith, he repeated it.
On the 25th of June General Burnside had commenced running a mine from
about the centre of his front under the Confederate works confronting
him. He was induced to do this by Colonel Pleasants, of the
Pennsylvania Volunteers, whose regiment was mostly composed of miners,
and who was himself a practical miner. Burnside had submitted the
scheme to Meade and myself, and we both approved of it, as a means of
keeping the men occupied. His position was very favorable for carrying
on this work, but not so favorable for the operations to follow its
completion. The position of the two lines at that point were only about
a hundred yards apart with a comparatively deep ravine intervening. In
the bottom of this ravine the work commenced. The position was
unfavorable in this particular: that the enemy's line at that point was
re-entering, so that its front was commanded by their own lines both to
the right and left. Then, too, the ground was sloping upward back of
the Confederate line for a considerable distance, and it was presumable
that the enemy had, at least, a detached work on this highest point.
The work progressed, and on the 23d of July the mine was finished ready
for charging; but I had this work of charging deferred until we were
ready for it.
On the 17th of July several deserters came in and said that there was
great consternation in Richmond, and that Lee was coming out to make an
attack upon us the object being to put us on the defensive so that he
might detach troops to go to Georgia where the army Sherman was
operating against was said to be in great trouble. I put the army
commanders, Meade and Butler, on the lookout, but the attack was not
made.
I concluded, then, a few days later, to do something in the way of
offensive movement myself, having in view something of the same object
that Lee had had. Wright's and Emory's corps were in Washington, and
with this reduction of my force Lee might very readily have spared some
troops from the defences to send West. I had other objects in view,
however, besides keeping Lee where he was. The mine was constructed and
ready to be exploded, and I wanted to take that occasion to carry
Petersburg if I could. It was the object, therefore, to get as many of
Lee's troops away from the south side of the James River as possible.
Accordingly, on the 26th, we commenced a movement with Hancock's corps
and Sheridan's cavalry to the north side by the way of Deep Bottom,
where Butler had a pontoon bridge laid. The plan, in the main, was to
let the cavalry cut loose and, joining with Kautz's cavalry of the Army
of the James, get by Lee's lines and destroy as much as they could of